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another branch of the government to discharge its own appropriate duties, in that mode which seems to itself most conducive to the public interests. We are, by so voting, no more responsible for the manner in which the negotiation shall be conducted, than we are for the manner in which one of the Heads of Department may discharge the duties of his office.
On the other hand, if we withhold the ordinary means, we do incur a heavy responsibility. We interfere, as it seems to me, to prevent the action of the Government, according to constitutional forms and provisions. It ought constantly to be remembered that our whole power, in the case, is merely incidental. It is only because public ministers must have salaries, like other officers, and because no salaries can be paid, but by our vote, that the subject is referred to us at all. The Constitution vests the power of appointment in the President and Senate; the law gives to the President even the power of fixing the amount of salary, within certain limits; and the only question, here, is upon the appropriation. There is no doubt that we have the power, if we see fit to exercise it, to break up the mission, by withholding the salaries; we have power also to break up the Court, by withholding the salaries of the Judges, or to break up the office of President, by withholding the salary provided for it by law. All these things, it is true, we have the power to do, since we hold the keys of the Treasury. But, then, can we rightfully exercise this power? The gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. BUCHANAN,) with whom I have great pleasure in concurring on this part of the case, while I regret that I differ with him on others, has placed this question in a point of view which cannot be improved. These officers do, indeed, already exist. They are public ministers. If they were to negotiate a treaty, and the Senate should ratify it, it would become a law of the land, whether we voted their salaries or not. This shows that the Constitution never contemplated that the House of Representatives should act a part in originating negotiations, or concluding treaties.
I know, sir, it is a useless labor to discuss the kind of power which this House incidentally holds in these cases. Men will differ in that particular; and as the forms of public business and of the Constitution are such, that the power may be exercised by this House, there will always be some, or always may be some, who feel inclined to exercise it. For myself, I feel bound not to step out of my own sphere, and neither to exercise nor control any authority, of which the Constitution has intended to lodge the free and unrestrained exercise in other hands. Cases of extreme necessity, in which a regard to public safety is to be the supreme law, or rather to take place of all law, must be allowed to provide for themselves, when they arise. Reasoning from such possible cases, will shed no light on the general path of our constitutional duty.
Mr. Chairman: I have a habitual and very sincere respect for the opinions of the gentleman from Delaware. And I can say with truth, that he is the last man in the House from whom I should have looked for this proposition of amendment, or from whom I should have expected to hear some of the reasons which he has given in its support. He says, that, in this matter, the source from which the mea
sure springs should have no influence with us whatever. I do not comprehend this; and I cannot but think the honorable gentleman has been surprised into an expression which does not convey his meaning. This measure comes from the Executive, and it is an appropriate exercise of Executive Power. How is it, then, that we are to consider it as entirely an open question for us; as if it were a legislative measure originating with ourselves? In deciding whether we will enable the Executive to exercise his own duties, are we to consider whether we should have exercised them in the same way ourselves? And if we differ in opinion with the President and Senate, are we on that account to refuse the ordinary means? I think not; unless we mean to say that we will exercise ourselves, all the powers of the Government.
But the gentleman argues, that although, generally, such a course would not be proper, yet, in the present case, the President has especially referred the matter to our opinion; that he has thrown off, or attempted to throw off, his own constitutional responsibility; or, at least, that he proposes to divide it with us; that he requests our advice, and that we, having referred that request to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, have now received from that Committee their Report thereon.
Sir, this appears to me a very mistaken view of the subject; but if it were all so-if our advice and opinion had thus been asked, it would not alter the line of our duty. We cannot take, though it were offered, any share in Executive duty. We cannot divide their own proper responsibility with other branches of the Government. The President cannot properly ask, and we cannot properly give, our advice, as to the manner in which he shall discharge his duties. He cannot shift the responsibility from himself; and we cannot assume it. Such a course, sir, would confound all that is distinct in the constitutional assignment of our respective functions. It would break down all known divisions of power, and put an end to all just responsibility. If the President were to receive directions or advice from us, in things pertaining to the duties of his own office, what becomes of his responsibility to us, and to the Senate? We hold the impeaching power. We are to bring him to trial in any case of maladministration. The Senate are to judge him by the Constitution and laws; and it would be singular, indeed, if, when such occasion should arise, the party accused should have the means of sheltering himself under the advice or opinions of his accusers. Nothing can be more incorrect, or more dangerous, than this pledging the House beforehand, to any opinion, as to the manner of discharging Executive duties.
