XIII. : CHAP. adjoining states, they had incorporated them all with the ruling Republic that the recent annexation of Savoy, 1793. Nice, and Flanders, with the French territory, gave sufficient proof of this grasping disposition, and afforded due warning to the neighbouring powers to place no reliance on the professions of a state, in which no principle was fixed but that of republican ambition: that treaties were vain with a government subject to such sudden changes as that of the French Republic, in which each successive party that rose to the head of affairs, disregarding the faith of ancient engagements,. sought only to gain a short-lived popularity by new. and dazzling schemes of foreign aggression that the Convention had already given the clearest indication of its resolution to shake itself loose of all former obligations, by its remarkable declaration, that "Treaties made by despots could never bind the free and enlightened inhabitants of Belgium" that in all ages republics had been the most ambitious and the most warlike of states, In consequence of the restless and insatiable spirit which their institutions 'tended to nourish among the mass of their citizens, and the necessity which their rulers felt themselves under of signalising their short-lived power by some acts calculated to dazzle the multitude; that the French Republic had already given ample proof that it was not destined to form any exception to the general rule, and even if its leaders were inclined to such forbearance, the suffering and ambition of the people would soon drive them into action: that history proved both that France was too powerful for Europe when her territory was advanced to the Rhine, and that the moment her influence became predominant, it would all be directed with inveterate hostility against this country that in this way the contest would sooner or later approach our own shores, and if so, 1 Parl. Hist. how much better to anticipate the evil, when it might be 128. Annual done with comparative ease, and crush the growing 1793, p. 15. Republic before it wielded the forces of Europe at its xxx. p. 79 Register, will.1 XIII. 1793. Such were the arguments urged in this country generally CHAP. on the policy of this great undertaking those advanced in parliament related, as is usual with debates in that assembly, less to the general policy of the measure, or the principles involved in it on both sides, than to the immediate causes which had led to a rupture. 5. in Parlia same sub ject. On the part of the Opposition, it was contended by Mr Fox and Mr Grey, "that the causes of war with France Arguments were in no respect different now from what they were ment on the under the government of Louis XIV. or Louis XVI. What, then, were those causes? Not an insult.or agres sion, but a refusal of satisfaction wheir specifically demanded. What proof had ministers produced of such demand and of such refusal? It may be admitted that the decree of 19th November. entitled this country to require some satisfaction; but even of this they could not show that any clear and specific explanation had been demanded. Security that the French would not act upon that decree was, indeed, mentioned in one of Lord Gronville's letters, but what kind of security was neither specified nor even named. The same might be said with respect to the opening of the Scheldt, and the conquest of Brabant. We complained of an attack on the rights of our ally; we remonstrated against an accession of territory alarming to Europe; but we proposed nothing that would be admitted as satisfaction for the injury-we pointed out nothing that would remove our alarm. The same argument applied to their conquest of Savoy from the King of Sardinia, with whom, in their opinion, they were at war as much as with the Emperor. Can it be said, that it was our business only to complain, and theirs to propose satisfaction? Common sense would see that this was too much for one independent power to expect of another. By what clue could they discover that which would satisfy those who did not choose to tell with what they would be satisfied? How could they judge of the too little, or the too much? And was it not natural for them CHAP. 1793. to suppose that complaints, for which nothing was stated as adequate satisfaction, there was no disposition to withdraw? Yet on this the whole question of aggression hinged; for that the refusal of satisfaction, and not the insult, was the justifiable cause of war, was not merely their opinion, but the opinion of all the writers on the law of nations and how could that be said to have been refused which was never asked? Of the death of the King, none could ever speak but with grief and detestation. But was the expression of our sorrow all that we did? Was not •he atrocious event made the subject of a message from his Majesty to both houses of parliament? And now they would ask the few more candid men who owned that they thought this event alone a sufficient cause of war, what end could be gained by further negotiations with Chauvelin, with Marat, .or Dumourier? Did ministers mean to barter the blood of this ill-fated monarch for any of the points in dispute? to say that the evacuation of Brabant shall atone