them; and 2dly, the revolution has bad the accidental good effect of discovering and pointing out, in the clearest and most impressive manner, to all governments, the imperfections existing in their for mer constitutions, or in the ancient federation of Europe.

On the other hand, I am convinced, and I trust that all enlightened persons will now agree with me, that the condition of Europe in the latter times preceding the revolution, was not so desperate either in a social, a domestic, or a federative point of view, as to lead immediately to violent convulsions, or to render such convulsions desirable; that the French revolution, though facilitated, and in that sense prepared, by many social and political discordances, was by no means a necessary or unavoidable consequence of the state of France, much less of Europe; that this event, with all its dreadful consequences, was occasioned by some obvious errors of the former French government, was continued and completed by the untimely zeal, the ill-advised activity, the inability, the presumption, or the wickedness of those who, in consequence of these errors, were intrusted with the direction of the public affairs, and was converted into a principle of destruction for all Europe by the improvident measures of the surrounding nations; that, far from furthering the improvement of the condition of civil and political society, this revolution, on the contrary, has interrupted and arrested its progress at a moment when it appeared particularly promising; and that, when considered in a more extensive point of view, the greatest and most lamentable of the evils which accompanied it, was this: before the revolution there only needed a few wise reforms in the internal constitutions of states, and some happy combinations for ameliorating and confirming the federal system, to have raised Europe to a high degree of prosperity and happiness; whereas now all the means of attaining to this desired object must be sought for amidst a heap of ruins, and drawn forth, as it were, from chaos again.'

The progress of improvement, previously to the French revolution, is sketched with great ability by this German politician :

It has been asserted, that all the favourable changes brought about in this period, were owing to the labours of public writers. But these writers were themselves, in fact, the creatures of the general improvement; I mean the great mass of them, those who had a wide and extensive influence on the minds of their cotemporaries; not those men of extraordinary genius, who sometimes burst, like splendid meteors, through the deep gloom of an age of barbarism. The productions of genius only become the daily occupation of mankind, and a powerful aid of social advancement, when the increase of wealth has promoted the progress of civilization; when the desire of more refined enjoyments has been awakened; and, above all, when governments of empires have acquired a certain liberality of principle, which they attain in proportion as they are enlightened and im proved.

• Without inquiring, however, which was the first, or the last, in the chain of causes that produced these great changes, the event is

clear

clear and undeniable. There arose in all the principal states without exception, and more or less in most of the smaller ones, a spirit of advancement and improvement, extending to every branch of the public administration, which the body of the people communicated to the governors, and which these again imparted to their subjects. The necessity of a revisal of the existing laws, and particularly of the criminal code, was every where felt. Measures were taken for encouraging industry, for promoting agriculture, for extending commerce: while high roads, canals, plantations, and public edifices of every kind, began to enrich and embellish all countries. In the place of the ancient system of taxation, often oppressive and unjust, much attention was every where bestowed to introduce one more simple and equitable, founded on a better knowlege of the true sources of wealth and the real springs of industry. The employments of civil society were every where freed from a number of burdensome constraints; and the beneficial principle of general competition supplanted the pernicious monopolies which were considered, in the infancy of society, as the only encouragements and rewards of industry. Exclusive privileges were diminished; inequalities reduced; and the advantages of individuals made subordinate to the good of the whole. The education of youth began every where to be attended to as a great national concern; to become an object of the care and protection of government; and, by the adoption of more effectual methods, the many speculations on this subject were rendered more subservient to the purposes of practical life.

I am far from intending to assert, that this happy progress of society was any where as perfect and consistent as I have here described it. There were still many dark and uncouth parts in the great picture of the age, from which the observer turned away with sorrow or disgust. There still appeared frequent traces of barbarism in the manners, laws, and governments of the most polished nations. The abilities and characters of the men in power, were not always proportioned to the degree of maturity and refinement which their subjects had attained, or to which their hopes and endeavours were directed. The impediments likewise arising from particular circumstances and local relations, which opposed the execution of beneficial plans, must naturally have been more frequent and considerable in some countries than in others: but the general tendency of all nations and all governments was at this period directed to a progressive, persevering, and systematic improvement of the state of mankind, more than in any other either of ancient or modern history. The good actually accomplished, was not brought about, as in former, even the brightest and happiest periods of antiquity, by irregular, partial, insulated, and transient measures; but with order, consistency, and method; upon principles clearly understood; having a great and lasting object in view; and comprehending the interests of all mankind.

The most important of the causes that prepared the dreadful storms which closed the eighteenth century, will be found in this tendency to a general and always progressive reform, which constituted the prominent and distinguishing feature of the social and political character of the age, especially in the last twenty years before

the

the revolution. The elements of the desolating tempest were fostered, as in the natural world, in the same fertilizing atmosphere that gave a rich and wholesome nourishment, a rapid and luxuriant growth, to the noblest plants in the soil of society. The new opinions of the governed combined with the altered dispositions of the governors, to bring on this dreadful phenomenon. On the one hand, the consciousness of a higher degree of happiness and freedom, of increased strength, and of greater individual importance, produced a number of wishes, desires, and pretensions, hitherto unknown: with the increase of wealth arose discontent; with freedom, arrogance; with the progress of knowlege, the propensity to idle and extravagant speculations: a spirit of disorder, of uneasiness, and censoriousness, was the prevailing temper of all the leading states of Europe. On the other hand, those invested with power were not always sufficiently cautious and circumspect in the reforms and alterations they wished to make. They were too hasty in the execution of their plans; they strained the springs of power till they risked their breaking; they irritated the minds of their subjects by rash and violent measures; they increased the dangerous fermentation of the times, instead of using every endeavour to appease it; they often gave ear to rash, enthusiastic, and even suspicious counsellors, who, under the seductive pretext of the general good, and of immortal fame, led them by untimely, ill-combined, chimerical projects, into a labyrinth of errors and troubles, and brought them to the brink of ruin.'

