as the most learned and deep-thinking philosopher. It is extremely difficult for any man to help reasoning from the effect to the cause. Should the greatest skeptic travel two or three hundred miles into a wild wilderness, and there discover a very ancient and elegant house, he would instantaneously draw the conclusion in his own mind that that house was built by some man. In short, we intuitively perceive that whatever begins to exist, may have a cause of its existence. If the world, therefore, might have had a beginning, it is easy and natural to conceive that it might have had a cause.

III. If the world might have had a cause, then it must have had a cause. Some seem to scruple whether this can be fairly made out by strict and proper reasoning. Lord Kaimes and Mr. Hume deny that it implies any absurdity to suppose that a thing may begin to exist without a cause. And hence they

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conclude it is impossible to prove that every thing which begins effect

to exist must have a cause. Mr. Hume says a cause is nothing more than an antecedent to a consequent, and an effect is nothing more than a consequent of an antecedent. But this representation of cause and effect is contrary to common sense. When a number of men walk in procession, they bear the relation of antecedent and consequent to each other, but not the relation of cause and effect. The motion of those who walk before is no cause of the motion of those who walk behind; or in other words, the antecedents do not bear the relation of cause to the consequents, nor the consequents bear the relation of effect to the antecedents. The idea of cause and effect always carries something more in it than the bare perception of antecedent and consequent. This we know from our own experience. The operation of our own minds gives us a clear and distinct perception of cause and effect. When we walk, we are conscious of a power to produce motion. The exercise of this power gives us the perception of cause, and the motion which flows from it gives us the perception not only of a consequent, but of an effect. Our idea of cause and effect is as clear and distinct as our idea of heat and cold, and is as truly correspondent to an original impression. This being established, the way is prepared to show, that if the world might have had a cause, it must have had a cause.

Whatever we can conceive to be capable of existing by a cause, we can as clearly conceive to be incapable of existing without a cause. For that which renders any thing capable of existing by a cause, renders it equally incapable of existing without a cause. Thus if the nature of a certain wheel render it capable of being moved by a cause, then that same nature renders it incapable of moving without a cause. Or if the

nature of a certain wheel render it capable of moving without a cause, then that same nature renders it incapable of being moved by a cause. Suppose there are two wheels, the one large and the other small. Suppose it is the nature of the large wheel to stand still of itself, but the nature of the small wheel to move of itself. Here it is easy to see that motion in one of these wheels may be owing to a cause, but not in the other. The large wheel, whose nature it is to stand still of itself, may be moved by a cause. For if a proper power be applied to it, motion will instantly follow; and if that power be withdrawn, motion will instantly cease. But the small wheel, whose nature it is to move of itself, cannot be moved by a cause. For if any power whatever be applied to it, the motion will be the same; and consequently the power applied will produce no effect, and be no cause. If this reasoning be just, then whatever we can conceive to be capable of being an effect, must have been an effect; or whatever we can conceive to be capable of having a cause of its existence, must have had a cause of its existence. If we can only conceive, therefore, that the world in which we live, and the objects with which we are surrounded, are capable of having a cause of their existence, then we can as clearly conceive that it was absolutely impossible for them to have come into existence without a cause.

But Mr. Hume does not pretend to deny that the world is capable of having had a cause. And if this be true, then it is certain to a demonstration, that there was some cause which actually produced it. That is demonstrably false which cannot be conceived to be true; and that is demonstrably true which cannot be conceived to be false. It is demonstrably false that a body can move north and south at the same time; for it is not in the power of the mind to conceive that a body is moving north while it is moving south. It is demonstrably true that two and two are equal to four; for it is not in the power of the mind to conceive that two and two should be more or less than four. It is demonstrably true that all the parts are equal to the whole; for it is not in the power of the mind to conceive that all the parts should be more or less than the whole. And in the same manner it is demonstrably true that the world must have had a cause of its existence. We can clearly conceive that the world is capable of having had a cause of its existence, and therefore we cannot conceive that it was capable of coming into existence without a cause. The possibility of its having had a cause, destroys the possibility of its having come into existence without a cause; just as the possi

* That is, if it moves as fast as possible, which is supposed.

bility of a body's moving one way at once, destroys the possibility of its moving two ways at once. Had Hume and Kaimes properly consulted the operation of their own minds upon this subject, we presume they never would have granted that it was possible for the world to have come into existence by a cause, and yet asserted that it was possible it might have come into existence without a cause. By granting the possibility of the world's coming into existence by a cause, they have virtually granted that it was absolutely impossible it should have come into existence without a cause. The bare possibility of the world's beginning to exist, amounts to a demonstration that it did begin to exist. And the bare possibility of its beginning to exist by a cause, amounts to a demonstration that there was some cause of its beginning to exist.

