against him. They urged that, cut off from their supplies, they could scarcely hope to maintain themselves against a superior force in a most unfriendly country, and a most inclement season. Stanhope could insist no longer; and it was determined to fall back to the borders of Aragon, and there take up winter quarters.

As the first step in this design, the Allied chiefs moved their encampment from Ciempozuelos to Chinchon on the other side of the Henares, while Stanhope rode off with some cavalry to bring back the troops from Toledo. Having arrived with these at Chinchon, the retreat of the whole army commenced. But so scanty were the supplies, and so hostile the inhabitants, that the soldiers could only hope to subsist by marching in separate bodies and sweeping over a wide extent of country. Staremberg led the Germans and Dutch in the centre; Atalaya the Catalans and Portuguese on the right; and Stanhope the English on the left, which, as nearest to the enemy, was the post of principal danger.

Vendome also was in motion. Accompanied by Philip he had led his army in the first place from the bridge of Almaraz to Talavera. There they met the deputies from Madrid, announcing that the city was freed from the invaders and impatient for His Majesty's return. The King and Duke accordingly pressed onward, and finding no enemy before them entered the city amidst loud acclamations on the 3rd of December-the same day on which the Allies were commencing their retreat from Chinchon.

But though the Allies marched fast, Vendome marched faster still. In his former campaigns he had often been accused of sloth and sluggishness. His late hours of rising-on some days indeed he would not rise at all his gluttonous indulgence at meals, and

his gross addiction to the worst of vices, had cost his countrymen some severe disasters. Now on the contrary, roused by the occasion, and eager to vindicate his fame, he showed almost incredible diligence. While the infantry straight from Talavera marched over the Henares by the Guadalaxara bridge, Vendome, still in company with Philip, coming from Madrid to another point on that river then in flood, plunged in and swam across at the head of the cavalry. From the opposite bank they still pressed forward with the light troops, horse and foot, leaving the rest to follow; and thus they overtook the left wing of the Allies.

That left wing under Stanhope consisted of eight battalions and as many squadrons; all of them English except only one battalion of Portuguese, and even that commanded by English officers. Thinned as were both battalions and squadrons by this toilsome campaign, the total numbers did not exceed 5,500 men. It had been agreed with Staremberg that he and Stanhope should proceed in parallel lines. Stanhope was to march in four days from Chinchon to Brihuega, and there halt to give his troops some rest and to bake for them some bread, while Staremberg did the like at Cifuentes, the two places being about five hours' march from each other. Brihuega is a town of great antiquity; the Roman Centobriga, built on the river Tajuna and with high uplands around it on every side but one. For its defence it had only a decaying Moorish wall.2

2 Some account of the affair at Brihuega, as also of Milord Preterbourg (Peterborough), and of El General Estanop (Stanhope), is given in a history of the neighbouring townlet of Orche, called on the titlepage Ilustre y leal Villa and

also strangely enough Señora de su misma. The volume was printed at Madrid in 1748, the author's name Fray Juan Talamanco. It was shown me by my friend Mr. Ford, and is, I believe, extremely

rare.

In pursuance of this plan, Stanhope had entered Brihuega late at night on the 6th of December. Next day he employed himself in collecting corn and in baking loaves. So adverse to him was the disposition in all Castille that neither at Brihuega nor through his four days' march did he receive the slightest intimation of the enemy's advance. It was therefore with surprise that, on the morning of the 8th, he observed some of their horse on the brow of the neighbouring hills. His surprise increased when, early in the afternoon, there appeared some infantry also. "Till that time" he writes "nobody with me, nor I believe did the Marshal, imagine that they had any foot within some days' march of us. And our misfortune is owing to the incredible diligence which their army made; for having, as we have since learnt, decamped from Talavera on the 1st of December, they arrived before Brihuega the 8th, which is forty-five long leagues." 3

In face of a force so superior to his own, Stanhope could not attempt to march out of Brihuega and seek a junction with Staremberg. He despatched one of his aides-de-camp full speed to apprise the Marshal of his danger, gave a becoming answer to a summons of surrender which was sent him by Vendome, and prepared for a resolute defence until succour should arrive. All that night his men were most actively employed in barricading the gates and making loopholes for musketry in the houses.

Before sunset there had already come up 6,000 of the enemies' cavalry and 3,000 of their foot. Vendome sent the Marquis of Valdecañas with one division to seize the bridge over the Tajuna, which was outside the town;

3 To Lord Dartmouth from Valladolid, January 2, 1711.

and he completed his investment of the latter. Towards midnight he was joined by several more bodies of his troops with twelve pieces of the battering train. These he at once disposed in due order, and at day-break of the 9th of December they began to play. Two breaches were soon made in the old Moorish wall. Through these the Spaniards poured in. But the English had cast up intrenchments behind the breaches, as also barricades across the streets, and they continued to defend themselves with the utmost intrepidity. Several times were the assailants driven back in disarray.

After some hours of sharp conflict a short pause ensued. But at three in the afternoon, Vendome having sent a second summons, which was rejected like the former, gave orders for a general assault. Besides playing field-pieces from the hills, which were so close as to command most of the streets, and besides renewing the onset in the two breaches, he sprung a mine under one of the gates. Some of his men moreover found means to break passages through the wall into houses which adjoined it; and there they established themselves in force before they were perceived. The English however with unabated spirit still fought on. Still on every point they beat back their assailants. How many an anxious look must they meanwhile have cast to the opposite heights, on which they expected every moment to see Staremberg and his army appear! Hour after hour passed and no sign of such succour came. Still worse was the rumour now rife among themselves, that their own ammunition had begun to fail.

Even then the resistance of these stout soldiers did not cease. "Even with bayonets "-so writes Stanhope to Lord Dartmouth-" the enemy were more than once driven out by some of our troops who had spent their

shot; and when no other remedy was left, the town was preserved some time by putting fire to the houses which they had possessed, and where many of them were destroyed. . .; and when things were reduced to the last extremity, that the enemy had a considerable body of men in the town and that in our whole garrison we had not five hundred men who had any ammunition left, I thought myself obliged in conscience to save so many brave men, who had done good service to the Queen, and will I hope live to do so again. So about seven of the clock I beat the chamade, and obtained the capitulation of which I send your Lordship the copy."

In this capitulation the enemy had been willing to grant most honorable terms; and on these terms then did Stanhope and his gallant little army become prisoners of war. Their defence of Brihuega had cost them 600 men in killed and wounded, while that of the Spaniards was acknowledged by themselves as double, and may even have amounted to 1,500, which was Stanhope's computation.

The delay of Staremberg on this occasion is not easy to explain or excuse. The aide-de-camp sent to him by Stanhope in the afternoon of the 8th must have reached him in the course of that night. Had Staremberg next morning set in movement the troops under his own immediate orders, he might have been in sight of Brihuega before noon. It is most probable that he forbore from marching until he could call in his right wing. It is certain at all events that it was only on the forenoon of the 10th that his vanguard appeared. As he heard no sound of firing, and received no answer to his signals, he rightly concluded that Stanhope had already surrendered. Under these circumstances he desired to avoid