C guage, there is reafon to think, that they are extremely clear, diftinct, and accurate. Now I have here propofed a fentence, in which there is a ftudied ambiguity of language; and yet I maintain, that every perfon, who understands English, will instantly, on hearing these words, perceive, that by the word fight I mean, in the first claufe, the thing feen; in the fecond, the power, or perhaps the organ, of feeing; in the third, the ception itself, as diftinguished both from the percipient faculty, and from the visible object *. If one of the multitude, on hearing per me. To every perfon of common understanding this distinction is in reality and practice quite familiar. But as the words we ufe in expreffing it are of ambiguous fignification, it is not eafy to write about it fo as to be immediately understood by every reader. The thing seen or perceived is fomething permanent and external, and is believed to exift, whether perceived or not; the faculty of feeing or perceiving is alfo fomething permanent in the mind, and is believed to exift, whether exerted or not; but what I here call the perception itself is temporary, and is conceived to have no existence but in the mind that perceives it, and to exist no longer than while it is perceived; for in being perceived, its very effence does confift; fo that to be, and to be perceived, when predicated of it, do mean precifely the fame thing. Thus, I just now fee this paper, which I call the external object: I turn away, or shut my eyes, and then I fee it no longer, but I ftill believe it to exift; though buried an hundred fathom deep in the earth, or left in an uninhabitable ifland, its existence would be as real as if it were gazed at by ten thousand men. Again, when I shut my eyes, or tie a bandage over them, or go into a dark place, I fee no longer; that is, my faculty of feeing acts, or me pronounce this fentence, were to reply as follows: "The fight is not at all ftrange; "it is a man on horfeback: but your fight "must needs be weak, as you are lately re covered from fickness: however, if you "wait a little, till the man and horse, which are now in the fhade, come into the funfhine, you will then have a much more "distinct fight of them: -I would afk, Is the study of any part of philosophy neceffary to make a man comprehend the meaning of these two sentences? Is there any thing abfurd or unintelligible, either in the former or in the latter? Is there any thing in the reply, that feems to exceed the capacity of the vulgar, and fuppofes them to be more acute than they really are? If there be not, and I am certain there is not, here is an unquestionable proof, that the vulgar, or is acted upon, no longer; but I ftill believe it to remain in my mind, ready to act, or to be acted upon, whenever it is again placed in the proper circumstances; for no body fuppofes, that by thutting our eyes, or going into a dark place, we annihilate our faculty of feeing. But, thirdly, my perception of this paper is no permanent thing; nor has it any existence, but while it is perceived; nor does it at all exift, but in the mind that per ceives it; I can put an end to, or annihilate it, when ever I please, by fhutting my eyes; and I can at pleasure renew it again, by opening them. It is really aftonishing, that fo many of our modern philofophers should have overlooked a diftinction, which is of fo great importance, that if we were unacquainted with it, a great part of human language would seem to be perfect nonsense. and indeed all men whom metaphyfic has not deprived of their fenfes, do distinguish between the object perceived, the faculty perceiving, and the perception or impulfe communicated by the external object to the mind through the organ of fenfation. What tho' all the three are fometimes expreffed by the fame name? This only fhows, that accuraсу of language is not always neceflary for anfwering the common purposes of life. If the ideas of the vulgar are fufficiently dif tinct, notwithstanding, what fhall we fay of that philofopher, whofe ideas are really confounded by this inaccuracy, and who, because there is no difference in the figns, imagines that there is none in the things fignified! That the understanding of fuch a philofopher is not a vulgar one, will be readily allowed; whether it exceeds, or falls thort, let the reader determine *. This author's method of investigation is no less extraordinary than his fundamental principles. There are many notions in the human mind, of which it is not eafy perhaps to explain the origin. If you can describe in words what were the circumstances in which * Mr HUME does not feem to me to be always confiftent with himself in affirming, that the vulgar do not comprehend the diftinction between perceptions and objects. But, upon the whole, he feems to hold this diftinction to be unreafonable, unphilofophical, and unfupported by the evidence of fenfe. See Treatife of Human Nature, p. 330. - 338. VOL. I. F f you *: you received an impreffion of any particular notion, it is well; he will allow that you may form an idea of it. But if you cannot do this, then, fays he, there is no fuch notion in your mind; for all perceptions are either impreffions or ideas; and it is not poffible for us fo much as to conceive any thing fpecifically different from ideas and impreffions now all ideas are copied from impreffions therefore you can have no idea nor conception of any thing of which you have not received an impreffion. -All mankind have a notion of power or energy. No, fays he; an impreffion of power or energy was never received by any man; and therefore an idea of it can never be formed in the human mind. If you infift on your experience and confcioufnefs of power, it is all a miftake his hypothefis admits not the idea of power; and therefore there is no fuch ideat. All mankind have an idea of felf. That I deny, fays our author; I maintain, that no man ever had, or can have, an impreffion of felf; and therefore no man can form any idea of it. If you perfift, and fay, that certainly you have fone notion or idea of yourfelf: My dear Sir, he would fay, you do not confider, that this affertion con * Treatife of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 123. + Ibid. p. 282. Ibid. p. 437. 438.: tradicts tradicts my hypothesis of impreffions and ideas; how then is it poffible it should be true! But though the author deny, that I have any notion of felf, furely he does not mean to affirm, that I do not exist, or that I have no notion of myself as an exiftent being. In truth, it is not easy to say what he means on this fubject. Moft philofophical fubjects become obfcure in the hands of this author; for he has a notable talent at puzzling his readers and himfelf: but when he treats of confciousness, of perfonal identity, and of the nature of the foul, he expreffes himself fo ftrangely, that his words either have no meaning, or imply very great absurdity. "The question," fays he, "concerning the "fubftance of the foul is unintelligible you Well, Sir, if think fo, you may let it alone. - No; that must not be neither. "What we call a mind, is nothing but a σε heap or collection of different perceptions σε (or objects) united together by certain rela"tions, and fuppofed, though falfely, to be "endowed with perfect fimplicity and identity . t -If any one, upon ferious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a "different notion of himfelf, I must confefs "I can reafon with him no longer. All I ડ *Treatife of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 434. 435. Ibid. p. 361. 362: Ff2 can |