and doing, in working out their own falvation, are as neceffary as if they were independent on God, and he did not work in them to will and to do: and therefore this is no reason why they fhould not will and work, but fit ftill and do nothing; but is a good reafon why they fhould work, and do what they do with fear and trembling, not trufting in themselves, but in God alone, to enable them to go through and perfect this work.

2. This doctrine of abfolute dependence on God for every volition and exertion in working out our own falvation, which is implied and afferted in the explanation which has been given of this text, has been repre fented and objected to as a very difcouraging doctrine, tending to lead perfons to fit ftill, and not attempt to do any thing towards their falvation.

It is granted that the view of the text which has been given does tend to difcourage perfons from attempting to work out their own falvation in their own ftrength and fufficiency, independent of God, and his effectual operation on their hearts to will and to do; and will effectually do it, where it has its proper influence on the hearts of men. But this affords no real ground of objection to the doctrine, but is rather in favour of it. It is neceffary that men fhould be dif couraged from working out their falvation in this way, and relinquifh it, in order to their being faved; and the fooner and more thoroughly they are difcouraged, the better. Such difcouragement is indeed given in the text, and in a vaft number of other paffages in the Bible, being rightly understood; for men are every where in fcripture reprefented as wholly dependent on God for the effectual influences of the Holy Spirit in order to do that which is neceffary to be done by them for their falvation.

But to him who feels his own moral depravity and utter infufficiency to will and do any thing by which he may be faved, without the powerful operations of God to work in him to will to do it, this doctrine will

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open the only ground of hope and encouragement to do or attempt to do any thing. If a child or any per fon were called to do fome great thing, to which he knew he was wholly unequal, being utterly infufficient to fuch a work of himself, he would not have any cou rage to attempt it, until he knew that one stood by him who was able and promised to give him all neceffary affiftance, if he would rely wholly on him for it; but this would give him fufficient encouragement to engage in the work with hope of fuccefs; and would be the only ground of encouragement and hope.

Jefus Chrift faid to his difciples, "Without me ye can do nothing." Surely he did not fay this to difcourage them, and lead them to fit ftill and do nothing; but to encourage them to truft in him, and to engage in the work affigned to them with alacrity, courage and hope. The apostle Paul knew that he was what he was by the grace of God, working mightily and effectually in him both to will and to do; that he had no fufficiency of himself for any good thing, but that all his fufficiency was of God; that without the powerful affiftance of Christ he could do nothing. Did this difcourage him, from attempting to do any thing? No; directly the contrary: from this he took his fole encouragement, and was animated to purfue his work with activity and diligence, and laboured more than all the other apoftles, knowing that through Chrift who ftrengthened him he could do all things.

Thus it appears not only that the objection under confideration is altogether without any ground or reason, but that it is made againft a paffage of fcripture which, according to the explanation which has been given, affords the only ground of hope to finners, and gives fufficient and the only encouragement to work out our own falvation with fear and trembling; and which does contain a complete anfwer to the objection, and that it is as direct, great and mifchievous a perverfion and abuse of the text, as can be imagined. Let it therefore be reject ed by all with abhorrence, and filenced forever.

3. The objection which has been made, that this doctrine of man's dependence on the powerful operation of God for every virtuous and holy act of will, fo that it is really produced by him, and could not exift did not God work in him both to will and to do, is inconsistent with human liberty, and makes man a mere machine, who is acted upon in all he wills and does, is really answered and refuted in the words themselves, as they have been explained.

Human liberty confifts in willing and doing, or in acting voluntarily. To act freely, and to act voluntarily, are fynonimous terms, meaning the fame thing; and it is impoflible to exercife or conceive of any other real liberty than this. All the liberty of any moral agent confifts in acting voluntarily. There is no other liberty in nature poffible. Therefore liberty does not confift in any thing which takes place before the actual exertion of willing; man does not, he cannot, exercife freedom antecedent to his acting voluntarily, or when he ceases to will and to do. Therefore, when God worketh in men to will and do what otherwise they would not will and do, their liberty is so far from being obftructed by this, that it is promoted, and the confequence is, their actually willing and doing, and confequently exercising all the liberty of which any creature is or can be made capable. How groundless and unreasonable then is this objection! It amounts to this, that man cannot be free in that which is the only exercife of liberty, because he never would have acted thus freely in that inftance, did not God by working in him induce him to exercise all the freedom of which he is capable in actually willing and doing.

It is evident that many puzzle and bewilder themselves about human liberty, and think many facts and doctrines contained in the Bible to be inconfiftent with liberty; or at least confefs themselves unable to conceive how they can be confiftent with it, because they have never attended fo much to the nature of human liberty as to be able to determine precifely in what it does confift, and imagine

imagine it confifts in fomething, of which they have no clear and consistent idea, and which is really impoffible, and never did or can exift. If they would carefully confult their own feelings to find what that is which they feel and exercife when they confider themselves perfectly free in what they do, they would find that when they acted voluntarily or of choice, and did as they pleased, they acted freely, and poffeffed all the freedom they could defire, or have any confiftent conception of; therefore, that though God work in them to will and to do, or whatever were the previous caufe of their willing and acting as they did, yet they were perfectly free in their choice and conduct; and that it was as much their own will and choice, as it could be on any fuppofition whatever, and they themselves wholly accountable for what they will and do.

This paffage therefore is fo far from being inconfiftent with human liberty, that it supposes and afferts that perfons have and exercise all the liberty in the practice of morality and religion of which man is capable, and carries in the face of it a complete confutation of the objection under confideration. And let no one imagine he has not all the freedom that is defirable, or that, in the nature of things, can be poffeffed and exercised, while he feels and knows that he acts voluntarily, or does as he pleases. And if he does both will and do that which is really working out his own falvation, let him ascribe it wholly to the fovereign mercy of God, who worketh in him thus to will and do, of his good pleasure.

Sermon XIII.

Phil. ii. 12, 13. Work out your own falvation with fear and trembling for it is God who worketh in you, both to I will and to do, of his good pleasure.

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AVING confidered three objections to the text, as it has been explained, in the preceding discourse, it is proposed in this to anfwer feveral more.

4. It is objected, that if men are not and cannot be willing to work out their own falvation, unless God first work in them to will and do, then they cannot be blamcable for not willing and doing.

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To this objection there is a full folution and answer in the words to which, it is made. If none do any thing towards working out their own falvation, till God worketh in them to will and to do, this fuppofes that previous to this they are unwilling; and that this unwillingness, or oppofition of will to this work, is the only difficulty in the way of their willing and doing that by which they would be faved; and were it not for this oppofition of heart or will to do that by which they would be faved, there would be no need that God fhould thus work in them to will and to do, which otherwife they voluntarily refufe to do. It is therefore fuppofed that they act freely in willing and doing that which is contrary to working out their falvation, and confequently that they are wholly blameable for voluntarily oppofing that by which they might be faved, if they were willing to comply with it. For we have no other idea of blame or crime, but that which confifts in willing and doing that which is contrary to reafon and truth, and the command of God, when nothing is in the way of willing and doing that which is right and wife, but their unwillingness or oppofition of heart or will to that which is required. And the great

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