On May 25 General Grant wrote General Banks who was then operating below Fort Hudson:

hold the enemy

"I feel that my force is abundantly strong to where he is, or to whip him if he should come out. The place is so strongly fortified, however, that it cannot be taken without either a great sacrifice of life or by a regular siege. I have determined to adopt the latter course, and save my men. The great danger now to be apprehended is, that the enemy may collect a force outside, and attempt to rescue the garrison."

On the 31st he again wrote:

"It is now certain that Johnston has already collected a force from twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand strong, at Jackson and Canton, and is using every effort to increase it to forty thousand. With this, he will undoubtedly attack Haines' Bluff, and compel me to abandon the investment of the city, if not reinforced before he can get here."

General Grant had been reinforced by Lauman's division and four regiments from Memphis, two divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps, Major-General C. C. Washburn commanding, Herron's division from the Department of the Missouri, two divisions from the Ninth Corps, under command of Major-General Parke. Sherman's corps held the extreme right, McPherson the center, and General Ord, now in command of General McClernand's corps, McClernand having been relieved, on McPherson's left, while Herron held the extreme left. General Blair held Haines' Bluff and the country between the Yazoo and the Big Black River. He was also ordered to watch the movements of Johnston and hold all fords on the Big Black.

Every disposition was made by Grant to meet either a sortie from the invested town or from an attack in the rear. The latter part of June the enemy's ammunition had become exhausted, as also his commissary supplies;

not only the garrison but the entire population were threatened with famine, the troops were reduced to eating mule meat; yet they still hoped that Johnston would come to their relief. Owing to the constant bombardment of the town the inhabitants were compelled to seek safety in caves dug in the steep banks where streets passed through.

General Grant about this time formed an expedition to resist an advance of Johnston, he having been apprised of

his threatened advance with a very large force. General Sherman was placed in command. In his notes to General Sherman, accompanying the order for this advance movement, General Grant spoke of several letters written by the imprisoned garrison to their wives and friends. These letters had been found on a captured rebel courier. He says: "They seem to put a great deal of faith in the Lord and Joe Johnston, but you must whip Johnston at least fifteen miles from here." He also issued the following order to General Parke, it shows the same decided de

termination to whip the rebel chief, should he make the attempt to raise the siege:

June 22, 1863.

GENERAL PARKE:-Sherman goes out from here with five brigades, and Osterhaus' Division subject to his orders besides. In addition to this, another division, 5,000 strong, is notified to be in readines to move on notice. In addition to this, I can spare still another divi. sion, 6,000 strong, if they should be required. We want to whip Johnston at least fifteen miles off, if possible.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.`

The result of this movement was, that General John ston finding Grant in force and ready to give battle, gave up all hopes of rescuing the doomed city, and retreated to Jackson.

On the 25th of June the sappers and miners had pushed their work to completion and the mines were ready to be sprung, the utmost secrecy having been observed, the work being performed after dark. Everything being in readiness for the explosion a mine which had been dug under an important part of the enemy's works was fired. In this mine two thousand two hundred pounds of powder were placed. Its explosion was to be the signal for a simultaneous attack from every gun on land and in the fleet-through the gorge cut by the explosion several thousand men were to rush to gain an advance position.

In a dispatch of the same date a correspondent gives a brief sketch of the explosion:

This morning the work was completed, an immense quantity of gunpowder was stored in the cavity prepared to receive it, and the fuse train was laid. At noon the different regiments of the Seventeenth Corps, selected to make the assault upon the breach when it should have been effected, were marshaled in long lines upon the near slopes of the hills immediately confronting the doomed rebel fortifications, where, disposed for the attack, they impatiently awaited the denouement. The rebels seemed to discover that some movement

was on foot, for from the moment our troops came into position until the explosion took place their sharpshooters kept up an incessant fire from the whole line of their works.

At length all was in readiness; the fuse train was fired, and it went fizzing and popping through the zigzag line of trenches, until for a moment it vanished. Its disappearance was quickly succeeded by the explosion, and the mine was sprung. So terrible a spectacle is seldom witnessed. Dust, dirt, smoke, gabions, stockades, timber gun-carriages, logs-in fact, everything connected with the fortrose hundreds of feet into the air, as if vomited forth from a volcano. Some who were close spectators even say that they saw the bodies of the poor wretches who a moment before had lined the ramparts of the work.

The Union lines were still pressed forward and on the 3d of July were within a few hundred feet of the rebel defenses. It was understood in both armies that the time had come for the final assault, and that July 4 was the day selected. General Pemberton was well aware that he could not repel the assault, and that he would be unable to cut his way out; further resistance was hopeless, and would cause unwarranted sacrifice of life.

On the morning of the 3d, Pemberton sent a flag of truce borne by General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery to General Grant proposing an armistice with the object of arranging terms of capitulation, stating that it was his wish to save further effusion of blood. General Grant replied: HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSee,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR VICKSBURG, July 3, 1563.}

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,

Commanding Confederate Forces, etc.:

GENERAL:-Your note of this date, just received, proposes an armistice of several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course, can be ended at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now

in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due them as prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no other terms than those indicated above.

I am, General, very respectfully your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

General Bowen requested that General Grant meet General Pemberton in a personal interview. General Grant readily agreed to do this, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon a conference was held, resulting in no definite decision. A further correspondence between the commanders resulted in General Grant agreeing to certain modifications of his first letter, and General Pemberton immediately forwarded his acceptance of the terms proposed. At 10 o'clock on the morning of July 4, 1863, Vicksburg surrendered. By the act of capitulation the defenders, numbering over thirty thousand men, became prisoners of war; 213 pieces of artillery, 35,000 stand of arms, and an immense amount of ordnance and other matter fell into the hands of the victors. On the afternoon of the same day General Grant's army marched into the city. Headley in his valuable work, "Grant and his Campaigns," closes his article on the surrender of Vicksburg with the following

comments:

"In a review of this great campaign, Grant's actions shine so preeminently, that an estimate of the biographer, in the way of a summury, is totally unnecessary. He was active, versatile, tenacious of purpose, Napoleonic in his judgment and use of men, with moral courage to assign or remove them according to their merits. And, combined with all these high qualities, he had exhibited remarkable skill in manœuvring large armies in the field; in learning instant lessons from repulses; in conducting an arduous siege; in brushing away a succoring army-always preserving that equal mind which it is more difficult to keep in the extreme of prosperity than in that of adversity.