its own nature. For this peculiarity of the mind it is difficult to find an appropriate name; it is generally, and perhaps most correctly, denoted by the term consciousness. If, however, by the term faculty, we are to understand some act or operation of the mind, it is, perhaps, not quite philosophical to denominate consciousness a faculty, because, in being merely conscious, there is no particular exertion of the mind: thus, when a man wills or remembers, he is conscious that he does so; but, in this case, it is obvious that the operation of the mind consists in willing or remembering, and his being conscious of either of these operations, implies nothing more than that he has a knowledge of the state of his mind or of the exertion which it is making at the time. Consciousness, then, in the common acceptation of the word, means that knowledge, which a man has of the various states or operations of his own mind, and on this consciousness, in conjunction with reflection and attention, all our knowledge of the mind must rest; for should we be asked, how we know that we feel, perceive, remember, &c., what could we say, or what should we say, but that we are conscious of it? To do more would only be to expose our folly, by attempting an explanation of what is, in its nature, inexplicable. K From these observations it must appear, that by the mind of a man is to be understood that in him which thinks, wills, remembers, &c. and which is, in its nature, totally distinct from every species of matter. An examination of this nobler part of our nature is interesting in itself, and will be found the best source from which to draw the principles of reasoning; but previously to an analysis of what are generally termed the intellectual powers, it will prove highly useful briefly to consider those inlets of a great part of our knowledge, the senses; and also the nature of those stimulators to action, or, more properly, states of mind, denominated the passions. OF THE SENSES. It is necessary to our comfortable existence, that we should be acquainted with the objects around us; and, for this purpose, the Author of our being has furnished us with what we term the senses. These are five in number; and, in the few observations that are to be made on them, will be noticed in the following order; smelling, tasting, hearing, touching, and seeing. This division is not founded on the diversity of notions, or sensations received by the senses, but on the number of the organs. The organs of smelling are the nostrils; the organ of tasting is the palate; the organs of hearing are the ears; and those of seeing, the eyes; but the sense of touching is not confined to any particular part of the body; with the exception of the hair and nails, it may be considered as extending over the whole. It is, as already mentioned, through the medium of the senses, that all our knowledge of the material world is obtained; but, though the organ of sense is in some way affected by external objects, yet the pleasure or pain accompanying the acquisition of our knowledge, is not in the organ of sense, but in the mind. The impressions made on the senses by external objects, are the cause of our sensations and perceptions; but the powers of feeling and of perceiving are wholly intellectual. That these impressions are conveyed by the senses to the mind, will readily be admitted by every one who consults his own experience; but in what manner the communication is carried on has never yet been, and probably never will be, discovered. Various accounts of so remarkable a phenomenon have indeed been given, but all of them hypothetical, and therefore all nearly alike unworthy of regard. True philosophy, instead of making men proud that they know so much, will only make them humble that 66 they know so little. We know that the body affects the mind, and the mind the body; but the cause is, in both cases, unknown. A few facts constitute the sum of our knowledge, and are ever found to be the most useful part of it. Conjectures and theories," says Dr. Reid," are the creatures of men, and will always be found very unlike the creatures of God. If we would know the works of God, we must consult them with attention and humility, without daring to add any thing of ours to what they declare." "Wonderful indeed are all his works, Pleasant to know, and worthiest to be all That brought them forth, but hid their causes deep?" Of Smelling. Of all the senses, that of smell seems to be the most simple, and it furnishes the mind with the fewest ideas. Some other animals enjoy this sense in greater excellence than man, and to them it is more useful. It enables them to find their prey, or to discover what is proper for their food. To man it is more pleasing than advantageous, and may be regarded as a proof of the bounty of Providence in affording him a double gratification, for in most of his viands particularly those of a vegetable kind, whilst his palate is regaled by their flavour, his nostrils are delighted by their fragrance. In many instances the utility of things would be equal to what they are now, though incapable of affording pleasure to the sense of smell. The bean would be equally useful as an article of food, and its blossom, as well as the rose, the carnation, and the jasmine, would be equally pleasing to the eye, though all were divested of their odour. Of the first, which is too common to be generally noticed, Thomson speaks with his usual discrimination in the following lines: "Long let us walk, Where the breeze blows from yon extended field Of blossomed beans, Arabia cannot boast A fuller gale of joy, than liberal, thence Breathes through the sense, and takes the ravished soul." Smell, like most of the terms expressive of sensation, has a double meaning. It is sometimes used to denote the power, that odoriferous bodies possess of producing an effect on the olfactory nerves, and sometimes to denote the effect produced. Want of attention to this distinction, has occasioned much unnecessary discussion among philosophers, and led |