VII.-An Argument against the Infallibility of the present church of Rome, taken from the contradictions in your doctrine of Transubstantiation.

Mr. Chillingworth. THAT church is not infallible which teacheth contradictions; but the church of Rome teacheth contradictions: therefore the church of Rome is not infallible.

Mr. Daniel. I deny the minor.

Chill. That church teacheth contradictions, which teacheth such a doctrine as contains contradictions; but the church of Rome teacheth such a doctrine therefore the church of Rome teacheth contradictions.

Dan. I deny the minor.

Chill. The doctrine of transubstantiation contains contradictions; but the church of Rome teacheth the doctrine of transubstantiation: therefore the church of Rome teacheth such a doctrine as contains contradictions.

Dan. I deny the major.

Chill. That the same thing, at the same time, should have the true figure of a man's body, and should not have the true figure of a man's body, is a contradiction; but in the doctrine of transubstantiation it is taught, that the same thing (viz. our Saviour present in the sacrament) has the true figure of a man's body, and has not the true figure of a man's body, at the same time: therefore the doctrine of transubstantiation contains contradictions.

Dan. The major, though not having all rules re

quired to a contradiction (as boys in logic know) yet let it pass.

Chill. Boys in logic know no more conditions required to a contradiction, but that the same thing should be affirmed and denied of the same thing at the same time. For my meaning was, that that should not be accounted the same thing, which was considered after divers manners.

Dan. I deny the minor of your syllogism.

Chill. I prove it, according to the several parts of it: and, first, for the first part. He must have the figure of a man's body in the eucharist, who is there without any real alteration or difference from the natural body of a man; but our Saviour, according to the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation, is in the sacrament without any real alteration or difference from the natural body of a man: therefore, according to this doctrine, he must have the figure of a man's body. To the second part, that he must not have the figure of a man's body, in the sacrament, according to this doctrine, thus I prove it. He must not have the figure of a man's body in the eucharist, which must not have extension there; but our Saviour's body, according to the doctrine of transubstantiation, must not have extension there: therefore, according to this doctrine, he must not have the figure of a man's body there. The major of this syllogism I proved, because the figure of a man's body could not be without extension. The minor I proved thus: that must not have extension in the eucharist, whose every part is together in one and the same point; but, according to this doctrine, every part of our Saviour's body must be here in one and the same point: therefore here it must not have extension.

Mr. Dan. answered, by distinguishing the major of the first syllogism, and said; that he must not have the true figure of a man's body, according to the reason of a figure taken in its essential consideration, which is to have positionem partium sic et sic extra partes; but not the accidental consideration, which is in ordine ad locum. And this answer he applied for the solution of the minor, saying thus: Our Saviour is there without any real alteration intrinsical, but not extrinsical; for he is not changed in order to himself, but in order to place or otherwise, he is not altered in his continual existence, which is only modus essentiæ, and inseparable even by Divine power, though altered in modo existendi, which is situation, and required to figure taken in order to place.

Chill. Against this it was replied by Chillingworth, That the distinction of a man's body, as considered in itself, and as considered in reference to place, is vain, and no solution of the argument: and thus he proved it: If it be impossible, that any thing should have several parts one out of another in order and reference of each to other, without having these parts in several places, then the distinction is vain; but it is impossible, that any thing should have several parts one out of another, without having these parts in several places: therefore the distinction is vain.

The major of this syllogism he took for granted. The minor he proved thus: Whatsoever body is in the proper place of another body, must of necessity be in that very body, by possessing the dimensions of it: therefore, whatsoever hath several parts one out of the other, must of necessity

have them one out of the place of the other; and consequently in several places.

For illustration of this argument he said: If my head, and belly, and thighs, and legs, and feet, be all in the very same place, of necessity, my head must be in my belly, and my belly in my thighs, and my thighs in my legs, and all of them in my feet, and my feet in all of them; and therefore, if my head be out of my belly, it must be out of the place where my belly is; and if it be not out of the place where my belly is, it is not out of my belly, but in it.

Again, to shew that, according to the doctrine of transubstantiation, our Saviour's body in the eucharist hath not the several parts of it out of one another, he disputed thus: Wheresoever there is a body, having several parts one out of the other, there must be some middle parts severing the extreme parts; but here, according to this doctrine, the extreme parts are not severed, but altogether in the same point; therefore, here our Saviour's body cannot have parts one out of the other.

Mr. Dan. To all this (for want of a better answer) gave only this: Let all scholars peruse these. After, upon better consideration, he wrote by the side of the last syllogism this: Quoad entitatem verum est, non quoad locum; that is, according to entity it is true, but not according to place. And to (Let all scholars peruse these) he caused this to be added-And weigh whether there is any new matter worth a new answer.

Chillingworth replied, That to say the extreme parts of a body are severed by the middle parts

according to their entity, but not according to place, is ridiculous. His reasons are, first, because severing of things is nothing else but putting or keeping them in several places, as every silly woman knows; and therefore to say, they are severed, but not according to place, is as if you should say, they are heated, but not according to heat; they are cooled, but not according to cold; indeed it is to say, they are severed, but not severed.