XVI. 1794. Austrian force, ten thousand strong, in the interior. The CHAP. great superiority of the French forces would have enabled them to have instantly commenced the invasion of Italy; but, pressed in other quarters, the Committee of Public Salvation, under the directions of Robespierre, contented themselves with enjoining their commanders to drive the enemy over the Alps, and get possession of all the passes, deferring to a future year the long-wished-for irruption into the Italian provinces. The first operations of the Republicans were not successful. General Sarret, with a detachment of two thousand men, was repulsed at the Little St Bernard, while the column destined for the attack of the Mont Cenis was also unsuccessful. Far from being dis- March 24. couraged by these trifling reverses, General Dumas returned to the charge with more considerable forces, and on the 23d April 23. April, after a vigorous resistance, made himself master of the first pass, which was followed on the 14th May by May 14. the capture of the second. The loss of Mont Cenis cost the Sardinians six hundred prisoners and twenty pieces of cannon. By these successes, the whole ridge of the higher Alps, separating Piedmont from Savoy, fell into the 201. Bot. possession of the Republican generals; and the keys of 196. Italy were placed in the hands of the French government.1 1 Jom. v. 194, 199, i. 185, 193, Nor were the operations of the Republicans less success- 60. cesses of and Massena ful on the frontiers of Nice. The counsels of the leaders Great sucwere there directed by General Buonaparte, whose extra- Napoleon ordinary military abilities had already given him an in the Mariascendency far beyond his rank. His design was to turn time Alps. Saorgio by its left, and cut off the retreat of its garrison, by the great road from over the Col de Tende. The attacking force was divided into three columns. The first, twenty thousand strong, commanded by Massena, broke up on the 1st April, with twenty pieces of cannon, to pass between Saorgio and the sea; the second, composed of ten thousand men, under the immediate directions of Dumorbion, remained in front of the enemy; while the third, of equal force, was destined to gain the upper extremity of the XVI. 1794. CHAP. valleys of the Vesubia, and communicate with the army of Savoy by Isola. In the course of his march, Massena traversed the neutral territory of Genoa, and, after a bold march as far as Carossio, found himself considerably in advance of the main body of the enemy, posted in intrenched camps on the western side of the mountains. Guided by the intrepid Colonel Rusca, an ardent hunter, well acquainted with these Alpine ridges, he boldly pursued his successes, and, by a skilful combination of all his force, succeeded in storming the redoubts of the Col Ardente. In vain the Piedmontese received the assailants with a shower of stones and balls; nothing could withstand the impetuosity of the Republicans; and Massena, pursuing his successes, reached Tanardo, and the heights which command the pass of the Briga. Rusca, familiar with the country, vehemently urged his commander to direct some battalions to descend to the convent of St Dalmazia, seize the great road, destroy the bridges, and cut off the retreat of the great body of the enemy posted at the camp at Rauss. But Massena had other objects in view. He had occupied, with considerable force, the cliffs which overhang in rear the fortress of Saorgio-an advantage which rendered that fortress no longer tenable. He preferred, in consequence, the certain advantage, now within his power, of rendering unavoidable, without risk, the evacuation of that important stronghold, which commands the pass by the Col de Tende from France into Italy, to the perilous attempt of compelling a force nearly equal to his own to surrender. Meanwhile the attack of the centre, under Dumorbion, had been attended with equal success; and the Sardinian forces, pressed in front and menaced in rear, evacuated the famous camp of Rauss, and fell back towards the Col de Tende. Dumorbion's leading columns approached the fort of Saorgio, at the Jom. v. 204, same time that Massena's forces appeared on the heights Th. vi. 283. immediately overhanging it behind; and this celebrated post, almost impregnable in front,1 but destitute of any April 28. Botta, i. 184, 190. 209, 210. 1794. 61. dinians are defence against the forces of the Republicans, now perched CHAP. on the rocks in its rear, surrendered at the first summons. XVI. Meanwhile the French left successfully ascended the Vesubia, and, after a vehement resistance, the winding The Sarrocky road between Figaretto and Lantosca was stormed, driven over and the Allies driven back to the Col de Fenestrelles, while the ridge of the Alps. General Serrurier cleared the valley of the Tinea, and established a communication by Isola with the army of Savoy. To reap the fruit of so many successes, Dumorbion ordered Garnier to seize the Col de Fenestrelles, while his own centre drove the enemy from the Col de Tende. Both operations were successful. The Col de Fenestrelles fell after hardly any resistance; and, although the Col de Tende was more bravely contested, the unexpected appearance of a division of French on their left spread a panic among the Piedmontese troops, which speedily led to the evacuation of the position. Thus the Republicans, before the end of May, were masters of all the passes through the Maritime Alps; and