ciple be admitted, that men pafs out of this life into an eternal state of happiness or mifery, according as they have behaved themselves in this world; then the account of the unequal providences of God in this world is eafy. For if we look upon this life as a state of probation, of trial ta wicked men, and of exercife to good men, in order to a fu ture and eternal state; and if we confider withal, how vaft the difference is between time and eternity, it will be eafy then to apprehend how all things may be fet ftrait in another world, and how the righteoufnefs of God may appear, in giving an abundant recompence to good men for all their temporal fervice and fufferings, which do but prepare them the more for a quicker relifh of the glory and happiness which is referved for them; and on the other hand, in punishing wicked men, whofe fhort cafe and profperity in this world will, by the juft judgment of God, for their abufe of the bleflings of this life, fet out their mifery and torment to the greatest difadvantage. For as nothing commends happiness more than precedent forrow; fo nothing makes pain and fuffering more bitter and intolerable, than to step into them out of a state of cafe and pleafure; fo that the pleafures and profperity of wicked men in this life, confidered with the punishment of the next, which will follow upon them," is an addition to their mifery. This is the very fting of the fecond death; and in this fenfe alfo, that of the wife man is true, the cafe of the fimple will flay them, and the profperity of these fools fhall be the great aggravation of their deftruction.

2. Another notion which is deeply rooted in the nature of man, is, that there is a difference between good and evil, which is not founded in the imagination of perfons, or in the custom and ufage of the world, but in the nature of things; that there are fome things which have a natural evil, and turpitude, and deformity in them; for example, impiety and prophanenefs towards God, injuftice and unrighteoufnefs towards men, perfidioufnefs, injury, ingratitude; thefe are things that are not only condemned by the pofitive laws and conftitutions of particular nations and governments, but by the general verdict and fentiments of humanity. Piety and religion towards God, juftice and righteouf

ness,

nefs, and fidelity and reverence of oaths, regard to a man's word and promife, and gratitude towards those who have obliged us; thefe and the like qualities, which we call virtues, are not only well spoken of, where they are countenanced by the authority of law, but have the tacite approbation and veneration of mankind: and any man that thinks these things are not naturally and in themselves good, but are merely arbitrary, and depend upon the pleasure of authority, and the will of thofe who have the power of impofing laws up on others; I fay, any fuch perfon may eafily be convinced of his error, by putting this fuppofition: fupe pofe wickedness were established by a law, and the pratice of fraud, and rapine, and perjury, falfenefs in a man's word and promifes, were commended and rewarded; and it were made a crime for any man to be honest, to have any regard to his oath or promife, and the man that should dare to be honeft or make good his word, fhould be feverely punished, and made a publick example; I fay, fuppofe the reverfe of all that which we now call virtue, were folemnly enacted by a law. and publick authority fhould enjoin the practice of that which we call vice; what would the confequence of this be, when the tables were thus turned? would that which we now call vice, gain the esteem and reputation of virtue; and those things which we now call virtue, grow contemptible, and become odious to human nature? If not, then there is a natural and intrinsical difference between good and evil, between virtue and vice; there is fomething in the nature of these things which does not depend upon arbitrary conftitution. And I think nothing can be more evident, than that the authority which fhould attempt fuch an establishment, would thereby be rendered ridiculous, and all laws of fuch a tendency as this, would be hiffed out of the world. And the reafon of this is plain, because no government could fubfift upon these terms: for the very forbidding men to be juft and honeft, the enjoining of fraud, and violence, and perjury, and breach of truft, would apparently destroy the end of government, which is to preferve men and their rights, against the encroachments and inconveniencies of these; and this

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end

end being deftroyed, human fociety would prefently disband, and men would naturally fall into a state of war which plainly fhews that there is a natural, and immutable, and eternal reason for that which we call goodness and virtue; and against that which we call vice and wickedness.

To come then to my purpose, it is very agreeable to this natural notion of the difference between good and evil, to believe the foul's immortality. For nothing is more reasonable to imagine, than that good and evil, as they are differenced in their nature, fo they fhall be in their rewards; that it fhall one time or other be well to them that do well, and evil to the wicked man. Now, feeing this difference is not made in this world, but all things happen alike to all, the belief of this difference between good and evil, and the different rewards belonging to them, infers another flate after this life, which is the very thing we mean by the foul's immortality, namely, that it does not die with the body, but remains after it, and paffeth into a state wherein it fhall receive a reward fuitable to the actions of this life.

