selves, when they say the devil of the Scriptures, which they believe is human nature, the work of God's own hand, is set up by them as this rival? for they have never attempted to abate one jot or tittle of the virulence of this devil, but allowed it to take the exact place of the orthodox devil, in their theology. Now, who most dishonors God, the orthodox believer, who says, a fallen free-agent, or angel, is this opponent to the ways of God, or the Universalist, who says human nature, which God himself has made, is this opponent? Has God made an enemy to himself? The idea is unfounded and utterly preposterous and impossible. In support of the opinion that it was a fallen angel called Satan, who by the permission of God, for a wise reason before noticed, we bring a strange concession from Mr. Balfour himself, on this subject, which the reader may find in his book, called his Second Enquiry, pages 58, 59. He says, the ancient heathen Persians, in the time of Job, held that there were two gods; the one the author of all good, and the other of all evil. This latter god, however, he says, the Old and New Testament esteemed (see p. 56 of the Second Enquiry) as the principle of evil drifted, and not as a being. But whereabouts this is so con. sidered in the Bible we are not able to ascertain. This being the case, namely, that the heathen in the time of Job are considered, as Balfour says, even by the Bible itself, to have worshipped or rather deified the mere principle of evil, says, "it is strange, and has always appeared strange, that in this account Saton, (or this evil,) should be represented as conversing freely and familiarly with God." This we consider a grand concession; as indeed it is passing strange that divine inspiration should thus state the matter, if it was not so in fact. Would the Holy Ghost, who moved men of old to write the Scriptures, have so far respected the opinion of the heathen Persians of the time of Job, as to have given it the name of Satan, the identity of a being, and of such a being as could reason, accuse, abuse, traduce, pass up and down in the earth, doing any and all things, like a real being, and yet a mere fiction, or abstract principle, which cannot reason, or do any thing else, in and of itself; for if there be no being which is evil, there can exist no abstract evil. Satan is a being, therefore, and so considered by the sense of the Scripture; and no wonder Mr. Balfour has said, "it has always appeared strange to him, that in this account, Satan should be represented as conversing freely and familiarly with Gcd," a thing, we add, an abstract principle could not do.

Balfour, in trying to show that Christianity, as held by the orthodox sects, respecting the being of the devil, was derived from Zoroaster, the great reformer of the more ancient Magian religion of the ancestors of the Medes and Persians, and that in doing this he incorporated into it one new idea, which was that there was one supreme and eternal God, who was above all, and

was the author of all good. Previous to his time, they had held that there were two gods, one good and the other bad, whose powers were equal; but Zoroaster exploded this doctrine, and gave to the Supreme God exclusive rule, the same as the Scriptures do, while the evil god or angel was far less, and was finally to be overcome and destroyed in everlasting darkness. He also taught, says Balfour, as he is informed by P. Michaelis, the doctrine of a final resurrection. No doubt both these opinions he had learned of the Jewish Scriptures, as he thinks he was a Jew by birth and education, and was deeply learned, and thinks it very likely that he was, when young, a servant to one of the prophets, of whom the true sense of the Scriptures might have been learned by him.

All this we do not doubt, but now comes the wonder. This same Zoroaster taught also the doctrine of a final day of judgment, and the being of a devil, who was inferior to God, just the same as Christianity teaches now-a-days, as promulged by the orthodox churches; and yet he never could have learned it from the Bible, says Balfour, when both opinions had been taught many hundred years before Zoroaster was born, both by Job and by Moses. Is not this a wonder? What is the reason that these two latter doctrines could not have been learned of him from the same writings that the other two were, when they are equally plainly taught, especially in the book of Job. How is it that Zoroaster could learn the doctrine of the resurrection from a mere trait in the book of Job, where he says, he knew that his Redeemer lived, and that in the latter day he should stand upon the earth and that although worms should devour his skin, yet in his flesh he should see God; and not also learn a belief in the being of the devil, when it is over and over again taught by his being named, identified and conversed with by the Almighty?

This is the most illogical conclusion we have ever met with in the writings of any man, for Balfour does not say that Zoroaster learned the opinion of the inferiority of the Persian evil god from them, but invented it himself, as well as that of a day of judgment; and on this account he is chiefly to be considered as a much greater impostor than Mahomet was. But because he taught a final resurrection from the dead, he is, we suppose, in this, no impostor at all, because Universalists believe this: but because he taught as he had learned from Moses, Job and David, the belief in a hell, a devil, and a day of judgment, he was therefore a very great impostor-the same which the Saviour and all the New-Testament writers taught, and yet these were not impostors: how wonderful!

Here follows another strange conclusion, and equally logical with the other which is, (pages 70, 71,) that Zoroaster, impostor as he was, did not choose to make God the author of evil, and that his conscience was more scrupulous than this-in which he

excelled some Christians; and yet Universalists teach us a doctrine, everywhere to be viewed, that if the evil exists at all, it is by the appointment of the Creator, for the wisest and best of purposes; for, says Ballou, God has a use for every volition of man, and that he is so situated as that he acts wholly from necessity. Whose conscience in this thing is the best, the universalist or the orthodox? We leave Universalists themselves to judge; for we make evil to arise from the abuse of free-agency, while Universalists make God its direct author. They are worse, therefore, from their own showing, than Zoroaster was.

