judgement, as contrary to reason, as to say, that, because I am ignorant of the cause of magnetical attraction, therefore I ought not to believe that the needle points to the north. -That I am a free agent, I know and believe; that God forefees whatever can be forefeen, as he can do whatever can be done, I alfo know and believe: nor have the Fatalifts ever proved, nor can they ever prove, that the one belief is inconfiftent with the other.

The afferters of human liberty have always maintained, that to believe all actions and intentions neceffary, is the fame thing as to believe, that man is not an accountable being, or, in other words, no moral agent. And indeed this notion is natural to every person who has the courage to truft his own experience, without feeking to puzzle plain matter of fact with verbal diftinctions and metaphysical refinement. But, it is said, the fenfe of moral beauty and turpitude ftill remains with us, even after we are convinced, that all actions and intentions are neceffary; that this fenfe maketh us moral agents; and therefore that our moral agency is perfectly confiftent with our neceffary agency. But this is nothing to the purpose; it is putting us off with mere words. For what is moral agency, and what is implied in it? This at least must be implied in it, that we ought to do fome things, and not to do others. But if every intention and action of my life is fixed by eternal laws,

which I can neither elude nor alter, it is as abfurd to say to me, You ought to be honest to-morrow, as to fay, You ought to stop the motion of the planets to-morrow. Unless fome events depend upon my determination, ought, and ought not, have no meaning when applied to me. Moral agency further implies, that we are accountable for our conduct; and that if we do what we ought not to do, we deserve blame and punishment. My conscience tells me, that I am accountable for thofe actions only that are in my own power; and neither blames nor approves, in myfelt or in others, that conduct which is the effect, not of choice, but of neceffity. Convince me, that all that all my actions are equally neceffary, and you filence my confcience for ever, or at least prove it to be a fallacious and impertinent monitor: you will then convince me, that all circumfpection is unneceffary, and all remorfe abfurd. And is it a matter of little moment, whether I believe my moral feelings authentic and true, or equivocal and fallacious? Can any principle be of more fatal confequence to me, or to fociety, than to believe, that the dictates of confcience are falfe, unreasonable, or infignificant? Yet this is one certain effect of my becoming a Fatalift, or even fceptical in regard to moral liberty.

I obferve, that when a man's underftanding begins to be fo far perverted by debauchery, as to make him imagine his crimes unavoidable,

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unavoidable, from that moment he begins to think them innocent, and deems it a fufficient apology, that in refpect of them he is no longer a free, but a neceffary agent. The drunkard pleads his conftitution, the blafphemer urges the invincible force of habit, and the fenfualift would have us believe, that his appetites are too ftrong to be refifted. Suppose all men fo far perverted as to argue in the fame manner with regard to crimes of every kind; — then it is certain, that all men would be equally difpofed to think all crimes innocent. And what would be the confequence? Licentiousness, mifery, and defolation, irremediable and univerfal. If God intended that men fhould be happy, and that the human race fhould continue for many generations, he certainly intended also that men fhould believe themselves free, moral, and accountable creatures.

Suppofing it poffible for a man to act upon the belief of his being a neceffary agent, let us fee how he would behave in fome of the common affairs of life. He does me an injury. I go to him and remonstrate. You will excufe me, fays he; I was put upon it by one on whom I am dependent, and who threatened me with beggary and perdition if I refused to comply. I acknowledge this to be a confiderable alleviation of the poor man's guilt. Next day he repeats the injury; and, on my renewing my remonftrances, Truly, fays he, I was offered fixpence to do it; or I

did

did it to please my humour: but I know you will pardon me, when I tell you, that as all motives are the neceffary causes of the actions that proceed from them, it follows, that all motives productive of the fame action are irresistible, and therefore, in respect of the agent, equally ftrong: I am therefore as innocent now as I was formerly; for the event has proved, that the motive arising from the offer of fixpence, or from the impulfe of whim, was as effectual in producing the action which you call an injury, as the motive arifing from the fear of ruin. Notwithstanding this fine fpeech, I fhould be afraid, that these principles, if persisted in, and acted upon, would foon bring the poor Fatalift to Tyburn or Bedlam.

Will you promise to affift me to-morrow with your labour, advice, or intereft? No, fays the practical Fatalift; I can promise nothing for my conduct to-morrow will certainly be determined by the motive that then happens to predominate. Let your promise, fay 1, be your motive. How can you be fo ignorant, he replies, as to imagine that our motives to action are in our own power ! O fad, O fad! you must study metaphyfic, indeed you muft. Why, Sir, our motives to action are obtruded upon us by irresistible neceffity. Perhaps they arife, immediately, from fome paffion, judgement, fancy, or (if you please) volition; but this volition, fancy, judgement, or paffion, what is it? VOL. I.

S f

an

an effect without a caufe? No, no; it is neceffarily excited by fome idea, object, or notion, which prefents itself independently on me, and in confequence of fome extrinfic caufe, the operation of which I can neither forefee nor prevent. Where is the man who would chufe this Fatalift for his friend, companion, or fellow-citizen? who will fay, that fociety could at all fubfift, if the generality of mankind were to think, and speak, and act, on fuch principles *?

But, fays the Fatalift, is it not easy to imagine cafes in which the men who believe themselves free, would act the part of fools or knaves? Nothing indeed is more easy. But let it be obferved, that the folly or knavery of fuch men arifes, not from their perfuafion of their own free agency; for many millions of this perfuafion have paffed through life with a fair character; but from other causes. I cannot conceive any greater difcouragement from knavery and folly, than the confideration, that man is an accountable being; and I know not how we can fuppofe him accountable, in the common ac

*This, it may be faid, would fuppofe a partial neceffity. It may be fo: but in this manner I apprehend that mankind will always argue, as long as they are confcious of a power of felf-determination. And while they are confcious of that power, and argue in this manner, they must confider the doctrine of neceffity as repugnant to our most familiar and most permanent notions in regard to morality and human agency.

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