But, sir, I see no evidence whatever, that the President has asked us to take this measure upon ourselves, or to divide the responsibility of it with him. I see no such invitation or request. The Senate having concurred in the mission, the President has sent a message, requesting the appropriation, in the usual and common form. Another message is sent, in answer to a call of the House, communicating the correspondence, and setting forth the objects of the mission. It is contended, that by this message he asks our advice, or refers the subject to our opinion. I do not so understand it.
Our concurrence, he says, by making the appropriation, is subject to our free determination. Doubtless it is so. If we determine at all, we shall determine freely; and the message does no more than leave to ourselves to decide how far we feel ourselves bound, either to support or to thwart the Executive Department, in the exercise of its duties. There is no message, no document, no communication to us, which asks for our concurrence, otherwise than as we shall manifest it by making the appropriation.
Undoubtedly, sir, the President would be glad to know that the measure met the approbation of the House. He must be aware, unquestionably, that all leading measures mainly depend for success on the support of Congress. Still, there is no evidence that on this occasion he has sought to throw off responsibility from himself, or that he desires us to be answerable for anything beyond the discharge of our own constitutional duties. I have already said, sir, that I know of no precedent for such a proceeding as the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Delaware. None which I think analogous has been cited. The resolution of the House, some years ago, on the subject of the slave-trade, is a precedent the other way. A committee had reported that, in order to put an end to the slavetrade, a mutual right of search might be admitted and arranged by negotiation. But this opinion was not incorporated, as the gentleman now proposes to incorporate his amendment, into the resolution of the House. The resolution only declared, in general terms, that the President be requested to enter upon such negotiations with other powers as he might deem expedient, for the effectual abolition of the African slave-trade. It is singular enough, and may serve as an admonition on the present occasion, that a negotiation having been concluded, in conformity to the opinions expressed, not, indeed, by the House, but by the committee, the treaty, when laid before the Senate, was rejected by that body.
The gentleman from Delaware himself says, that the Constitutional responsibility pertains alone to the Executive Department: and that none other has to do with it, as a public measure. These admissions seem to me to conclude the question; because, in the first place, if the Constitutional responsibility appertains alone to the President, he cannot devolve it on us, if he would; and because, in the second place, I see no proof of any intention, on his part, so to devolve it on us, even if he had the power.
Mr. Chairman: I will here take occasion, in order to prevent misapprehension, to observe, that no one is more convinced than I am, that it is the right of this House, and often its duty, to express its general opinion in regard to questions of foreign policy. Nothing, certainly, is more proper. I have concurred in such proceedings, and am ready to do so again. On those great subjects, for instance, which form the leading topics in this discussion, it is not only the right of the House to express its opinions, but I think it its duty to do so, if it should think the Executive to be pursuing a general course of policy which the House itself will not ultimately approve. But that is something entirely different from the present suggestion. Here it is proposed to decide, by our vote, what shall be discussed by particular ministers, already appointed, when they shall meet the
ministers of the other powers. This is not a general expression of opinion. It is a particular direction, or a special instruction. Its operation is limited to the conduct of particular men, on a particular occasion. Such a thing, sir, is wholly unprecedented in our history. When the House proceeds, in the accustomed way, by general resolution, its sentiments apply, as far as expressed, to all public agents, and on all occasions. They apply to the whole course of policy, and must, necessarily, be felt everywhere. But if we proceed by way of direction to particular ministers, we must direct them all. In short, we must ourselves furnish, in all cases, diplomatic instructions.
