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who judge him. But the community remains. The Commonwealth, we trust, will be perpetual. She is yet in her youth, as a free and independent State, and, by analogy to the life of individuals, may be said to be in that period of her existence, when principles of action are adopted, and character is formed. The Hon. Respondent will not be the principal sufferer, if he should here fall a victim to charges of undefined and undefinable offences, to loose notions of constitutional law, or novel rules of evidence. By the necessary retribution of things, the evil of such a course would fall most heavily on the State which should pursue it, by shaking its character for justice, and impairing its principles of constitutional liberty.-This, sir, is the first interesting and important impeachment which has arisen under the constitution of the Commonwealth.-The decision now to be made cannot but affect subsequent cases. Governments necessarily are more or less regardful of precedents, on interesting public trials, and as, on the present occasion, all who act any part here have naturally considered what has been done, and what rules and principles have governed, in similar cases, in other communities, so those who shall come after us will look back to this trial. And I most devoutly hope they may be able to regard it, as a safe and useful example, fit to instruct and guide them in their own duty; an example full of wisdom, and of moderation; an example of cautious and temperate justice; an example of law and principle successfully opposed to temporary excitement; an example, indicating in all those who bear a leading part in the proceedings, a spirit, fitted for a judicial trial, and proper for men who act with an enlightened and firm regard to the permanent interests of public constitutional liberty. To preserve the Respondent in the office which he fills, may be an object of little interest to the public; and to deprive him of that office may be of as little. But on what principles, he is either to be preserved or deprived, is an inquiry, in the highest degree important, and in which the public has a deep and lasting interest.

The provision, which the constitutions of this and other states have made for trying impeachments before the Senate, is obviously adopted from an analogy to the English constitution. It was perceived, however, and could hardly fail to be perceived, that the resemblance was not strong, between the tribunals, clothed with the power of trying impeachments, in this country, and the English. House of Lords. This last is not only a branch of the legislature, but a standing judicature. It has jurisdiction to revise the judgments of all other courts. It is accustomed to the daily exercise of judicial power, and has acquired the habit and character which such exercise confers. There is a presumption, therefore, that it will try impeachments, as it tries other causes, and that the common rules of evidence, and the forms of proceedings, so essential to the rights of the accused, which prevail in other cases, will prevail also in cases of impeachment. In the construction of our American governments, it is obvious, that although the power of judging on impeachments could probably be nowhere so well deposited, as with the senate, yet it could not but be foreseen, that this high act of judicature was to be trusted to the hands of those who did not ordinarily perform judicial functions; but who occasionally only, and on such

occasions, moreover, as were generally likely to be attended with some excitement, took upon themselves the duty of judges. It must, nevertheless, be confessed, that few evils have been, as yet, found to result from this arrangement. In all the states, in the aggregate, although there have been several impeachments, there have been fewer convictions, and fewer still, in which there is just reason to suppose injustice has taken place. From the experience of the past, I trust we form favorable anticipations of the future, and that the judgment which this court shall now pronounce, and the rules and principles which shall guide that judgment, will be such as shall secure to the community a rigorous and unrelenting censorship over maladministration in office, and to individuals entire protection against prejudice, excitement, and injustice.

The Respondent is impeached for various instances of alleged misconduct, in his office, as Judge of Probate, for the county of Middlesex. In order that we may understand the duties which he is charged with violating, it is necessary to inquire into the origin and nature of these duties, and to examine the legal history of the Commonwealth, in regard to the officers, who from time to time have executed and performed these duties. It is now two centuries since our ancestors established a colony here. They brought with them, of course, the general notions with regard to property, the administration of justice, and the peculiar powers and duties of different tribunals, which they had formed in the country which they left; and these notions, and general ideas, they adopted in practice, with such modifications as circumstances rendered necessary. In England, they had been accustomed to see the jurisdiction over wills and administrations exercised in the spiritual courts, by the bishops or their ordinaries. Here, there were no such courts. Still it was a necessary jurisdiction, to be exercised by some tribunal, and in the early history of the colony, it was exercised by the same magistrates, or some of them, on whom the other portions of judicial power were conferred. Wills were proved, and administrations granted, by the county magistrates, essentially in the same manner as in England by the bishops, or their delegates. It seems that any two magistrates, with the clerk of the county court, might prove a will, and cause it to be recorded in the county court; and might grant administrations, in like manner. (Ancient Charters, 204.)

