By the 1st of December, Colonel Goddard had established friendly relations with the Mahrattas of that state; and there he received despatches from Bombay, acquainting him that, at last, an army had been put in motion for Poonah, and it was expected that he would form a junction with it in the vicinity of that city. This Bombay force, 4,500 strong, was under Colonel Charles Egerton, who, on quitting the coast, boldly marched through the Ghauts, reached Khandala, and by the 4th of January, 1779, was in full advance upon Poonah, with twenty-five days' provisions in store.

Flying squadrons of Mahratta horse hovered about him, skirmishing and retreating; but Egerton could nowhere hear aught of a friendly Mahratta army, which Ragobah had given assurances would repair to his standard. Ragobah, who accompanied the colonel with a very few followers, and who had obtained a considerable loan from the Bombay treasury, was now questioned sharply, on which he represented that the undecided Mahratta chiefs would not join the British until some formidable blow had been struck.

By the 9th of January, Egerton was within sixteen miles of Poonah, at the point where he expected to meet and form a junction with Goddard's column; but now he was compelled to halt, as a great body of Mahratta horse was seen in front, and their aspect greatly excited the fears of two civil commissioners, whom, unfortunately for the credit of the expedition, the Bombay Government had ordered to accompany it. On the unmanly pretext that subsistence would become precarious if they continued to advance - though eighteen days' rations were still in store-they ordered a retreat. It was begun at night, on the 11th of January, the heavy guns having been thrown into a tank, and a quantity of stores buried.*

The army of Mahratta horse, 50,000 strong, came thundering after them, and eventually surrounded them completely, cut down or slew by rockets about 400 men, and carried off nearly all the baggage and provisions. The two helpless commissioners were overwhelmed by terror and despair, and even Egerton declared that it was impossible to carry back the column to Bombay; so Mr. Farmer, the secretary of the committee or commissioners, was sent to negotiate. The first demand was that Ragobah should be delivered up, and this degrading request would actually have been complied with, had he not previously made a better arrangement, by agreeing to surrender to Scindia. The next demand was, that the Bombay Government should, by treaty, surrender all the territory

*Duff's "Hindostan."

they had acquired since 1756 and the death of Madhoo Rao, together with the revenues drawn from Broach and Surat. Also, that orders should be sent to Colonel Goddard to retire peaceably back to Bengal. The terrified commissioners did as they were commanded, and signed a treaty at Wurgaon to the effect of all this, and Lieutenant Charles Stewart and Mr. Farmer were left as hostages in the hands of the enemy; but on descending the Ghauts, the first act of the commissioners was to commit a dangerous breach of faith -dangerous so far as the lives of the hostages were concerned by countermanding the order they had sent to Colonel Goddard, when, under the dictation of the Mahrattas, they forbade him to advance; these instructions no doubt explain the contradictory messages which so greatly puzzled. that officer.

This dishonoured army now continued its march without molestation to Bombay, where two colonels, Egerton and Cockburn, were dismissed the service, and a Captain Hartley, who had distinguished himself, was promoted to the rank of lieutenantcolonel.

In the meanwhile Colonel Goddard had continued his march towards Poonah, confident in the formation of a junction with Egerton at the appointed time; but when he reached the great city of Berhampore, the ancient capital of Candeish, on the northern bank of the Tapti, 980 miles from Calcutta by the route he had taken, he had to halt again, in perplexity by the nature of his orders and advices. "By one letter from the field commissioners, written in compliance with their treaty, he was told to retrace his steps; by another from the same field commissioners he was told that he must pay no attention to what they had said; but these lack-brains gave him no account or intelligible hint of what had befallen their Bombay army."

Full of strange doubts, the colonel continued to halt at Berhampore, till the 5th of February, 1779, when he became cognisant of the real state of affairs. In great indignation he resolved not to be bound by a treaty made by fools and cowards, who had no right or authority over him, as he had already orders which absolved him from the command of the Bombay Government; but fearing there might be more at stake than he knew of, he bravely resolved to continue his march towards the western coast, and avoiding Poonah, from whence a body of horse had been sent out to intercept him, to push on for Surat, where he would find himself in a British settlement, with the open sea to Bombay, and where he would be in readiness to act as his orders from Bengal or occasion might require.