And thus I have done with the fecond argument for the foul's immortality, namely, that this principle doth not contradict those other principles which nature hath planted in us, but doth very well accord and agree with thofe natural notions which we have of the goodnefs of God, and of the juftice of his providence, and of the real and intrinfical difference between good and evil: III. This principle of the foul's immortality, is fuitable to the natural hopes and fears of men.

To the natural hopes of men. Whence is it that men are so defirous to purchase a lafting fame, and to perpetuate their memory to pofterity, but that they hope that there is fomething belonging to them, which fhall survive the fate of the body, and when that lies in the filent grave, fhall be fenfible of the honour which is done to their memory, and shall enjoy the pleasure of the juft and impartial fame, which fhall speak of them to pofterity without envy or flattery? And this is a thing incident to the greatest and moft generous fpirits; none fo apt as they to feed themselves with thefe hopes of immortality. What was it made thofe great fpirits

among

among the Romans fo freely to facrifice their lives for the fafety of their country, but an ambition that their names might live after them, and be mentioned with honour when they were dead and gone? Which ambition of theirs, had it not been grounded in the hopes of immortality, and a natural opinion of another life after this, in which they might enjoy the delight and fatiffaction of the fame which they had purchased, nothing could have been more vain and unreafonable. If there were no hopes of a life beyond this, what is there in fame that fhould tempt any man to forego this prefent life, with all the contentments and enjoyments of it? what is the pleasure of being well fpoken of, when a man is not? what is the happiness which men can promife to themselves, when they are out of being, when they can enjoy nothing, nor be fenfible of any thing, because they are not? So that the fpring of all thofe brave and gallant actions, which the Heathens did with the hazard of their lives, out of a defire of after-fame and glory; I fay, the fpring of all thofe actions, could be no other than the hopes of another life after this, in which they made account to enjoy the pleafure of the fame, which they purchased with the expence and lofs of this prefent life.

But this ardent defire, and impatient thirst after fame, concerns but a few of mankind in comparison. I fhall therefore inftance in fomething which is more common and general to mankind, which plainly argues this hope of immortality. What is the ground of that peace, and quiet, and fatisfaction, which good men find in good and virtuous actions, but that they have a fecret perfuafion and comfortable hopes that they fhall fome time or other be rewarded? And we find that they maintain thefe, even when they despair of any reward in this world. Now, what do thefe hopes argue, but a fecret belief of a future ftate, and another life after this, wherein men fhall receive the reward of their a ctions,and inherit the fruit of their doings? Whence is it elfe, that good men, though they find that goodness fuffers, and is perfecuted in this world, and that the Beft defigns are many times unfuccefsful; what is it that bears them up under thefe disappointments, and makes

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makes them conftant in a virtuous course, but this hope of another life, in a better state of things hereafter ? They have fome fecret prefage in their own minds of a life after death, which will be a time of recompence, as this is of trial.

2. The fame may be argued from the natural fears of men. Whence is the fecret fhame, and fear, and horror, which feizeth upon the minds of men, when they are about a wicked action; yea, though no eye fee them, and though what they are doing do not fall under the cognizance of any human court or tribunal ? Whence is it that they meet with fuch checks and rebukes in their own fpirits, and feel fuch a disturbance and confufion in their minds, when they do a vile and unworthy thing; yea, although it be fo fecretly contrived and fo privately managed, that no man can charge them with it, or call them to account for it? What -art thou afraid of, man, if there be no life after this? why do thy joints tremble, and thy knees knock together, if thou beeft in no danger from any thing in this world, and haft no fears of the other? If men had not a natural dread of another world, and fad and dreadful prefages of future vengeance, why do not men fin with affurance when no eye fees them? Why are not men fecure, when they have only imagined a mifchief privately in their own hearts, and no creature is privy and confcious to it? Why do mens own confciences lafh and (ting them for these things, which they might do with as great impunity from men in this world, as the most virtuous actions? Whence is it that cogitare, peccare eft, as Min. Felix expreffeth it, & non folùm confcios timet, fed & confcientiam? Whence is it that " wicked man is guilty upon account merely of his thoughts, and is not only fearful, becaufe of those things which others are conscious of, but because of "thofe things which no body knows but his own con"fcience?'* Whence is it that,

Scelus intra fe tacitum qui cogitat ullum,

Facti crimen habet?

a

that he that does but imagine and devife fecret mif"chief in his heart, is guilty to himself, as if the fact

had