What authority then had Louis to promise, or what power to enforce, the resignation of his grandson ?

Already in announcing the withdrawal of the French auxiliaries from Spain Louis had authorised his ambassador at the Court of Madrid to make known to Philip that the exigency of his own affairs might compel him in any treaty of peace to cancel his first recognition and forswear his further aid. It was desired in this manner to prepare his mind for his voluntary retirement from Spain. But the answer of the young Monarch, addressed to Louis himself, was most lofty and uncompromising in its tone. "God" he said "has placed the Crown of Spain on my head; and I will maintain it so long as a drop of blood flows in my veins."4

It did seem to Louis however that so long as Philip had the prospect to continue King, though of a much smaller kingdom, he might be expected to resign. If France made peace he could scarcely hope single-handed to maintain himself against the united efforts of the High Allies. The certainty even of Sicily would be preferable to so slight a chance of Spain. But if no compensation at all were held out to him as the price of his compliance what motive had he to comply? What more could he lose by resisting and wherefore not resist?

On these grounds it was earnestly impressed by Torcy upon the other negotiators, that since they insisted on obtaining the entire succession of the Spanish monarchy Louis could not undertake to answer for his grandson. He could only promise to withhold every

This letter, which bears date | Mémoires de Noailles, vol. iv. p. April 17, 1709, is printed in the | 45, ed. 1777.

succour of men and money, and leave Philip to his fate. But here the chiefs of the Allies suspected some design of deception, as though the object was only to amuse them and gain time. The ill faith of Louis had been experienced on former occasions in the course of his long reign; and certainly if a Prince has broken his plighted engagements his enemies may be forgiven for mistrusting his solemn asseverations. Perhaps however they did not sufficiently discriminate the cases. In this case the depression of France was a pledge for the sincerity of Louis.

The party of war however was just then in the ascendant at the Hague, or to speak more accurately the party of peace on the hardest terms; and Marlborough was in like manner overruled by his instructions from England. On the 27th of May Pensionary Heinsius in the name of the Allies presented to Torcy their project of Preliminaries in forty articles. These comprised all the concessions on the part of France which have already been enumerated and a few besides, to England, to Holland, to the Emperor, and to the Duke of Savoy, but they did not give to France a treaty of peace in return. They provided only for a suspension of arms during two months commencing on the 1st of June. Within those two months the Duke of Anjou was to relinquish Spain and retire into France with his principal adherents, and if he failed to do so Louis was to enter into concert with the Allies for his compulsion; that is, in other words, join the league against his grandson. During these two months Louis was to place in the hands of the Allies some of the most important fortresses which he still possessed, as Mons and Namur, Luxemburg and Strasburg, and to raze the works at Dunkirk. In the Congress intended to be held

meanwhile at the Hague the smaller Princes of the confederacy might put forward their pretensions, and if a peace were not agreed upon within two months the hostilities might recommence.

On seeing these Preliminary Articles Torcy declared to Heinsius that he had no sufficient powers to sign them, and that, as he believed, they would not be accepted by his master. He undertook however to convey them with all despatch for the King's decision leaving meanwhile Rouillé at the Hague.

For

With these Articles accordingly did Torcy re-appear at Versailles, and a Council was forthwith summoned to decide the momentous question which he brought. There, on the 2nd of June, appeared the majestic presence of Louis; there were his son and his grandson ; there was his nephew of Orleans; there was every Minister of State. All with one voice declared the treaty inadmissible. It was not so much the vast amount of the concessions which deterred them. these they were in great measure prepared by what they knew of the distresses of France and the claims of the Allies. But it was felt that these concessions gave them in fact no peace and only a truce of two months, when France, after having surrendered some of her best fortresses and demolished her works at Dunkirk, might have to recommence the contest at still greater disadvantage. Louis was moreover deeply pained by the Article which, in the event of Philip's non-compliance might require him to join the Allies. "If I must wage war" he said "I would rather wage it against my enemies than against my children."

The decision of his Counsellors concurring with his own, the King on the same day addressed a letter to President Rouillé, commanding him to return to

France. First however he was to signify to Heinsius that His Majesty rejected the Preliminaries, and declared null the offers he had made. At the same time

The

by the advice of Torcy, and for the first time during his reign of fifty years, Louis made an appeal to his people. He issued a Circular to the Governors of the Provinces, designed to be made public, and explaining the great sacrifices which he had been willing to make for peace, while only a short truce was tendered in return, and calling on his faithful subjects to support him in the prosecution of now a necessary war. result of this appeal was such as to exceed his highest hopes. It roused from deep depression the martial spirit of the French. Famine-struck and wasted as they were, and cast down by a long succession of disasters, the call upon their pride of country was to them like the sound of the trumpet to the steed. They felt that their Sovereign had gone to the furthest lengths to give them peace, and they girded themselves up to renew the contest, even though with a bankrupt Treasury and with starving armies.

To set an example of the sacrifices which the time required, the King sent his plate, gold and silver, to the Mint, and the same course was adopted by nearly all the great Lords of his Court. There was another measure by which Louis sought to gratify his people. Rightly or wrongly they with one voice imputed great part of their reverses in the field to the fault of Chamillart. He had already some months since been permitted at his own request to resign one of the two great offices which he held as Minister of the Finances. Now he was dismissed from the other, or the War department, his place being supplied by Voisin, formerly Intendant at Maubeuge.

The demands of the Allies in these negotiations do not, when fairly reviewed, seem liable to the charge of injustice which the French historians have alleged.5 There was no injustice after such victories as those of Blenheim and Ramillies in demanding that France should relinquish whatever she had gained since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648-and it was to that limit that the claim for cessions was confined. But if not of injustice, the Allies may be accused of impolicy. By taking a stand on their extreme right, and urging conditions so harsh, they kindled as we have seen in France a flame of resentment and resistance, and supplied to their enemy a new weapon for the war.

During these negotiations the political foes of Marlborough both in Holland and in England renewed the malicious charge against him, that he endeavoured to prolong the war for the sake of his own emoluments. But the facts were directly otherwise. The secret letters of Marlborough to Godolphin and the Duchess, and not merely his conversations with Torcy, make it manifest that he was striving for peace-that he was hopeful of it—that he was fettered far more than he wished to be by the stringency of his instructions from home. Above all the pretentions of the Dutch as to their Barrier seemed to him exorbitant. So strongly did he feel this, that when, on the failure of the negotiations with France, the Dutch desired a Treaty of guarantee with England for their eventual claims in that respect, Marlborough peremptorily refused to sign it, and it was signed by his colleague only. The superior sagacity of the Great Duke was proved by the

"Les conditions aussi injustes | Sismondi. (Hist. des Français, qu' humiliantes," says, for example, vol. xxvii. p. 80.)