We now propose to prescribe what our ministers shall discuss, and what they shall not discuss, at Panama. But there is no subject coming up for discussion at Panama, which might not also be proposed for discussion either here or at Mexico, or in the Capital of Colombia. If we direct what our ministers at Panama shall or shall not say on the subject of Mr. Monroe's declaration, for example, why should we not proceed to say also what our other ministers abroad, or our Secretary at home, shall say on the same subject? There is precisely the same reason for one, as for the other. The course of the House, hitherto, sir, has not been such. It has expressed its opinions, when it deemed proper to express them at all, on great, leading questions, by resolution, and in a general form. These general opinions, being thus made known, have doubtless always had, and such expressions of opinion doubtless always will have, their effect.-This is the practice of the Government. It is a salutary practice; but if we carry it farther, or rather if we adopt a very different practice, and undertake to prescribe to our public ministers what they shall discuss, and what they shall not discuss, we take upon ourselves that which, in my judgment, does not at all belong to us. I see no more propriety in our deciding now, in what manner these ministers shall discharge their duty, than there would have in our prescribing to the President and Senate what persons ought to have been appointed ministers.
An honorable member from Virginia, who spoke some days ago, (Mr. RIVES,) seems to go still farther than the member from Delaware. He maintains, that we may distinguish between the various objects contemplated by the Executive in the proposed negotiation; and adopt some and reject others. And this high, delicate, and important trust, the gentleman deduces simply from our power to withhold the minister's salaries. The process of the gentleman's argument appears to me as singular as its conclusion. He founds himself on the legal maxim, that he who has the power to give, may annex whatever condition or qualification to the gift he chooses. This maxim, sir, would be applicable to the present case, if we were the sovereigns of the country; if all power were in our hands; if the public money were entirely our own; if our appropriation of it were mere grace and favor; and if there were no restraints upon us, our own sovereign will and pleasure. But the argument totally forgets that we are ourselves but public agents; that our power over the Treasury is but that of stewards over a trust fund; that we have nothing to give, and therefore no gifts to limit, or qualify; that it is
as much our duty to appropriate to proper objects, as to withhold appropriations from such as are improper; and that it is as much, and as clearly, our duty to appropriate in a proper and Constitutional manner, as to appropriate at all.
The same honorable member advanced another idea, in which I cannot concur. He does not admit that confidence is to be reposed in the Executive, on the present occasion, because confidence, he argues, implies only, that not knowing ourselves what will be done in a given case by others, we trust to those who are to act in it, that they will act right; and as we know the course likely to be pursued in regard to this subject, by the Executive, confidence can have no place. This seems a singular notion of confidence; certainly is not my notion of that confidence which the Constitution requires one branch of the Government to repose in another. The President is not our agent, but like ourselves, the agent of the People. They have trusted to his hands the proper duties of his office: and we are not to take those duties out of his hands, from any opinion of our own that we should execute them better ourselves. The confidence which is due from us to the Executive, and from the Executive to us, is not personal, but official and Constitutional. It has nothing to do with individual likings or dislikings; but results from that division of power among departments, and those limitations on the authority of each, which belong to the nature and frame of our government.
It would be unfortunate, indeed, if our line of Constitutional action were to vibrate, backward and forward, according to our opinions of persons, swerving this way to day, from undue attachment, and the other way to-morrow, from distrust or dislike. This may sometimes happen from the weakness of our virtues, or the excitement of our passions; but I trust it will not be coolly recommended to us, as the rightful course of public conduct.
It is obvious to remark, Mr. Chairman, that the Senate have not undertaken to give directions or instructions in this case. That body is closely connected with the President in Executive measures. Its consent to these very appointments is made absolutely necessary by the Constitution; yet it has not seen fit, in this or any other case, to take upon itself the responsibility of directing the mode in which the negotiations should be conducted.
For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I am for giving no instructions, advice, or directions, in the case. I prefer leaving it where, in my judgment, the Constitution has left it-to Executive discretion and Executive responsibility.
But, sir, I think there are other objections to the amendment. There are parts of it which I could not agree to, if it were proper to attach any such condition to our vote. As to all that part of the amendment, indeed, which asserts the neutral policy of the United States, and the inexpediency of forming alliances, no man assents to those sentiments more readily, or more sincerely, than myself. On these points, we are all agreed. Such is our opinion; such, the President assures us, in terms, is his opinion; such we know to be the opinion of the country. If it be thought necessary to affirm opinions which no one either denies or doubts, by a resolution of