"endowed with any power, MUCH LESS of

one endowed with infinite power *." The inference is but too glaring; and though our author does not plainly and avowedly exprefs it, he once and again puts his reader in mind, that this inference, or fomething very like it, is deducible from his theory +:-for which, no doubt, every friend to truth, virtue, and human nature, is infinitely obliged to him!

But what do you fay in oppofition to my theory? You affect to treat it with a contempt which hardly becomes you, and which my philofophy has not met with from your betters! pray let us hear your arguments. And do you, Sir, really think it incumbent on me to prove by argument, that I, and all other men, have a notion of power; and that the efficacy of a cause (of fire, for inftance, to melt lead) is in the cause, and not in my mind? Would you think it incumbent on me to confute you with arguments, if you were pleased to affirm, that all men have tails and cloven feet; and that it was I who produced the earthquake that deftroyed Lifbon, the plague that depopulates Conftantinople, the heat that fcorches the wilds of Africa, and the cold that freezes the Hyperborean ocean? Truly, Sir, I have not

* Treatife of Human Nature, vol. I. p. 432.

the face to undertake a direct confutation of what I do not understand; and I am so far from comprehending this part of your fyftem, that I will venture to pronounce it perfectly unintelligible. I know there are fome who say they understand it; but I also know, that there are fome who fpeak, and read, and write too, with very little expence of thought.

Thefe are all but evafions, you exclaim; and insist on my coming to the point. Never fear, Sir; I am too deeply interested in fome of the confequences of this theory of yours, to put you off with evafions.

To

come therefore to the point, I fhall firft ftate your doctrine in your own words, that there may be no risk of mifreprefentation; and then, if I fhould not be able directly to prove it falfe, (for the reafon already given), I fhall demonftrate, indirectly at leaft, or by the apagogical method, that it is not, and cannot be true.

"As the neceffity," fays our author, "which makes two times two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the act of the understanding, by which we confider and compare thefe ideas *; in like manner,

What is it an act of my understanding that makes two and two equal to four! Was it not fo before I was born, and would it not be fo though all intelligence were to cease throughout the univerfe! - But it is idle to spend time in confuting what every child who has learned the very firft elements of fcience, knows to be abfurd.

"the

"the neceffity or power which unites causes " and effects, lies in the determination of the "mind to pass from the one to the other. "The efficacy, or energy, of causes, is nei"ther placed in the causes themselves, nor "in the Deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely 66 to the foul, which confiders the union of two or more objects in all past instances. "It is here that the real power of caufes is "placed, along with their connection and neceffity

To find that his principles lead to Atheism, would ftagger an ordinary philofopher, and make him suspect his fundamental hypothefis, and all his subsequent reasonings. But the author now quoted is not apt to be ftaggered by confiderations of this kind. the contrary, he is fo intoxicated with his discovery, that, however fceptical in other points, he seems willing to admit this as one certain conclufion †.

On

If a man can reconcile himself to Atheism, which is the greatest of all abfurdities, I fear I fhall hardly put him out of conceit with

* Treatife of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 291.

his

+ Speaking of it in another place, he fays, " A con"clufion which is fomewhat extraordinary, but which "feems founded on fufficient evidence. Nor will its e"vidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the "understanding, or fceptical fufpicion, concerning every "conclufion which is new and extraordinary. No con"clufions

his doctrine, when I fhow him, that other lefs enormous abfurdities are implied in it. We may make the trial however. Gentlemen are fometimes pleased to entertain unaccountable prejudices againft their Maker; who yet, in other matters, where neither fashion nor hypothefis interfere, condescend to acknowledge, that the good old distinction between truth and falfehood is not altogether without foundation.

On the fuppofition that we have no idea of power or energy, and that the preceding theory of caufation is juft, our author gives the following definition of a caufe; which feems to be fairly deduced from his theory, and which he fays is the best that he can give. "A caufe is an object precedent and "contiguous to another, and fo united with

it, that the idea of the one determines the "mind to form the idea of the other, and the impreffion of the one to form a more lively

clufions can be more agreeable to fcepticism than fuch. 66 as make discoveries concerning the weaknefs and nar"row limits of human reafon and capacity."

Hume's Effays, vol. 2. p. 87. edit. 1767.

I know not what discoveries this conclufion may lead others to make concerning our author's reafon and capacity; but I have fome ground to think, that in him it has not wrought any extraordinary felf-abafement; otherwise he would not have afferted, with fo much confidence, what he acknowledges to be a moft violent paradox, and what is indeed contrary to the experience and conviction of every person of common fenfe. See Treatife of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 291. 299.

"idea of the other*." There are now in my view two contiguous houfes, one of which was built laft fummer, and the other two years ago. By seeing them constantly together for feveral months, I find, that the idea of the one determines my mind to form the idea of the other, and the impreffion of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. So that, according to our author's definition, the one houfe is the caufe, and the other the effect! - Again, day and night have always been contiguous and fucceffive; the imagination naturally runs from the idea or impreffion of the one to the idea of the other confequently, according to the fame profound theory and definition, either day

*Treatife of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 298. This is not the only definition of a caufe which Mr HUME has given. But his other definitions are all, in my opinion, inadequate; being all founded on the fame abfurd theory. My bufinefs, however, at prefent is, not to criticife Mr HUME's definitions, but to confute (if I can) his licentious doctrines. Thefe will be allowed to be abfurd, if they be found to lead to abfurd confequences. So Mr HUME himfelf, in another place, very juftly determines : "When any opinion leads into abfurdities, it is certain"ly falfe." Ejay on Liberty and Neceffity, part 2.The definition of a caufe, here quoted, is a confequence drawn by Mr HUME himfelf (and in my opinion fairly drawn) from his theory of power and caufation. By proving that confequence to be abfurd, I prove (accor ding to Mr HU ME's own rules of logic) the abfurdity of the opinion that leads to it. This is all that I mean by quoting it; and this I prefume is enough. A doctrine is fufficiently confuted, if it be fhown to lead into one abfurdity.

is