claimed by, Mohammed Ali, who called upon his allies, the Company, for assistance, while the rajah courted, by turns, Hyder and the Peishwa to aid him in his invasion. Though the Council at Madras declined being dragged into a new war with Hyder to further the nabob's dreams of conquest, they could not refuse him assistance in a case where justice seemed on his side, and more especially where their own means of revenue were concerned.

During the progress of their late war with Hyder, the Rajah of Tanjore had manifested the greatest reluctance to assist the Company with that arm which they required so much, cavalry, a contingent of which he was bound to furnish, and he made no suitable return for the tranquillity which his territories enjoyed under the protection of the Company, who hence deemed him somewhat of a masked enemy. Thus, when the nabob complained that the rajah had marched into the Marawar country, a division of Ajmeer (one portion of which is desert, the other abounding with grain, tobacco, cotton, and wheat), and moreover that he had attacked some Polygars, who were dependants of the Carnatic, the Council instantly remonstrated with him in high terms; but he replied scoffingly:"If I suffer Moravee to take possession of my country, Nalcooty to take my elephants, and Tondemar to injure me, it will be a dishonour to me among the people, to see such compulsions used by the Polygars. You are a protector of my government; notwithstanding you have not settled a single affair. I have finished the matter relating to Moravee, and confirmed him in his business; the affair with Nalcooty remains to be finished; but that I shall finish also."

While our troops, ready to march, assembled at Trichinopoly, it was resolved to attempt to negotiate with the rajah through Omdut-ul-Omrah, the eldest son of Mohammed Ali; but this proved a failure. Indeed, the latter personage, after inducing the Company to take up his quarrel with Tanjore, began to be apprehensive that they might conquer the whole district for themselves, instead of doing so for him. Accordingly, he offered to give the Company a good round sum for the dominion, and thereupon an agreement was signed, by which Tanjore was to be formally annexed to the Carnatic, to which naturally, it certainly belonged.

On the 12th of September, 1771, when our troops, under General Smith, were about to commence their march, it was discovered, upon inspection, that the nabob's younger son, who had been entrusted with the provision department, had, with genuine Indian rascality, betrayed his trust, and

that there was not food in the camp for a single day."

By great exertions, General Joseph Smith procured the necessary supplies, and the army crossed the frontiers of Tanjore. The latter is a populous and well-cultivated district of Southern Hindostan, bounded on the north by the Coleroon, on the south by the zemindaries of Ramnad and Shevagunga, and on the west by Trichinopoly. January the whole face of the country, a dead flat level, is one continuous sheet of paddy-ground, interspersed with villages, of which there are now nearly 5,000 in number.

In

On the 16th of September our troops were before Vellum, a fort situated eight miles southwest of the city of Tanjore-one of the chief bulwarks of the country. A battery against it was thrown up, and armed to breach it, and a practicable gap in the walls was soon effected; but at midnight on the 20th, the garrison silently evacuated the place.

Marching on Tanjore, the capital, a city some six miles in circumference, containing two forts, and one of the finest Hindoo temples in Southern India, the general invested it, forming his camp on the same ground where Lally had been so unfortunate, and he had effected a breach which was reported practicable on the 27th October, when further operations were arrested by an intimation from Omdut-ulOmrah, the eldest son of Mohammed Ali, called by the British, the "Young Nabob," that the rajah had come to terms, that he had signed a treaty of peace with him. He had accompanied the expedition, and in some way had arranged that the rajah was to pay a princely sum of money, to surrender the districts which the nabob claimed, and which were asserted to be the original cause of the quarrel ; that he was to defray all the expenses of the expedition, to become the ally of the Nabob of the Carnatic in all future wars, and to demolish, if required to do so, the strong fortress of Vellum. But, "before putting an end to hostilities in this way, Omdut-ul-Omrah had just had a serious quarrel with his British allies. He was informed that, by the usages of war, the plunder of places taken by storm belonged to the captors, and it was the prospect of this very plunder that had allured him to Tanjore. He offered a fixed sum of money to the troops in lieu of it; but it was considered a Jew's bargain; the offer was rejected, and violent altercations took place."

Incensed by these measures, which were quite beyond their calculations—and in which the nabob fully acted on the new ideas of independent *Mill, "History of British India."

sovereignty for which he was indebted to the impressions given him by our ministry, chiefly through his agent, Mr. Macpherson-the Council at Madras sent General Smith orders not to evacuate Vellum or withdraw his batteries from Tanjore, until the rajah should have made good one of his promised payments in gold or jewels.

As they seem to have well known beforehand, the rajah was not punctual in his time of payment, and when it was past, they declared that he had violated the treaty. To prevent a renewal of hostilities, the rajah consented to leave the fortress of Vellum in our hands, and to cede to us two districts in the neighbourhood of Madura. Thus, year by year, went steadily on the great system of gradual absorption and acquisition.