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IV. The cause which produced this world must be equal to the effect produced. No cause can produce an effect superior to itself. This is no less impossible than that an effect should exist without a cause. For just so far as an effect surpasses the cause, it ceases to be an effect, and exists of itself. suppose, therefore, that the world owes its existence to any cause inferior to itself, involves the same absurdity as to suppose that it began to exist without a cause. It requires a greater cause to produce a great, than a small effect. This we know by our own experience. We can produce small effects. We are able to move or new modify some things around us; but we cannot give existence to the smallest atom. To produce something out of nothing requires a far greater cause than it does merely to move or new modify things which already exist. Hence the character and perfections of the first and supreme Cause may be fairly argued from the things which he hath made.

Here, then, I would observe,

1. The Creator of all things must be possessed of almighty power. This is the first attribute of the first cause which his great and marvellous works impress upon the mind. In surveying the works of creation, their greatness constrains us to conclude that no less than almighty power could bring them out of nothing into being. It is true, our imagination is here apt to get the start of our reason, and we are ready to apprehend that the power of preserving is greater than the power of creating the world. Preserving power seems to admit of different degrees of effort, in proportion to the different degrees of magnitude in the objects preserved. It seems to require a greater effort in the Supreme Being to support a mountain than a mole-hill, or to support the ponderous earth than the light and flying clouds. But this is altogether owing to a delusive imag

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ination. In the eye of reason, whatever the Supreme Power can do, he can do with equal ease. It requires no more effort in the great First Cause to support and preserve the world, than it did to call it into existence at first. "He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." This facility of his operation displays the greatness of his power in the production of the world. He who produced an angel as easily as a man, a man as easily as a worm, and a world as easily as an atom, must be a being of unbounded power. His power of creating surpasses the powers of all dependent beings. For, were all their powers united, they could not create a fly, nor a worm, nor produce the least particle of matter. We cannot conceive of any power greater than that which can give existence, or produce something out of nothing. The being, therefore, who created this world, must be able to do every thing which lies within the limits of possibility. By creating one world, he has displayed a power sufficient to create as many worlds as space itself can contain. And therefore, if we may judge of the cause by the effect, we may safely conclude that the first and supreme Cause of all things is necessarily omnipotent.

2. The Author and Framer of the world must be supremely wise and intelligent. Mankind have always admired the beauty of the world. The Greeks, that learned and refined nation, called it beauty in the abstract. Uniformity amidst variety appears through every part of creation. The motions and revolutions of the heavenly bodies are uniform, though extremely various. There is uniformity amidst variety in every species of grain, of grass, of flowers, of trees and of animals. There is a great uniformity among the many millions of mankind, yet an almost infinite variety. The human body is a most curious piece of machinery. Its various parts are not only well proportioned, but nicely constructed, and situated to answer their various purposes. The feet are admirably fitted for walking, the hands for laboring, the eyes for seeing, the ears for hearing, and the mouth for both feeding and speaking. Indeed, not only the human frame, but the whole creation, appears to be made for use. All the luminaries of heaven serve many and important purposes. They not only afford light to the earth, but divide time into days, months and years, and a happy variety of seasons. Air and earth, fire and water, are all necessary to support and preserve the lives of men, of animals and vegetables. The seas which divide, at the same time unite the numerous nations of the earth. The lower species of animals appear to be made for the service of the higher; the higher and lower species appear to be made for the service of man; and man, a rational and noble creature, appears to be

made for the service of his Maker. Such variety, uniformity, regularity and intelligence in the effect, clearly demonstrate intelligence and wisdom in the cause. The world bears stronger marks of the design of the Creator, than a clock, or watch, or any other curious machine bears of the ingenuity of the artificer. Indeed it is easier to conceive that houses should be framed, that cities should be built, and all the arts and sciences carried to the highest pitch of improvement by mere chance, than that this beautiful, regular, and useful world should have been framed by any other cause than a wise and intelligent Being, who revolved and adjusted in his own mind every part of it, before he called it into existence. When we survey the order, usefulness and intelligence of the things that are made, we as clearly see and understand the manifold wisdom, as the eternal power, of the Godhead.

3. The builder and upholder of the world must be every where present. It is the nature of all created beings and objects to be constantly and absolutely dependent upon their Creator. But if he constantly upholds all his creatures and all his works, then he must be constantly present in every part of his wide creation. We cannot conceive that any cause can operate where it does not exist; and of course we cannot conceive that the Creator and Preserver of the world should exert his power beyond the limits of his presence. But it is certain that his preserving and governing power extends to every creature and every object, whether great or small, through every part of the created universe; and therefore it is equally certain that his presence constantly fills and surrounds the whole creation. And this gives us the highest possible idea of the immensity of the divine presence.

4. The maker and governor of the world must be a being of boundless knowledge. He must necessarily know himself, and be intuitively acquainted with all his natural and moral perfections. And by knowing these, he must necessarily know all possibles; that is, all things which lie within the limits of omnipotence. This is that knowledge which constitutes one of the essential attributes of the great first Cause. And besides this, he must necessarily have the knowledge of his own purposes and designs, which is properly termed fore-knowledge. For, by knowing his own decrees, he necessarily knows all actuals; that is, all things that ever will exist. Hence it appears that his understanding is infinite, and his knowledge boundless. His great and capacious mind comprehends at one view all things past, present and to come. And more than this cannot be known.

5. The first, supreme, and intelligent Cause of all things