objection to all places that are not held during pleafure; but in that objection I pronounce the gentlemen, from my knowledge of their complexion and of their principles, to be perfectly in earnest. The party (say these gentlemen) of the minister who proposes this fcheme will be rendered powerful by it; for he will name his party friends to the commiffion. This objection against party is a party objection; and in this too these gentlemen are perfectly ferious. They fee that if, by any intrigue, they fhould fucceed to office, they will lose the clandeftine patronage, the true inftrument of clandeftine influence, enjoyed in the name of fubfervient directors, and of wealthy trembling Indian delinquents. But as often as they are beaten off this ground, they return to it again. The minifter will name his friends, and perfons of his own party. -Whom should he name? Should he name his adverfaries? Should he name those whom he cannot truft? Should he name thofe to execute his plans, who are the declared enemies to the principles of his reform? His character is here at ftake. If he propofes for his own ends (but he never will propose) fuch names as, from their want of rank, fortune, character, ability, or knowledge, are likely to betray or to fall fhort of their truft, he is in an independent house of commons; in a houfe of commons which has, by its own virtue, destroyed

deftroyed the inftruments of parliamentary fubfervience. This houfe of commons would not en dure the found of fuch names. He would perish by the means which he is fuppofed to pursue for the fecurity of his power. The first pledge he must give of his fincerity in this great reform, will be in the confidence which ought to be repofed in those

names.

For my part, Sir, in this business I put all indirect confiderations wholly out of my mind. My fole queftion, on each claufe of the bill, amounts to this: Is the measure propofed required by the neceffities of India? I cannot confent totally to lofe fight of the real wants of the people who are the objects of it, and to hunt after every matter of party fquabble that may be started on the feveral. provifions. On the queftion of the duration of the commiffion I am clear and decided. Can I, can any one who has taken the fmalleft trouble to be informed concerning the affairs of India, amufe himself with so strange an imagination, as that the habitual defpotifm and oppreffion, that the mo nopolies, the peculations, the univerfal deftruction of all the legal authority of this kingdom, which have been for twenty years maturing to their prefent enormity, combined with the diftance of the fcene, the boldnefs and artifice of delinquents, their combination, their exceffive wealth, and the

faction

faction they have made in England, can be fully corrected in a fhorter term than four years? None has hazarded fuch an affertion-None, who has a regard for his reputation, will hazard it,

Sir, the gentlemen, whoever they are, who shall be appointed to this commiffion, have an undertaking of magnitude on their hands, and their stability muft not only be, but it must be thought, real;-and who is it will believe, that any thing fhort of an establishment made, fupported, and fixed in its duration, with all the authority of parliament, can be thought fecure of a reasonable ftability? The plan of my honourable friend is the reverse of that of reforming by the authors of the abuse. The best we could expect from them is, that they should not continue their ancient pernicious activity. To those we could think of no. thing but applying control; as we are fure, that even a regard to their reputation (if any fuch thing exists in them) would oblige them to cover, to conceal, to fupprefs, and confequently to prevent, all cure of the grievances of India. For what can be discovered, which is not to their disgrace? Every attempt to correct an abufe would be a fatire on their former administration. Every man they should pretend to call to an account, would be found their inftrument or their accomplice. They can never fee a beneficial regulation, but with a view to defeat it. The shorter the tenure

of

of fuch perfons, the better would be the chance of fome amendment.

But the fyftem of the bill is different. It calls in perfons in no wife concerned with any act cen fured by parliament; perfons generated with, and for, the reform, of which they are themfelves the moft effential part. To these the chief regulations in the bill are helps, not fetters; they are authorities to fupport, not regulations to reftrain them. From these we look for much more than innocence. From thefe we expect zeal, firmness, and unremitted activity. Their duty, their character, binds them to proceedings of vigour; and they ought to have a tenure in their office which precludes all fear, whilft they are acting up to the purposes of their truft; a tenure without which, none will undertake plans that require a series and fyftem of acts. When they know that they cannot be whispered out of their duty, that their publick conduct cannot be cenfured without a publick difcuffion; that the fchemes which they have begun will not be committed to those who will have an interest and credit in defeating and difgracing them; then we may entertain hopes. The tenure is for four years, or during their good behaviour. That good behaviour is as long as they are true to the principles of the bill; and the judgment is in either house of parliament. This is the tenure of your judges; and the valuable principle of the

bill

bill is to make a judicial administration for India. It is to give confidence in the execution of a duty, which requires as much perfeverance and fortitude as can fall to the lot of any that is born of woman.

As to the gain by party, from the right honourable gentleman's bill, let it be fhewn, that this fuppofed party advantage is pernicious to its object, and the objection is of weight; but until this is done, and this has not been attempted, I shall confider the fole objection, from its tendency to promote the interest of a party, as altogether contemptible. The kingdom is divided into parties, and it ever has been fo divided, and it ever will be fo divided; and if no system for relieving the fubjects of this kingdom from oppreffion, and fnatching its affairs from ruin, can be adopted until it is demonstrated that no party can derive an advantage from it, no good can ever be done in this country. If party is to derive an advantage from the reform of India, (which is more than I know, or believe) it ought to be that party which alone, in this kingdom, has its reputation, nay its very being, pledged to the protection and prefervation of that part of the empire. Great fear is expreffed, that the commiffioners named in this bill will shew fome regard to a minifter out of place. To men made like the objectors, this muft by

appear criminal. Let it however be remembered