At length, by the act of 1685, (An. Ch. 205) it was expressly declared, that the county court, in cases of probate of wills, and the granting of administrations, should have the same power and authority as the ordinary in England.

By the provincial charter of 1692, all power and jurisdiction, in the probate of wills and granting administration, was conferred on the governor and council. The governor then became supreme ordinary, and by the provision of the statutes they were to exercise the same power and authority as were exercised by the ordinary in England.

At this time, no statute had regulated fees in the probate office; and yet it is not probable that business was done there, at that time, without fees, any more than at later periods. We must look therefore for some other authority, than a statute permission, for the

establishment and regulation of fees, in this office. And as the governor and council possessed the general power of the courts in England, it is material to inquire into the authority and practice of those courts in this particular. There can be no doubt, that in the English courts, fees, in cases of probate and administration, were, from early times, in most cases regulated by custom, and the authority and direction of the courts themselves, without statute provisions. A table of fees, established in 1597, in the time of archbishop Whitgift, may be seen in Burn's Ecclesiastical Law, vol. 2. p. 266.

This table sets forth a long list of charges and fees of office accruing in the administration of estates, such as for "administration," which probably means decreeing administration, "commission," which is the letter of administration, "interlocutory decree," "examination of account," "respite of inventory,' (6 caveat," "citation," ," "quietus," &c. &c. &c. At this time there was no statute which established the fees of office, in cases of administration, except one single provision in the St. 21, Hen. VIII, cap. 5, which enacted, that for granting administration on goods under forty pounds, the judge should receive no more than two shillings and sixpence. It appears from the preamble of that statute, that no previous law was existing, on the subject, and the grievance recited, is, that the bishops and their ordinaries demanded and received greater fees, for the probation of testaments, and other things thereunto belonging, than had been aforetime usual and accustomed. The preamble recites also, that an act of Henry V. had ordained, that no ordinary should take, for the probation of testaments, or other things to the same belonging, any more than was accustomed and used in the time of king Edward the third, which act did endure but to the next parliament, by reason that the said ordinaries did then promise to reform and amend their exactions: but inasmuch as the evil was still continued and aggravated, the act proceeded to limit and fix fees of office, for the probate of wills, and for other services respecting testate estates, and contains the single provision above mentioned, and no more, respecting administrations on intestate


It is entirely clear and certain, that the fees of bishops and their ordinaries did not originate in the grant or provision of any act of parliament. Such acts were passed only to restrain and limit the amount, and to prevent exaction and extortion. The right to demand and receive fees rested on the general principle of a right to compensation for services rendered; and in the absence of statute limitations, the amount was ascertained by the practice and usage of the courts, being reasonable and proper. Hence it happened, in England, that different fees were paid, and probably still are, in the different dioceses, according to the usage of different courts, and the time when their tables of fees were respectively established. the several dioceses there are tables of fees, different, as it seemeth, in the several charges, in proportion to the difference of times wherein they have been established." (2. Burn, 269.) This is precisely what has happened, and what, whether allowed to prove it or not, every member of this court knows, now actually exists, in relation to the different counties of this Commonwealth.


It is most material to the Respondent's case to understand clearly, on what ground it is, that, as Judge of Probate, he had a right to receive fees for services performed in his office. There is a difference of opinion, in matter of law, in this respect, between the Managers and ourselves, wide enough, in my judgment, to extend over the whole case. If the House of Representatives be right, in the legal doctrine which their Managers have advanced here, I agree at once the case is against the Respondent, unless, indeed, an indulgence may be allowed to his infirmity, in not understanding the law, as it is now asserted. I will proceed to state the question, now at issue between the Managers and us, as clearly as I may be able. The Managers contend that all fees of office, in such offices as the Respondent's, arise only from the express grant of the legislature; and that none can be claimed, where such grant is not shown. We, on the other hand, humbly submit, that the right, in such offices, to receive fees, is the general right to receive reasonable compensation for services rendered, and labor performed; and is no otherwise affected by statute, than as the amount of fees, is, or may be, limited by statute.

