XVIII. 1795. : CHAP. nature, only be temporary how great soever may be the accumulated wealth of a state, it must in time be exhausted, if not supplied by the continued labours of private industry. The Reign of Terror, by stopping all the efforts of individuals to better their condition, and paralysing the arms of labour over the whole country, dried up the sources of national wealth. Even had the fall of Robespierre not put a period to the violent means adopted for rendering it available to the state, the same result must soon have followed from the cessation of all the sources of its supply.1 1 Mig. ii. 402. Th. vii. 433. Jom. vii. 56. 10. tions in the Mediter ranean. Combat of la Spezia. During the winter of 1794, the French government Naval opera- made the greatest exertions to put their navy on a respectable footing, but all their efforts on that element led to nothing but disaster. Early in March the Toulon fleet, consisting of thirteen ships of the line, put to sea with the design of expelling the British squadron from the Gulf of Genoa, and landing an expedition in Corsica. Being ignorant of their intention, Lord Hotham, who commanded the British blockading fleet, was at Leghorn at the time, and they succeeded in capturing the Berwick, of seventy-four guns, in the Gulf of St Florent, which found itself surrounded by the French fleet before its crew were aware it had put to sea. But the British admiral was not long in taking his revenge. On the 7th March he set sail from Leghorn with thirteen line-ofMarch 13. battle ships, and on the 13th fell in with the French squadron of the same force, By a skilful manœuvre he succeeded in cutting off two ships of the line, the Ça Ira and the Censeur, which fell into the hands of the British; and the remainder of the fleet, after a severe but partial action, was compelled to fall back to the Isles de Hyères, and disembark the land troops which they had on board. By this vigorous stroke the object of the expedition in the recovery of Corsica was entirely frustrated;2 and such was the dismay with which the soldiers were inspired from their sufferings during its continuance, that out of 2 James's Naval Hist. ii. 81, 92. Ann. Reg. p. 138. Jom. vii. 72, 74. XVIII. eighteen thousand men who were originally embarked, CHAP. only ten thousand reached the French army, then lying in the Marquisate of Oneille. 1795. 11. Maritime Meanwhile the courts of Vienna and of Turin were making the most vigorous efforts for the prosecution of War in the the war on the Piedmontese frontier. The Austrians Alps. reinforced the King of Sardinia with fifteen thousand men, and the Piedmontese troops raised the effective force in the field to fifty thousand men. The French soldiers on that frontier were in a still greater state of destitution and misery than the army of the Rhine. From the effect of desertion and sickness, during the severe winter of 1794, amidst the inhospitable region of the Alps, the total effective forces on that frontier did not exceed forty-five thousand. They occupied the whole crest of the mountains, from Vado to the Little St Bernard, while eighteen thousand of the Allied forces were stationed in front of Cairo, fifteen thousand near Ceva, ten thousand in the valleys of Stura and Suza, and six thousand on the lofty ridges which close the upper extremity of the valley of Aosta. Generally speaking, the Republicans were perched on the summits of the mountains, while the Piedmontese forces occupied the 293. Jom. narrow defiles where they sink down into the Italian 80. plains.1 1 Toul. v. vii. 76, 78, rations of successful, of the May 12. The campaign commenced by a well-concerted enter- 12. prise of the French against the Col Dumont, near Mont First opeCenis, which the Piedmontese occupied with a force of the Allies, two thousand men, from whence they were driven with which are considerable loss. But shortly afterwards, Kellermann and dangers having been obliged to weaken his right by large detach- French. ments, to suppress a revolt at Toulon, the Imperialists resolved to take the lead by offensive operations against the French forces stationed in the Maritime Alps. For this purpose a simultaneous attack was made on the June 20. Republican posts at St Giacomo, Bordinetto, and Vado, which were all fortified. Though the French gained an XVIII. 1795. June 26. CHAP. advantage at the Col de Tende, their line was forced back after several days' fighting, and the Republicans were obliged to evacuate all their positions in the Maritime Alps. The Allied forces occupied Loano, Final, and Voltri, with the whole magazines and artillery which had been collected there, and threatened the country of Nice and the territory of the Republic. Had the Allied generals pushed their advantages with vigour, the whole right wing of the French army might have been driven from the mountains, or destroyed; for they could have collected thirty thousand fresh troops, flushed with victory, to crush twenty thousand, harassed with fatigue, destitute of shoes, and literally starving. Kellermann, with the aid of his chief of the staff, Berthier, exerted the utmost degree of skill and ability to compensate the inferiority of their force; but it was with the greatest difficulty, and only by pledging their private credit for the supplies of the army, that they were enabled either to procure provisions for the troops, or