From Berhampore the route to Surat was 250 miles; the disposition of the intervening country was very dubious, and the Mahratta horse were hanging on his rear; but his decision, and rapidity of movement, together with the splendid discipline and conduct of his Bengal native infantry, saved him alike from all danger and dishonour. Wherever he and they went the fame of a good name preceded them. The march was a long one, and accompanied by many toils and perils; but there were no pillaging, no insult or wrong offered to the people, hence they flocked on all hands to supply his men with provisions, and to accord all the service and information in their power.

The march lay through one of the most fertile and best cultivated tracts of Hindostan, thickly dotted with defenceless villages and open towns, with much valuable property in them, and luxuries most tempting to the sepoys; "but nothing was touched, nothing taken without being paid for ; and thus the inhabitants, instead of flying and concealing their provisions and property, as they had ever done at the approach of an army, quietly pursued their occupations, or thronged to relieve his wants by a traffic beneficial to both parties."

In nineteen days after quitting Berhampore, Goddard entered Surat amid the acclamations of the people, thus achieving a triumph more valuable than any victory could prove. "Be assured," wrote Hastings, in one of his letters to Sullivan, "that the successful and steady progress of a part-and that known to be but a small part-of the military force of Bengal from the Jumna to Surat, has contributed more, perhaps, than our more splendid achievements to augment our military reputation, and to confirm the ascendant of our influence over all the powers of Hindostan. To them, as to ourselves, the attempt appeared astonishing, because it had never before been made or suggested. It has shown what the British are capable of effecting!"*

Colonel Goddard was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and soon received the commands of the Supreme Council at Calcutta to take upon himself all future wars and negotiations with the Mahrattas. On being made aware of the disgraceful treaty between the Bombay commissioners and the chiefs of that people, the Supreme Council first provided for their own safety by ordering a brigade to the banks of the Jumna, and sending their commander-in-chief to inspect and put upon a war footing their military resources on the north-west frontier, where an attack was expected. After this they gave their attention to the Bombay Presidency, and manifested a spirit worthy of all praise, while Gleig, "Life of Warren Hastings."

197

Hastings urged the Council there to exert themselves for the retrieval of their misfortunes, and arm themselves with means adequate to that end.

But the Bombay Council chose to deem themselves slighted when Goddard was appointed brigadier, with powers to negotiate for the Governor-General, as our plenipotentiary at the court of Poonah, and objected particularly to the cantoning of a military force within their limits, and independent of their authority, as being unconstitutional. The Governor-General, heedless of their petty spirit, on the 15th of April, 1779, directed Brigadier Goddard to endeavour to negotiate a peace on the terms of the Treaty of Poorundhur, with an additional clause excluding all French from any portion of the Mahratta territories. By the end of May he received more detailed instructions, directing him, if peace could not be obtained on the above terms, to form an alliance with Futteh Sing, the acknowledged head of the Baroda or Guicowar dominions. There was another alliance from which great things were expected.

This was one with Scindia, whose rivalry with Nana Furnavese, the Mahratta minister, was well known; these two chiefs, while acting together with apparent cordiality, only hid thereby their secret and mutual animosity, and of this a marked instance occurred. By the Treaty of Wurgaon, Ragobah had been committed to his care, and on his prisoner, Scindia had settled an estate in Bundelcund worth twelve lacs of rupees. Ragobah thus believed that Scindia was his friend, and Nana was also satisfied, because Scindia became security that Ragobah would molest his government no more; so the latter was sent to take possession of his new property, but having received a hint that he would probably be confined in the castle of Jhansi, and being slenderly guarded, he watched his opportunity, and when his escort was about to ford the Nerbudda, he escaped, and fled with all speed to Broach, and put himself under the protection of the British. This was all believed to be a scheme of Scindia's, who thus widened the breach between the Nana and the Company, and led the minister to fear that there was a plan on foot for establishing Ragobah at Poonah.

