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and restrains thofe lively fallies of fancy, fo effectual in promoting good-humour and good-will, which, though often erroneous, are a thoufand times more valuable than the dull correctness of a mood-and-figure disciplinarian.

One of the first maxims of the fchool-logic is, That nothing is to be believed, but what we can give a reason for believing; a maxim destructive of all truth and fcience, as hath been fully fhown in the former part of this difcourfe. We muft not, however, lay this maxim to the charge of the ancient logic. DES CARTES, and the modern fceptics, got it from the fchoolmen, who forged it out of fome paffages of Aristotle mifunderstood. The philofopher faid indeed, that all investigation fhould begin with doubt; but this doubt is to remain only till the understanding be convinced; which, in Ariftotle's judgement, may be effected by intuitive evidence as well as by argumentative. The doctrine we have been endeavouring to illuftrate, tends not to encourage any prejudices, or any opinions, unfriendly to truth or virtue: its only aim is, to establish the authority of thofe inftinctive principles of conviction and affent, which the rational part of mankind have acknowledged in all ages, and which the condition of man, in refpect both of action and intelligence, renders it abfurd not to acknowledge. We cannot fuppofe, that the human mind, VOL. I. Y y unlike

unlike to all other natural systems, is made up of incompatible principles; in it, as in all the rest, there must be unity of design; and therefore the principles of human belief, and of human action, must have one and the fame tendency. But many of our modern philosophers teach a different doctrine; endeavouring to perfuade themselves, and others, that they ought not to believe what they cannot poffibly difbelieve; and that those actions may be abfurd, and contrary to truth, the performance of which is neceffary to our very existence. If they will have it, that this is philosophy, I fhall not dispute about the word; but I infift on it, that all fuch philofophy is no better than pedantic nonfenfe; and that, if a man were to write a book, to prove, that fire is the element in which we ought to live, he would not act more abfurdly, than fome metaphysicians of thefe times would be thought to have acted, if their works were understood, and rated according to their intrinfic merit.

That every thing may be made matter of difpute, is another favourite maxim of the fchool-logic; and it would not be easy to devife one more detrimental to true science. What a strange propensity thefe doctors have had to difputation! One would think, that, in their judgement, "the chief end of man

is, to contradict his neighbour, and wrangle "with him for ever." To attempt a proof of what I know to be false, and a confu

tation of what I know to be true, is an exercife from which I can never expect advantage fo long as I deem rationality a blessing. I never heard it prescribed as a recipe for ftrengthening the fight, to keep constantly blindfolded in the day-time, and put on fpectacles when we go to fleep; nor can I imagine how the ear of a mufician could be improved, by his playing frequently on an ill-tuned fiddle. And yet the schoolmen feem to have thought, that the more we fhut our eyes against the truth, we fhall the more diftinctly perceive it; and that the oftener we practife falfehood, we fhall be the more fagacious in detecting, and the more hearty in abhorring it. To fuppofe, that we may make every thing matter of difpute, is to fuppofe, that we can account for every thing. Alas! in moft cafes, to feel and believe, is all we have to do, or can do. Destined for action rather than for knowledge, and governed more by instinct than by reafon, we can extend our investigations, efpecially with regard to ourselves, but a very little way. And, after all, when we acquiefce with implicit confidence in the dictates of our nature, where is the harm or the danger of fuch a conduct? Is our life fhortened, or health injured by it? No. Are our judgements perverted, or our hearts corrupted? No. Is our happinefs impaired, or the fphere of our gratification contracted? Quite the contrary. Have we lefs leisure for attending

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attending to the duties of life, and for adorning our minds with useful and elegant literature? We have evidently more time left for those purposes. Why then fo much logic, fo many difputes, and fo many theories, about the first philofophy? Rather than in difguifing falfehood, and labouring to fubvert the foundations of truth, why do we not, with humility and candour, employ our faculties in the attainment of plain, practical, and useful knowledge? *

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* It is far from my intention to fay, that a talent for arguing on either fide of a controvertible question is of no ufe. When exerted with good-nature and modefty, it may fometimes help to enliven converfation, and give play to the intellectual faculties. And it may also be applied with good effect to purposes ftill more important.

It would feem that Cicero thought, that the end of public fpeaking was not to elucidate or inveftigate truth, but only to make one opinion appear more probable than another; and that when an orator had done his best, it could only be faid, "Illum prudentibus diferte, ftultis "etiam vere dicere videri." De Oratore, lib. 1. & 3. For fuch an employment, difputation was a very proper prèparatory exercife, as the fame author often declares. But it does not follow, that a habit of difputation is of benent to the philofopher, or to thofe public fpeakers, whofe aim, far more noble than that of the Ciceronian orator, is to inform the judgement, and improve the heart.

In a fenate or council, met for the purpose of preparing or making laws, it is highly expedient, that the reafons for and against every public meafure be urged with freedom. This tends not only to preferve the laws and conftitution, but alfo to quiet mens minds, by removing thofe jealoufies which are generally entertained against perfons in high office. Befides, political truth depends

The confequences of fubmitting every fentiment and principle to the test of reafoning, have been confidered already. This practice has, in every age, tended much to confound science, to prevent the detection of error, and (may we not add?) to debase the human understanding. For have we not feen real genius, under the influence of

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pends often on principles fo exceedingly complicated, that a magiftrate or fenator will hardly truft his own judgement, till he finds it warranted by that of others, and has heard the most material reasons that can be urged in oppofition. But to argue againft conviction, and for the fake of argument, or in order to gratify private pique, or to fupport a faction, is furely unworthy of fenators met in folemn affembly, and deliberating upon affairs of the utmost importance, both to the prefent, and to future generations.

Moreover: As it is better that a criminal efcape, than an innocent man fuffer punishment; and as the law fhould not only determine the differences, but as much as poffible fatisfy the minds of men; it will be readily allowed, that in a court of juftice every prifoner fhould be prefumed to be innocent, till the proofs of his guilt appear, and every caufe thoroughly difcuffed on both fides, that the grounds upon which the fentence proceeds may be evident to all concerned. It is therefore right, that each party fhould be permitted to exert itself, as far as truth and decency will permit, in its own vindication. So that a habit of devifing arguments on either fide of controverted queftions feems to be a neceffary qualification to every perfon who wifhes to make a figure at the bar. For the more fully thofe queftions are difcuffed before the judges, the greater honour redounds, not to the pleader only, but to the law alfo, and confequently the greater emolument to the community. Yet even thefe judicial difputations may be carried too far. And the more a pleader indulges himself in deviating

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