good of intellectual being, so pleasure is the good and perfect purpose of sensible being, and pain, misery, and deformity are their imperfections and evil. Hence, pleasure and pain divide the sensible passions into two classes; a distribution in which the poet and philosopher agree. "Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleasure's smiling train, Ess. on Man. 1171. Pleasure, or sensible good, and Pain, or sensible evil, are, accordingly, the agent and reagent, or final causes of the Passions, opposed in triple distinctions; under which are also naturally arranged in triple opposition all the affections of sense. Thus, under one species of fear, come Bashfulness, which is physical; Shame, which is moral; and between them Modesty, which is sensible and accordingly Plato, in his "Laws," has not unjustly designated shame and modesty as "Divine fear." There are also secondary and compound passions, and such is Anger, composed of Hate and Hope; and Gentleness, or Mildness, which is the opposite of Anger, is composed of Love and Fear; and, hence, gentleness appeases anger, and love and fear suppress it. 1172. As the Passions and Will of man are the elements of moral effects, or the virtues and vices, these may be regarded as of two classes,—the one free, or determined by will, the other impulsive, or determined by passion. Hence the Passions are virtuous or vicious according as they influence power, inclination, or intelligence, to a proper and natural, or an improper and unnatural end,—and the same may be asserted of the will; while morals in the abstract include the doctrines both of the will and of the passions. 1173. Accordingly, man, under the influence of passive good nature, may act virtuously without moral merit, for meritorious virtue is dictated by will and consciousness, or conscience,-while, on the other hand, it is evident he may act viciously, through passion and nature, without ill will ignorantly, and therefore, also, without criminal demerit, for this is also the dictate of will and consciousness; and such are the vices of children and savages. Hence vice and crime are distinguished, the first being passive, the latter active; the first produced blindly by the impulse of passion, the latter with intelligence voluntarily, or by the consent of will. 1174. To the will and consciousness, then, all moral merit devolves, as that alone by which man has free election, while the virtues and vices which depend upon passion are referable to the good or bad nature, or taste, of the man who exercises them, without any moral merit when unattended by the voluntary cultivation of a good disposition, or the control of a disposition inclined to evil. 1175. Thus the Passion for Power produces ambition, avarice, the love of fame, or reputation, and their subordinates; and these are virtuous or vicious according to their motive and management. 1176. Again, the Passion for Pleasure, or the indulgence of inclination or feeling, which are the chief passions, including those of the appetites, senses, and affections, and abound with distinctions, has a double tendency, virtuous or vicious, according to their limitation or license. 1177. Finally, the Passion for Knowledge includes curiosity, the love of liberty, the love of learning and of science, and their subordinates; and these, also, become virtuous or vicious according to their motive, measure, and tendency. 1178. Hence, the Passions are the fruitful source of virtues when they are under the control of a well-regulated will; wanting which, they are, however, more naturally prone to their extremes, which are vices. Accordingly, by the impulse of power, tyranny and violence oppress and destroy; the seductions of inclination conduct the body to destruction, and degrade the soul; and even knowledge or intelligence, impelled by passion and prejudice, becomes but the abettor of tyranny and sensuality, the slave itself of every vice. Happily, however, for the honour and interests of science and of mankind, the natural and prevailing alliance of knowledge is with reason and universal will, and its nobler end that of giving laws to power, inclination, and will. 1179. The chief objects of man, in the cultivation of the extremes of his middle faculties, of which we have been treating, should be to convert appetites into fair affections, and to subdue passion to sentiment, although in common practice, and in early life, every thing is regarded and pursued with passion or appetite; nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the man who has exchanged appetites for decorous affections, and passions for sentiments, is nobler, and seasoned with a more safe, permanent, and moral enjoyment, associated with intellect, and approaching to happiness: for good morals are intimately allied to good taste. 1180. To do adequate justice to a subject of such extent and importance as the Passions demands an especial treatise, and is not to be accomplished by a partial and desultory sketch like the present; but such a work would require an induction of every denomination of these affections of passive intellect, from which a correct analogism of their classes and connexions may be determined, and their proper discipline deduced from their just doctrine; a task fraught with curious inquiry, and of no ordinary utility in the ethical regulation of the mind. 1181. To effect this partially, or even in a single species of the Passions, would be to benefit science, and to merit its distinction. An able analysis of fear, or hope, or love, or any other affection of the mind, has surely as much interest for mankind, and claims at least as much attention and applause, as an equally ingenious analysis of a material substance, and is certainly more necessary toward establishing that self-knowledge and regulation which is so essential to the dispelling of ignorance, and to the fruition of happiness. "The spacious west, And all the teeming regions of the south, Of knowledge, half so tempting and so fair As MAN to man."-AKENside. 1182. The above may, however, suffice to mark the position of the Passions as a portion of science, and to shew how they connect the esthetical, or sensible sciences, with the ethical or moral. Whether we have given a sufficient or unexceptionable account of the Passions here, or of other particulars of science elsewhere, is of comparatively little moment, if we have put them in their proper places; for when things are placed in order by a true relative adjustment, it may become an easier after-task to regulate them specifically, to correct them individually, and to extend them to their legitimate boundaries. Any further analysis of the Passions is therefore inexpedient here; we having already trespassed upon the ground of ethical science. 1183. Upon the whole, the wisdom of nature, apparent and wonderful in all things, is especially admirable in the rise and decline of the appetites, |