But if, by implicit faith, you mean, what I think is commonly meant by that term, an unwarrantable or unquestioned acquiefcence in the fentiments of other men, I deny that any part of this discourse hath a tendency to promote it. I never faid, that doctrines are to be taken for granted without examination; though I affirmed, that, in regard to moral doctrines, a long and intricate examination is neither neceffary nor expedient. With moral truth, it is the bufinefs of every man to be acquainted; and therefore the Deity has made it level to every capacity.

Far be it from a lover of truth to discourage freedom of inquiry! Man is poffeffed of reafoning powers; by means of which he may bring that within the sphere of common fenfe, which was originally beyond it. Of these powers he may, and ought to avail himself; for many important truths are not felf-evident, and our faculties were not defigned for a state of inactivity. But neither were they defigned to be employed in fruitlefs or dangerous inveftigation. Our knowledge and capacity are limited; it is fit and neceffary they fhould be fo: we need not wander into forbidden paths, or attempt to penetrate inacceffible regions, in queft of employment; the cultivation of ufeful and practical fcience, the improvement of arts, and the indifpenfable duties of life, will furnish ample fcope to all the exertions

"

of

of human genius. Surely that man is my friend, who diffuades me from attempting what I cannot perform, nor even attempt without danger. And is not he a friend to science and mankind, who endeavours to difcourage fallacious and unprofitable fpeculation, and to propofe a criterion by which may be known and avoided?

it

But if reasoning ought not be carried beyond a certain boundary, and if it is the authority of common fenfe that fixeth this boundary, and if it be poffible to mistake a prejudice for a principle of common sense, how (it may be faid) are prejudices to be detected? At this rate, a man has nothing to do, but to call his prejudice a dictate of common fenfe, and then it is established in perfect fecurity, beyond the reach of argument. Does not this furnish a pretence for limiting the freedom of inquiry?— Having already faid a great deal in answer to the first part of this question, I need not now fay much in answer to the laft. I fhall only afk, on the other hand, what method of reasoning is the propereft for overcoming the prejudices of an obftinate man? Are we to wrangle with him in infinitum, without ever arriving at any fixed principle? That furely is not the way to illuftrate truth, or rectify error. Do we mean to afcertain the importance of our arguments by their number, and to pronounce that the better caufe whofe champion gives the laft word? This, Uu2

I fear, would not mend the matter. Sup fofe our antagonist fhould deny a felf-evident truth, or refufe his affent to an intuitive probability; muft we not refer him to the common fenfe of mankind? If we do not, we must either hold our peace, or have recourfe to fophiftry for when a principle comes to be intuitively true or false, all legitimate reafoning is at an end, and all further reafoning impertinent. To the common fenfe of mankind we must therefore refer him fooner or later; and if he continue obftinate, we must leave him. Is it not then of confequence to truth, and may it not ferve to prevent many a fophiftical argument, and unprofitable logomachy, that we have it continually in view, that common fenfe is the ftandard of truth? a maxim, which men are not always difpofed to admit in its full latitude, and which, in the heat and hurry of difpute, they are apt to o verlook altogether. Some men will always be found, who think the most abfurd prejudices founded in common fenfe. Reafonable men never fcruple to fubmit their prejudices or principles to examination: but if that examination turn to no account, or if it turn to a bad account; if it only puzzle where it ought to convince, and darken what it ought to illuftrate; if it recommend impracticable modes of action, or inconceivable modes of thought;-I must confefs I cannot perceive the ufe of it. This is the only

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only kind of reafoning that I mean to difcourage. It is this kind of reafoning that has proved fo fatal to the abstract sciences. In it all our sceptical fyftems are founded; of it they confift; and by it they are fupported. Till the abftract fciences be cleared of this kind of reafoning, they deferve not the name of philofophy: they may amufe a weak and turbulent mind, and render it ftill weaker and more turbulent; but they cannot convey any real instruction: they may undermine the foundations of virtue and science; but they cannot illuftrate a fingle truth, nor establish one principle of importance, nor improve the mind of man in any respect whatsoever.

By fome it may be thought an objection to the principles of this effay, "That they "feem to recommend a method of confu"tation which is not ftrictly according to logic, and do actually contradict fome of "the established laws of that fcience."

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It will readily be acknowledged, that many of the maxims of the fchool-logic are founded in truth and nature, and have fo long obtained universal approbation, that they are now become proverbial in philofophy. Many of its rules and diftinctions are extremely useful, not fo much for ftrengthening the judgement, as for enabling the difputant quickly to comprehend, and perfpicuously to exprefs, in what the force or fallacy of an argument confifts. The ground

work

work of this fcience, the Logic of Aristotle, if we may judge of the whole by the part now extant, is one of the most fuccessful and most extraordinary efforts of philofophic genius that ever appeared in the world. And yet, if we confider this fcience, with regard to its defign and confequences, we fhall perhaps fee reafon to think, that a strict observance of its laws is not always necessary to the discovery of truth.

It was originally intended as a help to difcourfe among a talkative and fprightly people. The conftitution of Athens made public speaking of great importance, and almost a certain road to preferment or diftinction. This was alfo in fome measure the cafe at Rome; but the Romans were more referved, and did not, till about the time of Cicero, think of reducing converfation or public fpeaking to rule. The vivacity of the Athenians, encouraged by their democratical fpirit, made them fond of difputes and declamations, which were often carried on without any view to difcover truth, but merely to gratify humour, give employment to the tongue, and amufe a vacant hour. Some of the dialogues of Plato are to be confidered in this light, rather as exercises in declamation, than ferious difquifitions in philofophy. It is true, this is not the only merit even of fuch of them as feem the leaft confiderable. If we are often diffatisfied with his doctrine; if we have little curiofity to learn