The rajah's concessions, by admitting weakness, only tempted the Company to attack him once more; thus in the summer of 1773, General Smith had orders to advance again from Trichinopoly. In June of that year, the Nabob had complained to the governor, Mr. Dupré, that the luckless Rajah of Tanjore was not only ten lacs of rupees in arrear of the sum which he had engaged to pay him, but had applied for a body of troops, both to Hyder and the Mahrattas, to aid him in his quarrel; and, moreover, that he had instigated certain marauders to ravage the borders of the Carnatic.

A few days after, at another conference, he not only urged the conquest of Tanjore, but offered the Company, in the event of their proving victorious, ten lacs of pagodas, or about £350,000, the pagoda being a gold coin, used principally in the south of India, and worth about 6s. 8d. It was called a hoon by the Mohammedans, and a varaha by the Hindoos. After giving it as their candid

opinion that the rajah was perhaps not to blame, with curious inconsistency, they went on to say, that "it is evident that in the present system, it is dangerous to have such a power (¿.e., the rajah) in the heart of the province; for as the honourable Court have been repeatedly advised, unless the Company can engage the rajah in their interest by a firm support in all his just rights, we look upon it as certain that should any troubles arise in the Carnatic, whether from the French or a country enemy, and present a favourable opportunity of freeing himself from his apprehensions of the nabob, he would take part against him, and at such a time might be a dangerous enemy in the south. The propriety and expediency, therefore, of reducing him entirely before such an event takes place, is evident."

Put into fewer words, says Beveridge justly, the argument is merely this-our relations with the nabob will not allow us to do the rajah justice. It is therefore reasonable to presume that he will seek justice elsewhere. As in this way he may become a formidable enemy, our true policy is to put it out of his power, by taking the first favourable chance of destroying him.*

Accordingly, on the 31st July, General Smith took the field at Trichinopoly, while the nabob bound himself to make payment in advance, by cash or good bills, for the whole expense of the expedition, to provide all necessaries, save military stores, and to pay in future for a force of 10,000 sepoys; and on the 3rd of August, the entire forces under Smith and the nabob's second son, Modulul-Moolk, began their march from the Sugar-loaf Rock, towards the territories of the doomed rajah.

In the year before the Tanjore expedition, the troops for Trichinopoly, consisting of 520 British infantry and artillery, and three battalions of the Company's sepoys, with six siege-guns, had marched into the Marawars, over the Polygars of which, the rajah held a doubtful rule, as they had formerly paid tribute and allegiance to the Nabobs of the Carnatic.

These troops were led on that occasion by General Smith and a Colonel Bonjour, and with these were some of the nabob's cavalry, and two battalions of his sepoys, under Omdut-ul-Omrah. Ramdampooram, the capital of the Greater Marawar, was stormed early in April; and by the middle of June the troops of our ally were in full posses

*“Hist. India,” vol. ii.

sion of all the forts of that country. The conquest of the Lesser Marawar was much more difficult, and is said to have been accompanied with such cruelties even on the part of the British, that this new expedition spread terror through Tanjore as it advanced.

The troops destined, as a print of the time has it, for the destruction of "the ill-fated Rajah Toolajee, for having dared to assert the rights which had descended to him from a long line of martial ancestors," on the 6th of August were before the city of Tanjore; and a week later there came from the rajah a letter, in which, after declaring that he had submitted to the hard terms imposed by the nabob, he added this :—

"Some offence should surely be proved upon me before an expedition be taken against me. Without any show of equity, to wage an unjust war against me, is not consistent with reason. This charitable country is the support of multitudes of people; if you will preserve it from destruction, you will be the most great, glorious, and honoured of mankind. I am full of confidence that you will neither do injustice yourself, nor listen to the tale of the oppressor. I only desire a continuance of that support which this country has formerly experienced from the English, and you will reap the fame so good an action deserves."

But the unfortunate prince appealed to English clemency in vain, and after a smart skirmish between the nabob's two regiments of regular cavalry and the Tanjore horse, in which the latter were broken and routed, the army encamped to the westward of the city, at the distance of two and a half miles, establishing a post at a village half way between them and the principal fort.

Regarding Indian tactics, it has been remarked that the Asiatics have a dread of fire-arms, the true cause of which lay in the inexperience of their leaders, who never knew the advantages of discipline, and kept their infantry on a low footing. Their cavalry, though ready enough to engage with the sabre, were extremely unwilling to come within gunshot, through fear, not of themselves, but of their fine horses, on which all their fortunes were expended. And nothing is so ruinous, continues this writer, to the military affairs of Hindostan, as their false notions of artillery; they are scared by that of the enemy, and have a foolish confidence in their own, placing their chief dependence on the largest pieces, which they neither know how to move nor manage. They give them pompous and sounding names, as the Italians do their guns, and have some that carry a ball of seventy pounds. "When we march round them with our light field

141

pieces, and make it necessary to move those enormous weights, their bullocks, which at best are very untractable, if a shot comes among them are quite ungovernable; and, at the same time, are so illharnessed, that it occasions no small delay to free the rest from one that shall happen to be unruly or slain."