for so much, the evacuation of Savoy for so much more? Of this they would accuse no man ; but, on their principle, when the crime was committed negotiation must cease. It might be admitted, however, as had been stated on the opposite side, that this crime was no cause of war; but if it were admitted to be so, it was surely not decent that the subject of war should never be even mentioned without reverting to the death of the King. When the attack on France was called the cause of kings, it was not only a very witty, but a sufficient reply, that opposing it might be called the cause of subjects. It is fortunate that the public abhorrence of a war on such a motive was so great, that ministers felt themselves called upon to disclaim it at great length. But how had they acted? They had taken advantage of the folly of the French; they had negotiated without 1 Parl. Hist. proposing specific terms, and then broken off the negotiation.1 At home they had alarmed the people that their own constitution was in danger, and they had made xxx. 370, 378. XIII. 1793. use of a melancholy event, which, however it might affect CHAP. us as men, did not concern us as a nation, to inflame our passions and impel us to war; and now that we were at war, they durst not avow the causes of it, nor tell us on what terms peace might have been preserved." 6. Burke and On the other hand, it was contended by Mr Pitt and Mr Burke, that, "whatever temptations might have Reply by Mr existed to this country from ancient enmity and rivalship- Mr Pitt. paltry motives indeed!-or whatever opportunity might have been afforded by the tumultuous and distracted state of France, or whatever sentiments might be excited by the transactions which had taken place in that nation, his majesty had uniformly abstained from all interference in its internal government, and had maintained with respect to it, on every occasion, the strictest and most inviolable neutrality. Such being his conduct towards France, he had a right to expect on their part a suitable return; more especially as this return had been expressly conditioned for by a compact, into which they entered, and by which they engaged to respect the rights of his majesty and his allies, not to interfere in the government of any neutral country, and not to pursue any system of aggrandisement, or make any additions to their dominions, but to confine themselves at the conclusion of the war within their own territories. These conditions they had all grossly violated; they had adopted a system of ambitious and destructive policy, fatal to the peace and security of every government, and which, in its consequences, had shaken Europe itself to its foundations. Their decree of the 19th of November, which had been so much talked of, offering fraternity and alliance to all people who wished to recover their liberty, was a decree not levelled against particular nations, but against every country where there was any form of government established-a decree not hostile to individuals, but to the human racewhich was calculated every where to sow the seeds of rebellion and civil contention, and to spread war from one XIII. 1793. CHAP. end of Europe to the other, from one end of the globe to the other. While they were bound to this country by these obligations, they had showed no intention to exempt it from the consequences of this decree. Not only had they evinced no inclination to fulfil their engagements, but they had even put it out of their own power, by taking the first opportunity to make additions to their territory, in contradiction to their own express stipulations. By express resolutions for the destruction of the existing government of all invaded countries, by means of Jacobin societies, by orders given to their generals, by the whole system adopted in this respect by the National Assembly, and by the actual annexation of the whole country of Savoy, they had marked their determination to add to the dominions of France, and to provide means, through the medium of every new conquest, to diffuse their principles over Europe. Their conduct was such, that in every instance it had militated against the dearest and most valuable interests of this country. The catastrophe of the French monarch they ought all to feel deeply; and, consistently with that impression, be led more firmly to resist those principles from which an event of so black and atrocious a nature had proceeded; principles which, if not opposed, might be expected in their progress to lead to the commission of similar crimes. But, notwithstanding all this, although government had been obliged to decline all communication which tended to acknowledge the authority of the Convention, still they 1 Parl. Hist. had left open the means of accommodation, nor could that line of conduct which they had pursued be stated as affording any ground of hostility."1 xxx. 345, 362. 7. Real mo tives for the war. The event has at length enabled the historian to decide which of these views was the most reasonable; for we know the evil we have incurred, and we can figure the peril we have escaped, by engaging in the contest. In truth, the arguments urged by government were not the only motives for commencing the war. The danger they |