It is certain, that judges of probate, in this state, are required to perform many acts, (such, for instance, as granting guardianship to persons non compotes mentis) for which no fees are specifically established by the statute. One of the learned Managers has expressly advanced the proposition, that for such services the judge is entitled to receive no fees whatever. He contends, that the law presumes him to be adequately paid, on a sort of average, for all services by him performed, by the fees specially provided for some. On the contrary, we, very humbly, insist, that in all such cases the judge has a right to receive a just and reasonable fee of office for the service performed; the amount to be settled, on proper principles, and, as well as in any way, by analogy to similar services, for which the amount of fees is fixed by statute. The statute, for example, establishes the fees for a grant of guardianship over minors. It establishes none, for guardianship over persons non compotes mentis. The precise difference between the learned Managers and us, is, that they contend, that, in the last case, the judge is entitled to receive no fee at all; while we think, that he has a right to receive, in such case, a reasonable fee; and that what is resonable may fairly be determined by reference to what the law allows him in the case of guardianship over minors.

I rejoice, sir, in behalf of my client, that we have here a plain, intelligible question of law, to be discussed and decided. This is a question, in which neither prerogative nor discretion has aught to do. It is not to be decided, by reasons of state, or those political considerations, which we have heard so often, but so indefinitely, and, in my judgment, so alarmingly, referred to, and relied on, in the opening speeches of more than one of the learned Managers. It may possibly happen, sir, to the learned Managers, to share the fortunes of the gods in Homer's battles. While they keep themselves in the high atmosphere of prerogative, and political discretion, and assail the Respondent from the clouds, the advantage, in the controversy, may remain entirely with them. When they descend, however, to

an equal field of mortal combat, and consent to contend with mortal weapons-cominus ense-it is probable they may sometimes get, as well as give, a wound. On the present question, we meet the learned Managers on equal terms, and fair ground, and we are willing that our client's fate should abide the result. The Managers have advanced a plain and intelligible proposition, as being the law of the land. If they make it out, they show a good case against the Respondent; if they fail so to do, then their case, so far as it rests on this proposition, fails also. Let, then, the proposition be examined.

The proposition is, as before stated, that for services, which the law requires judges of probate to perform, but for which there is no particular fee established or provided by statute, they can receive no fee whatever.

In the first place, let it be remarked, that, of the various duties and services, required of judges of probate, some grow out of the very nature of their office, and are incidental to it, or arise by common law; others were imposed by statutes passed before the establishment of any fee bill whatever, and others, again, by statutes passed since. The statute, commonly called the fee bill, was passed for the regulation of fees in other courts, and other offices, as well as of the judges and registers of probate. It imposes no duty whatever on any officer. It treats only of existing duties, and of those no farther than to limit fees. It declares, that, "The fees of the several persons hereafter mentioned, for the services respectively annexed to their names, shall be as follows," &c. The statute then proceeds to enumerate, among other things, certain services of the judges of probate; but it is acknowledged that it does not enumerate or set forth all the services, which the law calls on him to perform. In our opinion, sir, this is simply a restraining statute. It fixes the amount of fees, in the cases mentioned, leaving everything else as it stood before. I have already stated, that, in England, fees, in the ecclesiastical courts, for probate of wills, and granting administrations, were of earlier date than any statute respecting them, and their amount ascertained, by usage, and the authority of the courts themselves. "The rule is," says Dr. Burn, "the known and established custom of every place, being reasonable." (4. Burn's Eccles. Law, 267.)

And if the reasonableness of the fee be disputed, it may be tried by jury, whether the fee be reasonable. (1. Salkeld, 333.) If this be so, then clearly there exists a right to some fee, independent of a particular statute; for if there be no right to any fee at all, why refer to a jury to decide what fee would be reasonable? But the law is still more express on this point.-" Fees are certain perquisites allowed to officers in the administration of justice, as a recompense for their labor and trouble; ascertained, either by acts of parliament, or by ancient usage, which gives them an equal sanction with an act of parliament.” All such fees as have been allowed by courts of justice to their officers, as a recompense for their labor and attendance, are established fees; and the parties cannot be deprived of them without an act of parliament." (Coke, Lit. 368. Prec. Chan. 551. Jacob's Law Dict.-" FEES.")

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