while, from the summit of Mont Cenis, they threatened a descent upon the valley of Susa and the capital, from the Col de Tende they could advance straight to the siege of the important fortress of Coni. Buonaparte, whose prophetic eye already anticipated the triumphs of 1796, in vain urged the government to unite the victorious armies in the valley of the Stura, and push on immediately with their combined strength to the conquest of Italy. The reverse at Kayserslautern induced them to withdraw ten thousand men from the army of the Alps to support the troops on the Rhine; and Dumorbion, satisfied with the laurels he had won, and with energies enfeebled by years, could not be induced to risk ulterior operations. After so brilliant a début, the Republican forces failed even in reducing the little fort of Exiles, on the eastern descent of Mont Cenis; and for the three summer months, 187. Jom. v. 211, 214. the victorious troops reposed from their fatigues on the Th. vi. 282. heights which they had won above the clouds.1 On the frontiers of Spain the war assumed still more 1 Bot. i. 186, XVI. 1794. 62. Eastern cial difficul ties of the Spaniards. decisive features. The reduction of Toulon enabled the central government to detach General Dugommier, with half the forces employed in its siege, to reinforce the army War in the on the eastern Pyrenees; and it was resolved to act offenPyrenees, sively at both extremities of that range of mountains. Great finan- During the winter months, incessant exertions were made to recruit the armies, which the immense levies of the Republic enabled the southern departments to do to such a degree, that at the opening of the campaign, notwithstanding their late reverses, they were greatly superior in number to their opponents. On the other hand, the Spanish government, destitute of energy, and exhausted by the exertions they had already made, was unable to maintain their forces at the former complement. Before the end of the year 1793, they were reduced to the necessity of issuing above £12,000,000 sterling of paper money, secured on the produce of the tobacco-tax; but all their efforts to recruit their armies from the natives of the country having proved ineffectual, they were compelled to take the foreigners employed at the siege of Toulon into their service, and augment the number of their mercenary troops. Every thing on the Republican side indicated the energy and resolution of a rising, every thing, on the Spanish, the decrepitude and vacillation of a declining state. Between such powers, victory could 1 Jom. v. 218, 221. Toul. iv. 304. Th. vi. 278, 279. 63. Dugommier total defeat iards. not long remain doubtful.1 Dugommier, on his arrival at the end of December, found Successes of the army of the eastern Pyrenees raised by his junction to there, and thirty-five thousand men, encamped under the cannon of of the Span- Perpignan; but a large proportion of the troops were in hospital, and the remainder in a state of insubordination and dejection, which seemed to promise the most disastrous results. By entirely reorganising the regiments, appointing new officers in the staff, and communicating to all the vigour of his own character, he succeeded in a few months not only in restoring the efficiency of the army, but leading it to the most glorious successes. The Spanish army, XVI. 1794. recently so triumphant, had proportionally declined; above CHAP. ten thousand men were in hospital, the expected reinforcements had not arrived, and the force in the field did not exceed twenty-five thousand effective troops. Before the end of February, the French force was augmented to sixty-five thousand men, of whom thirty-five thousand were in a condition immediately to commence operations. On the 27th March, the Republicans broke up and drew near to the Spanish position. A redoubt on the Spanish left was taken a few days after the campaign opened, and General Dagobert was carried off by the malignant fever which had already made such ravages in both armies. The Marquis Amarillas upon that drew back all his forces. into the intrenched camp at Boulon. He was shortly after succeeded in the command by la Union, who immediately transferred the headquarters to Ceret, a good position for an attacking, but defective for a defending army. They were there assailed on the 30th April by the whole French force. One of the redoubts in the centre of the Spanish position having been stormed, the whole April 30. army fell back in confusion, which was increased to a total rout on the following day, by the Republican troops having made themselves masters of the road to Bellegarde, May 1. the principal line of their communication over the mountains into their own country. Finding themselves cut off from this route, the Spaniards were seized with one of those panics which afterwards became so common to their troops in the Peninsular war: the whole army fled in confusion over the hills, and could be rallied only under the cannon of Figueras, leaving one hundred and forty pieces of cannon, fifteen hundred prisoners, eight hundred mules, and all their baggage and ammunition, to the vic- 278, 279. tors, whose loss did not amount to one thousand men, 1 Dugommier immediately took advantage of his successes to undertake the siege of the fortresses of which the Spaniards had possessed themselves on the French territory. Collioure and Bellegarde were besieged at the same time; Toul. iv. Jom. v. 222, 305, 307. 225. Th. vi. |