There is much truth in these observations, and they merit the attention of those who wish to understand the important subject which the author of them discusses. M. Gentz is

not of opinion that this country has prospered by the late war: but he thinks it a phenomenon sufficiently extraordi nary, which can only be explained by the history of its government during the preceding ten years, that Great Britain should have been able to maintain itself entire and unshaken in the dreadful war excited by the French revolution."

In his review of France itself, the central point of the revo lution, M. Gentz remarks:

That the former government of France was such as stood in need of the greatest reforms; that the errors in its legislation, its admi. nistration, and its domestic constitution, were many and great, cannot for a moment be disputed. Noboby will attempt to deny that the government of Louis the XVth laid the foundation of a dangerous disorganization. But was the reign of Lewis XVI. from its commencement to its tragical end, a proof of the assertion, that there no longer existed any proper principles of government in Europe? Was it not rather marked throughout by the desire of beneficial reforms, the prevailing character of the times? Was not its chief misfortune a misconception of its strength,which sank under the weight of its own undertakings? Was the monarch who placed Turgot and Malesherbes among the number of his ministers, who twice intrusted the fate of his kingdom to the hands of Necker, was he a patron of abuses

abuses, a blind follower of former systems? Was the convocation of the Notables, and the plan for which they were convened, the work of mean, contemptible, obscure, and common-place politics? Was the facility, or rather the levity with which this government consented to the assembling of the States, a proof of tenacious obstinacy, or of an imprudent spirit of concession? Was the edict of the 5th July 1788, which not only established the freedom of the press, but called upon every hand that could guide a pen to employ itself in publishing plans of general utility-was that edict the measure of a court that trembled at every prospect of innovation? Was the decree of the council of state of the 27th December 1788, and the speech of the minister of finance of the 5th May 1789, and even the unfortunate declaration of the 23d May-were these the productions of a government far behind the wishes and opinions of its enlightened subjects? Is the revolution, in short, to be attributed to the want of system and principles; or, on the contrary, to the multiplicity and abuse of them ?'

These are fair questions: but, since real effects must have real and adequate causes, the specific march of events should have been noted; and it is not a little strange that the interference of France in the American war should not have been mentioned by this very intelligent author.

A clear account is given by M. Gentz of the political relations of France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England; for the last of which he is a strenuous advocate, in opposition to the suggestions of M. Hauterive:

I have proved, (says he,) that, at the beginning of the revolu tion, England was precisely so placed as her own safety and the secu rity of Europe required; that her political influence could not be dangerous to any nation, not even to France, her constant and only enemy; that neither desirous nor able to disturb the equilibrium of the general system, she was, on the contrary, the shield and bulwark of that system in all the most important transactions of the eighteenth century.'

So far from admitting it as an universal maxim, that "a nation has no right to interfere with the domestic affairs of any other," M. Gentz regards it as liable to some exceptions; and he considers the French Revolution as an event of that kind, which not merely permitted, but required the active interference of other nations. Hence he justifies the conduct of the surrounding states, and regards it as childish credulity to suppose that the continental powers were leagued against France merely to gratify England. He thus unfolds his sentiments on the origin and policy of the late war:

The war was resorted to and commenced by France herself, that is, by the dreadful succession of outrageous and barbarous factions which enslaved, distracted, and tyrannized over her during ten

years.

years. What rendered it inevitable, was the wide difference between those reigning factions and the rest of Europe, in their systems of administration, and in all their principles of internal and external policy; which created a discordance not to be remedied by any peaceful measures. The revolutionary chiefs, aware of all this, and feeling the precariousness of their own situations, recurred to the war as the only means of maintaining themselves, or as the last refuge of their despair; and they would have contrived to involve all Europe in this misfortune, even though every government had been anxious to avoid it, even had they coalesced to preserve peace. Unimpelled by any coalition, at a time when the very name did not yet exist, and not a vestige of it was perceptible, they challenged successively every nation, near or remote, continental or maritime, and at length made one general declaration of war against every ancient establishment. Thus Europe had no alternative but the dangers of the contest on the one hand, and the perhaps still greater danger, with which, on the other, those demagogues threatened the very elements of the social constitution.'

Instead, however, of the kind of belligerent union which was formed, it is to be lamented that there did not subsist a coalition against the destroyers of France, not against France herself. Had such a league as M. Gentz suggests been formed; a league prudent, just, and benevolent, in its principle disclaiming every idea of partition, dismemberment, and subjection, it is probable that the late conflict would have been less bloody, and have had a different termination: but wisdom is often too late in her visits to politicians.-The conduct of the coalesced powers is here strongly reprobated:

There

Some evil genius seems to have perplexed the councils of every cabinet, and paralyzed their political and military energies; for it has been their fate to meet the most trying difficulties with pitiful projects, half-measures, weak and incapable instruments, and a deplorable deficiency of every thing [which] the magnitude of the occasion required. They too late, if ever, learned the character of their enemy, and how to combat revolutionary weapons and resources. was no plan, coherence, or uniformity in their proceedings; no two of them were of one opinion. Their unfortunate dissensions, the fatal influence of their private interests, their want of unanimity and concert, the tardiness and indecision of their measures, redoubled the strength and courage of their enemy. Capable, at most, of a weak and partial defence, unequal to a vigorous and uniform attack, they formed no effective coalition, but were merely a reluctant assem. blage of ill-according parts. They were, in short, unfortunately for the interests of Europe, any thing imaginable, except what the subtle declamations of the enemy, and the easy credulity of the age, have represented and believed.'

In treating of the present relations between France and the other states of Europe, the author considers her in a double