Thus, after Goddard had been negotiating with him for some months, all hope of a treaty came to an end when the Nana demanded the immediate surrender of the Isle of Salsette and the person of Ragobah, as preliminaries thereto. Previous to this, Ragobah, with his two sons, Amrut Rao and Bajee Rao, a child of four years, had visited the camp of General Goddard, who gave him an allowance of 50,000 rupees per month, which was

censured by the Bengal Government, who intended to make no more use of him politically. Too late, the discovery had at last been made that it was impolitic to attempt to thrust upon the warlike Mahrattas, a person whom the whole nation, instead of flocking to his banner, as expected during the recent expedition, viewed with general indifference and aversion.

But now, therefore, that the declaration and double demands of Nana Furnavese made war inevitable, it was resolved that it should be carried on, not in

the name of Ragobah, but in that of the East India Company alone; so General Goddard, on receiving his final answer from the Nana, set out for Bombay, where he arrived on the 1st of November, 1779.

The object of the general's visit was two-fold— to arrange the plan of future warlike operations, to urge the preparation and march of a reinforcement, and also to adjust the proposed allowance with Futteh Sing, the Guicowar of Baroda. The Council would have preferred delay, but they could not resist the urgency of the energetic Goddard.

ACCORDINGLY, a detachment of the Bombay troops, consisting of 100 European artillery, 200 European infantry, and two battalions of sepoys, under Colonel Hartley, were immediately embarked for Goojerat. From Madras, 100 artillery, 500 Europeans, and one battalion of sepoys were expected, under Colonel Brown; from Bengal, 2,000 sepoys were expected by the route overland, but failed to appear; and on returning to Surat, where the main body of his army was cantoned, General Goddard dismissed the envoys of Nana Furnavese, and opened a negotiation with Futteh Sing, of Baroda; but finding that prince loth to entangle himself by any definite treaty, on the New Year's Day of 1780 he put his army in motion, and crossed the river Tapti.

Progressing slowly northward, till overtaken by his siege-train and stores from Broach, he then moved to attack the fort of Dubhoy, which was held for the peishwa by an officer with a garrison of 2,000 Mahrattas. This place including the remains of an ancient Hindoo city, of which there is no history extant, but which was probably abandoned because of its low and unhealthy situation-had once fortifications three miles in extent, with the remains of many elegant temples. In 1779, it was little more than a mass of magnificent ruins, amid which dwelt a squalid population of 40,000 souls.*

The fort formed a quadrangle of two miles in circuit, the rampart being of large hewn stones,

* Forbes.

strengthened by fifty-six towers. Between two of these was a kind of Moorish archway of great beauty, named "the Gate of Diamonds." On the 18th of January, 1780, General Goddard was before it, and by the 20th he had thrown up a battery of three eighteen-pounders within 200 yards of the walls; but the garrison was found to have evacuated the place in the night. He garrisoned it by a company of sepoys, and some irregular troops, under James Forbes, author of the "Oriental Memoirs," and pushed on in the direction of Baroda. En route he was met by the Guicowar Futteh Sing, who had been so greatly impressed by the sudden fall of Dubhoy-which was believed by the natives to be a place of great strength-that he entered into an alliance with us, offensive and defensive. By this, in addition to other advantages given to the Company, he agreed to furnish them with a body of 3,000 horse; one of the stipulations in his favour being the possession of Ahmedabad, towards which our troops at once advanced.

This strong and stately city, which has been already described, had then a population of 100,000 persons, and a garrison consisting of 6,000 Arab and Scindia infantry, with 2,000 Mahratta horse, the whole being under a Brahmin officer in the service of the peishwa. Goddard arrived before its lofty and turreted walls on the 10th of February; by the 12th this active officer had his batteries armed and in operation. Thus a practicable breach was effected by the evening of the 13th. Two days after, the city was won by storm

but few details of the event are given. Our total loss was only 105 killed and wounded. Among the latter were twelve European officers; two of them, who were volunteers, died of their wounds. Not the least honourable part of this gallant assault was the subsequent steadiness and good conduct of the troops, as only two men not belonging to the garrison were killed.*

The standard of the Guicowar had barely been displayed upon the towers of Ahmedabad, when tidings came of the approach of Mahadajee Scindia and Tookajee Holkar, with 20,000 horse, at the head of which they had forded the Nerbudda, and were now on the march to Baroda.

