For a month or more the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pleas ants, had been diligently at work in digging a mine to blow up one of the most formidable forts of the rebels, situated in front of General Burnside's lines. The work was completed on the 23d of July, and charged with four tons of gunpowder on the 25th. Beyond the rebel fort was a crest called Cemetery Hill, which, once in the possession of the Union forces, would command the city and adjacent rebel lines, and compel Lee to retreat.

On the night of the 29th, General Meade issued instructions for the disposition of the forces and their duty. The eighth and succeeding paragraphs of this order refers to the explosion of this mine, and is as follows:

"8. At half-past three (3:30) in the morning of the 30th, MajorGeneral Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgment there. He will be followed by MajorGeneral Ord, who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major-General Warren, who will support him on the left.

"Upon the explosion of the mine, the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery.

"9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operation, and of everything important that occurs.

"10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation, are essential to success; and the commanding General is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops."

At the appointed hour the fuse was lighted, but no explosion followed. Upon investigation it was found that the fuse had gone out at a point where it had been spliced. Lieutenant Douty and Sergeant Henry Reese volunteered to enter the mine. Relighting the fuse, the mine exploded at forty-two minutes past four-just one hour and twelve minutes after the time appointed.

The explosion was a triumphant success—a crater two hundred feet long, sixty wide and thirty deep had been formed, opening the enemy's line for an assault, and had so paralyzed them that their artillery was silent. An unnecessary delay of some minutes followed, when the charging column rushed into the gap and there halted and at once commenced to entrench. This delay was fatal. The Confederates, having recovered from their surprise, opened fire upon the crater from every gun that commanded it. The important point to be taken was the crest of Cemetery Hill, four hundred yards beyond. At seven, two hours after his first advance, General Ledlie, who commanded the assaulting column, still halted in the crater, where he had been joined by Generals Wilcox and Potter. Making no attempt to move forward, he prevented the latter from doing so. The three divisions soon became so intermixed that general confusion prevailed. An attempt by Potter to take the crest was easily repulsed, as he was unsupported. The crater now became a slaughter pen. The day, which opened so auspiciously for the Union force, had been lost. To longer remain was certain death, to advance was impossible, while it was equally as certain death to attempt a retreat. In this "miserable affair," as Grant termed it, we lost, in killed, wounded and missing, four thousand men, the enemy losing but a thousand

In the subsequent examination of this affair by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, they assigned the following as reasons why the attack should have been suc cessful:

1. The evident surprise of the enemy at the time of the explosion of the mine, and for some time after.

2. The comparatively small force in the enemy's works.

3. The ineffective fire of the enemy's artillery and musketry, there being scarcely any for about thirty minutes after the explosion, and our artillery being just the reverse as to time and power.

4. The fact that some of our troops were able to get two hundred yards beyond the crater, toward the crest, but could not remain there or proceed further for want of supports, or because they were not properly formed or led.

The Committee gave the following as the causes of the failure:

1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement being mainly by flank instead of extended front. General Meade's order indicated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery Hill, and that proper passages should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of the court that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops should have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack, parallel to the line of the enemy's works. The evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed over at and to the left of the crater, without any previous preparation of the ground.

2. The halting of the troops in the crater instead of going forward to the crest, when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy.

3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working parties, and of material and tools for their use, in the Ninth Corps.

4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not properly led.

5. The want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand.

Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest been

gained, the success might have been jeopardied by the failure to have prepared in season proper and adequate debouches through the Ninth Corps' lines for troops, and especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major-General Meade.

While the repulse was a great disappointment to the army, yet it did not occasion the least shade of despondency in the army or throughout the North. During the following summer and autumn months the siege was pressed forward. Not a day of idleness was allowed in the trenches. The restless activity and indomitable perseverance of Grant kept them constantly employed in attempts to cut the enemy's line of communication and diversions upon the north side of the James to threaten Richmond.

On the 12th of August a strong expedition was sent out from Deep Bottom, and with reckless courage stormed the Confederate entrenchments and obtained a strong position within six miles of Richmond. This attack was intended as a feint, to cover a movement of the Union forces in another attempt to obtain possession of the Weldon Railroad.

On the morning of the 18th General Gregg, with his cavalry division, succeeded in striking the railroad six miles south of Petersburg, and succeeded in tearing up the road, pushing his advance within three miles of the city, where he entrenched his forces. The cavalry were strongly reinforced by Warren and his corps, and though Lee made desperate and furious attacks day after day to regain the road, he was repulsed with great slaughter, and the Union forces refused to relinquish their hold.

The loss of the road would prove a terrible calamity to Lee, not only cutting off his most important line of supplies and recruits, but it foreboded the destruction of his entire army. Concentrating an immense force, gathered from all

points of his encampment, Lee massed them in heavy col. umns, concealed by the forest, and on the morning of the 20th rushed upon the Union lines, leaping over breastworks, engaging in a hand to hand fight with the desperation of a "lost cause." The carnage was fearful, the Federals fighting as desperately against overpowering numbers. Though their losses were nearly five thousand they held their position, which was now made perfectly secure, and they had permanently cut off from the Confederates their line of supplies.

Subsequent operations were pushed to the left from time to time, not without constant and desperate struggle, yet always resulting in the gradual advancement of the Union lines, and on the 5th of February they had reached Hatcher's Run, which was brought into our lines only after a severe struggle. At this point the Boydton plank road crosses; after the capture of the Weldon Road this had become very valuable and necessary to the enemy in the transportation of supplies from the Weldon Road at a point several miles below the Union lines. The Confederate defences at Hatcher's Run also covered the Southside Railroad two miles further west. Thus days and weeks of constant and uninterrupted warfare passed in the several departments of the army without any very decisive results, though in each movement Lee was losing and Grant was gaining.

On the 4th of September the joyful tidings that Sherman had captured Atlanta was announced to the army before Petersburg. A salute of a hundred shotted guns was discharged upon the doomed city, which was defiantly answered by fire from every Rebel gun. On the 25th of December Sherman had achieved his triumphant march to