The attention of General Smith was first directed to the fortification of his camp, which work was complete by the 20th of August, on the evening of which all the rajah's outposts were attacked and driven in. Colonel Fletcher, at the head of a chosen party, broke into the very centre of his cavalry camp, while Colonel Vaughan attacked and stormed two pagodas, within five hundred yards of the fort; yet the garrison of the rajah, 20,000 strong, were resolved to make a stout resistance. The same night an entrenchment, 300 yards in length, was dug between these two pagodas, and the temples formed an excellent shelter for our troops when, next morning, the garrison opened a heavy fire upon them.

Redoubts were thrown up, and trenches run out to the right and left; but on the 24th, the rajah made a sortie, with horse and foot, sepoys and Colleries, to scour these works. Fletcher, who commanded, was wounded by two barbed arrows, and must have given way, had not Vaughan advanced to his support; after which the nabob's horse and our grenadiers came up, when the enemy were driven in, and the trenches held.

About six the same evening the grenadiers took possession of five pagodas, about 400 yards from the chief post. At the right extremity of the parallel a six-gun battery was erected, and a four-gun battery on the left, with two others between them, armed with sixteen guns, all of which opened on the city on the 27th; and two nights later the sap was advanced 300 yards. More batteries were thrown up and more trenches dug, till the 6th of September, when our men were within a few yards of the crest of the glacis, and next day the infantry effected a lodgment on the face of it.

The sap battery was next constructed, and from thence a gallery was sunk for a passage into the ditch, and a practicable breach was made before daybreak on the 16th. On both sides the guns were worked furiously, but the breach was made wider, and orders came to carry the place by storm on the morning of the 27th. There was, however, no attempt made to defend the breach; they advanced straight into the town, and met with so little opposition in the end, that only three grenadiers were wounded.*

* "Authentic Journal of the Siege of Tanjour."

A letter from an officer present to a friend in Scotland, dated Trichinopoly, 18th October, 1773, states that he was one of those who had the honour to be detailed for the storming party under Colonel Vaughan. After entering, he adds, "the two European companies of the 1st Brigade, after making a short halt, to cool the men, marched, without shedding a drop of blood, to the rajah's palace, who, upon getting proper assurances of his life, surrendered with his attendants. Old Monajee, his general, who was so much in the interest of the nabob during his troubles, was taken with all his family. During the siege we had seven officers killed and fifteen wounded. Our loss in noncommissioned officers and privates was equally moderate."

The plunder of the place amounted to £800 sterling for every captain, £400 for each subaltern, and the rest in proportion; while the Company were to obtain 100 lacs of rupees from the princes of the Carnatic for the conquest of Tanjore; but, from future proceedings at Leadenhall Street, on the 28th of April, 1774, it would appear that the unhappy rajah was imprisoned, and his daughters forcibly placed in the seraglio of the nabob. And yet the Company, by a treaty signed in 1762, had given him security for his throne.*

The details of all this disgraceful affair did not reach London till the 26th of March, 1774. The Council felt somewhat ashamed of themselves, and detained the despatches as long as possible, and, on receipt of them, stormy indeed was the meeting that took place at the India House, when General Richard Smith moved, and Mr. Orme seconded him, that the Court of Directors should return thanks to General Joseph Smith, for his gallantry in the conquest of Tanjore. This was opposed, and we are told that when Sir Robert Fletcher narrated some

of the features of the event, with those attending the previous conquest of the Marawars, "several proprietors quitted the court, and the strongest marks of horror, pity, and amazement were visible in the countenances of those who stayed to hear the shocking narrative."

It was ultimately carried, however, that General Smith had only obeyed his orders, and done nothing deserving of censure; and so the original motion was carried. The plundering of Tanjore, it was agreed, had occurred in mistake, the order to abstain from it not having been properly communicated to the several officers, while "for the murder of the rajah, and the outrages committed on his daughters by the nabob, no excuse was alleged but the Asiatic custom."

*Mill, Colonel Wilkes, &c.

The rumour of the rajah's murder proved to be a mistake, or exaggeration, as he was merely thrown into prison.

But

A prevailing suspicion that the Dutch had been assisting the rajah was confirmed after the capture of Tanjore, when they took possession of its seaport, Nagpore, and some other ports, on the plea that they had become theirs by purchase. neither the Council nor the nabob recognised this alleged purchase, and the former justified their refusal to do so, on the plea that the rajah held his lands of the nabob in fee, according to the feudal system which prevailed all over India. "The assertion that the feudal system prevailed all over India," says Beveridge, “and the argument founded upon it, are ludicrous in the extreme, and only prove into what incompetent hands the interests of the Company, in the Madras Presidency, were at the time committed."

After long delays on the part of the directors, pressure at home was brought to bear upon the Council. They were condemned for all they had done; the president was deprived of office, and his successor had orders to restore the rajah to his throne-events to be noticed in our next chapter.

By this time the Company and their servants could readily obtain money of the inhabitants of India, by the various means of rents, revenues, and trade; and the use they made of these means, and their talents as statesmen and soldiers, will best appear from the following statement, published in 1776, as an account of the sums proved and acknowledged to have been received for the use of the East India Company, from May, 1761, to April, 1771:—