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be proved, and therefore is no proof at all. Nay, this last propofition feems to be only a different, and lefs proper, way of expreffing the fame thing: Nothing can produce itfelf; - that is, every thing produced, muft be produced by fome other thing; —that is, every effect muft proceed from a caufe; and that is, (for all effects being pofterior to their caufes, muft neceffarily have a beginning), every thing beginning to exist pro"ceeds from fome caufe." Other arguments have been offered in proof of this maxim, which I think are fufficiently confuted by Mr HUME, in his Treatife of Human Nature *. This maxim therefore he affirms, and I allow, to be not demonftrably certain. But he further affirms, that it is not intuitively certain; in which I cannot agree with him. "All certainty," fays he, "arifes from the comparison of ideas, and from the difcovery of fuch relations as are unalterable fo long as the ideas continue the fame; but "the only relations of this kind are re"femblance, proportion in quantity and

σε

* Book 1. part 3. fect. 3.

There are, according to Mr HU ME, feven different kinds of philofophical relation, to wit, Refemblance, 1dentity, Relations of time and place, Proportion in quantity or number, Degrees in any common quality, Contrariety, and Caufation. And by the word Relation he here means, that particular circumftance in which we may think proper to compare ideas. See Treatife of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 32. 142.

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number,

number, degrees of any quality, and contrariety; none of which is implied in the maxim, Whatever begins to exift, proceeds from fome caufe: - that maxim therefore is not intuitively certain." This argument, if it prove any thing at all, would prove, that the maxim is not even certain; for we are here told, that it has not that character or quality from which all certainty arises.

But, if I mistake not, both the premises of this fyllogifm are false. In the first place, I cannot admit, that all certainty arifes from a comparison of ideas. I am certain of the existence of myself, and of the other things that affect my fenfes; I am certain, that "whatever is, is ;" and yet I cannot conceive, that any comparison of ideas is neceffary to produce these convictions in my mind. Perhaps I cannot speak of them without ufing words expreffive of relation; but the fimple act or perception of the understanding by which I am confcious of them, implies not any comparison that I can difcover. If it did, then the simplest intuitive truth requires proof, or illuftration at least, before it can be acknowledged as truth by the mind; which I prefume will not be found warranted by experience. Whether others are conscious of making fuch a comparifon, before they yield affent to the fimpleft intuitive truth, know not; but this I know, that my mind is often conscious of certainty where no fuch VOL. I, comparison

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comparison has been made by me. knowledge, indeed, that no certain truth can become an object of fcience, till it be expreffed in words; that, if expreffed in words, it muft affume the form of a propofition; and that every propofition, being either affirmative or negative, muft imply a comparison of the thing or fubject, with that quality or circumstance which is affirmed or denied to belong to or agree with it: and therefore I acknowledge, that in fcience all certainty may be faid to arife from a comparison of ideas. But the generality of mankind believe many things as certain, which they never thought of expreffing in words. An ordinary man believes, that himself, his family, his house, and cattle, exift; but, in order to produce this belief in his mind, is it neceffary, that he compare thofe objects with the general idea of existence or non-existence, fo as to difcern their agreement with the one, or difagreement with the other? I cannot think it at least, if he has ever made fuch a comparison, it must have been without his knowledge; for I am convinced, that, if we were to ask him the question, he would not understand us.

Secondly, I apprehend, that our author has not enumerated all the relations which, when difcovered, give rife to certainty. I am certain, that I am the fame perfon to-day I was yesterday. This indeed our author denies

denies *. I cannot help it; I am certain notwithstanding; and I flatter myself, there are not many perfons in the world who would think this fentiment of mine a paradox. I fay, then, I am certain, that I am the fame perfon to-day I was yesterday. Now, the relation expreffed in this propofition is not refemblance, nor proportion in quantity and number, nor degrees of any common quality, nor contrariety: it is a relation different from all these; it is identity or fameness. That London is contiguous to the Thames, is a proposition which many of the most fenfible people in Europe hold to be certainly true; and yet the relation expreffed in it is none of those four which our author fuppofes to be the fole proprietors of certainty. For it is not in respect of refemblance, of proportion in quantity or number, of contrariety, or of degrees in any common quality, that London and the Thames are here compared, but purely in refpect of place or fituation.

Again, that the foregoing maxim is neither intuitively nor demonftrably certain, our author attempts to prove from this confideration, that we cannot demonftrate the impoffibility of the contrary. Nay, the contrary, he fays, is not inconceivable : "for 66 we can conceive an object non-existent this moment, and exiftent the next, without

* See part 2. chap. 2. fect. 1. of this Essay.

"joining it to the idea of a caufe, which is

an idea altogether diftinct and different." But this, I prefume, is not a fair state of the cafe. Can we conceive a thing beginning to exist, and yet bring ourfelves to think that a caufe is not neceffary to the production of fuch a thing? If we cannot, (I am fure I cannot), then is the contrary of this maxim, when fairly stated, found to be truly and properly inconceivable.

But whether the contrary of this maxim be inconceivable or not, the maxim itself may be intuitively certain. Of intuitive, as well as of demonftrable truths, there are different kinds. It is a character of fome, that their contraries are inconceivable: fuch are the axioms of goemetry. But of many other intuitive truths, the contraries are conceivable. I do feel a hard body;"-" I do

not feel a hard body;"-thefe propofitions are equally conceivable: the first is true, for I have a pen between my fingers; but I cannot prove its truth by argument; therefore its truth is perceived intuitively.

Thus far we have argued for the fake of argument, and oppofed metaphyfic to metaphyfic*, in order to prove, that our author's reafoning on the prefent fubject is not conclufive. It is now time to enter into the merits of the cause, and consider the matter philofophically, that is, according to fact and

See part 3. chap, 2. of this Effay.

experience.