On the 6th of March, General Goddard crossed the Mhye to do battle with them, an offer which they declined by retiring at his approach; and as a proof of his wish to stand well with us, Scindia set at liberty-to their great relief of mind, no doubt-Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart, who had been given up as hostages at Wurgaon, and who arrived in the British camp; and the reports they gave of Scindia's professions of friendship for the Company, and his hatred of Nana Furnavese, afforded some ground for a belief that he would prefer our alliance. But Goddard, suspicious that Scindia merely meant to amuse himself till the rainy season came on, broke off all negotiations, and gave him only three days to consider. On the 16th of March, the envoy returned with certain terms, the substance of which were "that Ragobah should retire to Jhansi, and live on his jaghire of twelve lacs; that the government should continue in the name of Madhoo Rao Narrain as peishwa; and Bajee Rao, Ragobah's son, be appointed the peishwa's dewan."

Though mentioned last, this was the most essential part of the proposed terms; Bajee Rao, a child of four years, could not act as dewan, thus Scindia would take him to Poonah and manage for him. So General Goddard replied :

"That, as these proposals amounted to nothing less than that the Company should assist Scindia in acquiring the entire power of the state, it was necessary that he should, on his part, consent in the name of the peishwa to certain concessions in favour of British interests."

Scindia, finding himself baffled in spinning out the negotiations for months, as he had hoped, now entered into secret communication with Govind Rao, the brother of Futteh Sing, and his rival claimant for the office of Guicowar, with a view of putting him in possession of Goojerat; but on discovering this new intrigue, Goddard resolved on

* Duff.

immediate battle. This was no easy matter to attain, as, by the rapid movements of their cavalry, Scindia and Holkar were for many days enabled to avoid an attack. The former having placed his baggage under the protection of the hill fort of Pamonghur, threw out many patrols of fleet horsemen to alarm him in case of danger, and to obviate a surprise.

Nevertheless Goddard, with a small but select portion of his forces, after being encamped quietly for six weeks near Scindia, on the morning of the 3rd of April resolved to give him an alerte. Heading his troops in person, and marching silently ere day dawned, he passed the Mahratta patrols, and even their grand-guard, or in-lying picket of some thousand men, and was pushing on for the camp, which lay a mile beyond, when dawn came in with its usual Indian rapidity; the glitter of steel was seen, and an alarm was given by the Mahratta drums.

The main body of the enemy were soon in their saddles and advancing to the attack, when a heavy musketry fire from our people sent them scampering to the right-about; but General Goddard, who had been under the impression that he had won a complete victory, was rather mortified when, after encamping, he perceived the enemy still, as before, in his front. On the 14th of April, he was joined by the welcome Madras contingent, under Colonel Browne. A week subsequently, he made another attempt on the camp of the Mahrattas, who retired under a shower of rockets.

Retreating in confusion to the Ghauts, the Mahrattas left Goddard undisputed master of the country between the mountains and the sea; but as the rainy season was at hand, he moved to the Nerbudda, and put his troops in cantonments.

In the meanwhile, many transactions had been taking place which were of interest, and of which but little notice has been taken in history. Among these was the alliance formed by Warren Hastings with the Rana of Gohud, a mountainous territory full of strong military positions, particularly the famous fortress of Gwalior. The rana, then described as "a chief south of Agra," by a treaty signed on the 2nd of December, 1779, was to furnish 10,000 horse for service against the Mahrattas; whenever peace took place between the Company and the latter, the rana was to be included therein, and his present possessions, with the fort of Gwalior, were guaranteed to him. On the other hand, the Company were to furnish a force for the defence of his country, on his paying 20,000 Muchildar rupees for each battalion of sepoys: nine sixteenths of any acquisitions were to go to the Company.