inspire them with the resolution to defend the rugged and desolate ridge in which the contest was carried on. Their situation was rendered the more desperate by a naval action between the British and Toulon fleets in the Bay of Frejus, in the course of which the Alcide, of seventyfour guns, blew up; and the French squadron, severely shattered, was compelled to take refuge in the harbour of Toulon. Fortunately for the Republicans, divisions between the Allied generals at this time paralysed their movements, and prevented them from following up the 297, 300. advantages which their recent successes, and the open communication with the British fleet, seemed to afford.1 These disasters on the frontiers of Provence induced The French the government to detach seven thousand men from the strongly army of the Eastern Pyrenees, and ten thousand men from the army of the Rhine, to reinforce the combatants on the Alps. Their arrival, towards the end of August, restored the superiority to the Republican side, while no 1 Jom. vii. 98, 101. Toul. v. 293, 13. armies reinforced, and resume the offen sive. XVIII. 1795. corresponding addition was made to the forces of the CHAP. Allied generals-another proof, among the many which these campaigns afford, of the total want of concert which prevailed between the Allies on the vast circle of operations from the Rhine to the Mediterranean, and the inestimable advantages which the French derived from the unity of government, and interior line of communication, which they enjoyed. The consequences soon proved ruinous to the Allied armies. Kellermann, enabled by this powerful reinforcement to resume the offensive, and encouraged by the evident discord between the Allied generals, formed the design of separating the Sardinian from the Austrian forces by a concentrated attack upon the centre of their line, and compelling the latter to give battle alone in the valley of Loano. But before this plan could be carried into effect, the peace with Spain enabled the government to detach to the support of the army of Italy the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, which arrived in the Maritime Alps before the end of September, and the command of the whole was given to General Scherer, Kellermann being detached to the command of the forces in Savoy. This great addition rendered the Republicans nearly double the Allied forces in that quarter; while the courts of Turin and Vienna took no steps to avert the storm preparing to burst upon their heads. In truth, the Piedmontese government, experiencing the fate of all weak states in alliance with powerful ones, began to be as jealous of its friends as its enemies; while the Imperial generals rendered it too evident, by their manner and conduct, that they had no confidence either in the sincerity of the government, or the efficiency of their soldiers. Devins, the Piedmontese general, trusted for his support not to the strength of the 1 Jom. vii. mountains which he occupied, but to the co-operation of 294, 297. the British fleet in the Bay of Genoa-a signal error, 301. which soon led to the most disastrous consequences.1 The Austrian army, consisting of forty thousand men, 280, 293, Toul. v. CHAP. XVIII. 1795. was posted in an extensive and fortified position, having its left resting on the little seaport town of Loano, and its right extending to the summit of the impending heights to the northward, from whence it communicated by a tions for the chain of fortified posts with the strong places of Ceva, 14. Prepara battle of Loano. 2 Jom. vii. 298, 309. Toul. v.378, 379. 15. ment of the action. * Mondovi, and Coni, held by the Piedmontese troops. The position was strong; but this strength was balanced by the circumstance that, in case of disaster, the left wing had no means of retreat. The Republicans occupied a position in front of their opponents, their right resting on the little village of Borghetto on the sea-coast, their left extending to the Col de Tende and the summits of the Maritime Alps. The army at first consisted only of thirty-seven thousand men, but it was raised, by the successive arrival of the columns from the Eastern Pyrenees, before the middle of November, to sixty thousand men. Massena, who had acquired a remarkable knowledge of the localities of that rugged district during the preceding campaigns, and whose great military abilities had already become conspicuous, was intrusted with the command of the attack. Notwithstanding the vast accession of force which the Republicans had received, and the increased activity which they had for some time evinced, the Austrian commander was so little aware of his danger that he lay at la Pietra, detained by an abscess in his mouth, while his officers were chiefly assembled at Feriole, where they were roused from a ball by the sound of the French cannon, at six o'clock on the morning of the 23d November.1 Scherer, the general-in-chief, commanded the right wing, Commence- Massena the centre, and Serrurier the left. Massena's design was to force the Austrian centre with an overwhelming force, and from that vantage-ground to take the remainder of the line in flank and rear. After haranguing his troops, he led them to the assault. The Austrian centre, commanded by Argenteau, made an obstinate resistance at the posts of Bordinetto and Melogno, and * See a biography of MASSENA, infra, chap. xx. § 49. Nov. 23. |