We conclude this chapter, therefore, being satisfied that it is impossible for any man, after duly considering this subject, to deny that Moses has in a manner satisfactory to the Jews, their prophets, to Jesus Christ and his disciples, and the church in all ages stated as plainly as pleased the holy ghost-that Satan, an evil apostate or fallen angel, beguiled the first woman with arguments and false reasoning, such as no beast or the appetites of Adam and Eve, could ever have made use of, as neither of them were capable, in the least degree, of moral perception, or power of reasoning; leaving the mind convinced that there must have been just such a being as the devil is supposed to be, who misled her, or she was not misled at all. Or if, as Mr. Ballou supposes, the whole account of Eve's fall is but an allegory, intended to teach the final predominance of her passions over her reasonyet, this will not meet even one difficulty, arising out of such a position. For if Moses invented an allegory for the above puposenamely, to illustrate the power of Eve's passions over her reason and innocence, yet it could not have been right, or according to truth, for her to make his allegory tell lies, as he has, if the account is but allegory. But how is this, says one; how does it tell lies, even allowing the account to be an allegory? We will show you-does not Moses say, that the serpent (which Mr. Balfour says was her lusts or appetites for food,) told her that her eyes should be opened, and that she should become as the gods, in the day she should eat of that fruit. Now this was false in the allegory, as it was impossible for the serpent (if that serpent was nothing more than her appetites,) for it to foretell any thing about it, as there is no perception in the mere cravings of hunger, or any other animal desire of her nature, or in any body else, since the world began. Eve's whole powers of body, mind and spirit, put together, could never have unaided by supernatural assistance foreseen, foretold, or foreknown, one jot or tittle of the effects of her eating that fruit; how much less, therefore, her appetites, or the serpent of Universalists. To suppose it was an allegory, is much worse than Balfour's opinion, which is that it was a real conflict, or dialogue, in her mind, relative to eating of that tree; it is worse, because the sense is more hidden and ab

struse, and less calculated to inform the reader what the real facts were, and how the law of God was infringed.

There is another view of the matter, which goes far to show that there was an evil spirit, or fallen angel engaged in Eve's ruin; and this is, that Eve could not have been hungry at the time, as she had universal and unlimited access to all the fruits of Eden. It is true that the text states, that when she saw the tree was good for food that she did eat. But this was no reason why she tasted it; as her only and highest reason was, she had been told that it would make her wise, and as wise as the gods, or holy angels of heaven, who, no doubt, she often saw and conversed with. Now if there is no good reason to suppose she was hungry at the time, then there is left no good reasoning why she should taste it, except being incited so to do, by an evil spirit, of whom it is said expressly, under the name of serpent, that he beguiled her in that matter; and thus understood all the writers of the New Testament, who have spoken of the fall of Eve. The whole stress of the matter is laid on her estimation of the power the fruit had of making her wise, while the circumstance of its being good for food, was but secondary, or of small account; unless we suppose her a hungry voracious animal, seeking everywhere, as her chief good, that which could sustain her body only.

Origin of Satan, and Cause of Sin, with many Curious Subjects connected therewith.

Having thus far treated on the subject of the identity of the creature, called in the English translation of Genesis, the serpent, and of the being who used it as an instrument of deception, as preliminary to our main object; we now hasten to ascertain the origin of Satan, and cause of sin, or moral evil, if there be such a being, and if there be real moral evil at all-which many Universalists deny. But were we now to adopt the opinion of Universalists, with several other sects of the same genus, we should save ourselves the labor of writing the present work; as we should at once discover the being of Satan, such as they believe him to be, to have been produced by the will and power of God; inasmuch as these people believe that there is no such being in existence, but a principle only, which they call the evil principle, or devil: and consists of the bad passions of the human soul, and appetites of the body: and that they were placed there by the Creator, at the moment of man's creation, for good and wise purposes. It is impossible to manage this question in any but one of two ways; either there must be a real personal spiritual Satan, or being distinct in existence from man,

or man is as he should be, in the sight of God-pure, innocent, and holy-and not fallen and corrupted, as generally supposed and believed. Because, to us it appears monstrous and absurd, to suppose man was created with latent and inherent tendencies, or principles, which were to produce, and have produced, the immense mass of natural and moral evil, now and always extant, since the fall, and would seem an impeachment of the goodness, wisdom, and power of God. For God cannot be good, if he is the author of moral, and consequently of natural evil. He cannot be wise in instituting a scene of things, so horrible, and contrary to all moral happiness. He cannot be powerful, nor good, or he would have prevented, if he consistently could, so dreadful a state of things as now, and ever has existed in the world.

We need not draw out an argument here, to prove that the earth mourns, through all her tribes over its entire surface, among the ranks of man, that temporal and moral death have the whole race in their grasp. We need not personate the monster—war, whose jaws are reeking with the blood of millions:-we need not mention famine,-diseases of mind and body,-with all the catalogue of sorrows, more in number than human calculation can make out, which are now the inheritage of man :---we need not bring to view a picture of all the horrid passions of the souls of both cultivated and uncultivated men, as exhibited in pride, in lust, in falsehood, in anger, in selfishness, in prejudice, in bigotry, in the love of dominion, in treachery, impiety, and recklessness of spirit, to prove that moral evil exists; as no man denies it, except such as do not receive the Bible as the man of their council, and guide of life. Yet there are those who profess even Christianity, and at the same time, unwitingly, and others designedly deny the fall of man into a sinful state, by saying that all this evil is but seeming evil, and is necessary for human happiness, upon the whole, by way of contrast; and such are Universalists, with all of that school. To maintain this belief respecting natural evil, were it not, say they, for labor and weariness, we could know no rest:-were it not for hunger and thirst, we should know no pleasure in the use of food and pleasant drinks:-were it not for weariness, we should know no sweet repose:-were it not for silence and want of society, the power of speech, conversation, could have no charms:were it not for a contrariety of thoughts, concord and harmony could not be distinguished as a blessing:-were it not for a variety of fancy, the joy of choice could have no being. All of which is true, and not even inconsistent with a Paradisical state of innocence and purity: if not carried to extremes, as could not have been the case, if man had not fallen; as his prudence and equanimity of temperament, would have in such a case prevented this forever. But when the idea respecting contrast