only is, that the first is a judgment of relations in sensations, producing sentiment, the latter a judgment of intellectual relations terminating in reason, or ratio. Hence, all judgments terminating in sentiment are judgments of taste; and sentiment is the reaction of intelligence upon sense, or of active upon passive intellection; and thus taste intellectuallizes sense.

943. Taste is, accordingly, sensibility, extending from the lowest objects of appetite to the highest affections of the mind; although, under a proper limitation, its chief object is beauty with regard to sense of which more hereafter, when we come to treat of Beauty as an end.

944. Taste is, therefore, an exquisite sensibility, regulated by judgment; or, finally, it is in all cases a sense, or sentiment of harmony; that is, a general sense to which belongs, also, negatively, a distaste, or sense of discordance or incongruity, that attaches sense to judgment in taste, for sense is of particulars, and judgment belongs to generality.

945. Taste, then, extends with propriety to every object of sense, and, doing so, it must have a principle by which it is identified in each of the senses; and it is the chief intention of the present outline to disclose this principle, and to indicate the analogy by which the Sensible Sciences are more intimately related and connected among themselves, and more remotely so with the whole family of the sciences.

946. We have attempted to demonstrate, in our preceding outlines, the ground upon which this analogy reclines, and to illustrate it by the coincidences of the physical or material sciences, whereby we have arrived in a natural course at the esthetical or sensible.

947. To these sciences, which have not been treated of conjointly, some advantage may arise individually from the study of their general relations, since the identity of their universal archetype, or paradigm, may become a light to their individual obscurities, and the science of one may be reciprocally reflected upon the others.

948. Such advantages are not, however, peculiar to the esthetical sciences, but are in various degrees common to the other branches of science; while these sciences, deducing their form and principles both from the internal and the external, and referring to distinct senses as a medium or basis, have thence a diversity which is attended by some intricacy of relations, but which is, nevertheless, compensated by the remarkable coincidences with which these sciences abound, whereby we have been enabled to trace their reciprocal fundamental similitude and uniformity, and their conformity with the plan and paradigm of science universally.

949. It contributes powerfully to the evidence of the truth of our universal plan, as deduced from the analogy of reason, that the elementary triad in each of the esthetical sciences is founded on

irrefragable fact, accurately determined in each by its appropriate sense, common to all men without intention, remission, or appeal.

950. Thus each has its triad of principles, from which, if we take, there is deficiency, and to which, if we add, there is redundancy; and it is sufficient to the mind that they are facts to all men original and ultimate. Why they are so? or why they are such as they are? are questions appropriate to a higher power, and beyond the capacity of man to answer perfectly; and these triads stand, like the elements of matter in the composition of bodies, as constructive or regulative of all the varieties of sense, and illustrative of the form of all science; and, also, as a sufficient clue to guide us safely through this most intricate department of knowledge.

CHAPTER I.

ESTHETICS.

951. THE term ESTHETICS, in its widest signification, denotes that genus of physiological science which comprehends whatever lies between physical or material, and ethical or moral science, which are the two extreme genera of physiological science, correlative with the esthetical as their mean. thetics, therefore, comprehend whatever belongs to the philosophy of sense, as distinguished from matter and intelligence.

Es

952. We may regard the world physically only, as a world of matter; we may regard it, also, intellectually, as a world of knowledge; and we may regard it, esthetically, as a world of

sensation.

953. We have, as appears in our first outline and synopsis, traced the course of science in the second of these views, which in a manner comprehends the other two, without ascribing any thing

to physical causes or material elements, and without attributing any thing to sensible impulse. In each of these other views, however, a similar distribution would arise, because they do but vary the same universal view.

954. If, therefore, we were to unfold universal science esthetically, we should, in place of the

955. And such would be our proper course in a special and particular treatise, in which this science was to be principal, and not subordinate to universal science, as it is in this place. Yet, in treating of the sensible genus of science in this outline, some attention to such a distribution will be expedient to completeness; with due deference, nevertheless, of its extremes to the sciences more purely and especially sensible.

956. The entire investigation of this subject would carry us throughout all animal nature, of which sense is the distinguishing attribute, and among the different orders of which it is variously inherent. But, although each of the senses indi