fufficiently fatisfactory, but, like others, hath as often been repeated.

The objection is thus ftated by a learned person, who is faid to lend the libertine these arms. "We should naturally expect to find an inspired language to be fuch as is worthy of God, that is, pure, clear, noble, and affecting, even beyond "the force of common fpeech, fince nothing can come from God, but what is perfect in it's “ kind: In short, the purity of Plato, and the eloquence of Cicero. Now, if we try the Apoftolic language by this rule, "far from ascribing it to God, "fcarce think it worthy of man,

we fhall be fo

that we shall

that is, of the "liberal and polite, it being utterly rude and "barbarous, and abounding with every fault "that can poffibly deform a language." [Dr. MIDDLETON.

The Lord Bishop of GLOUCESTER, in his late treatise on the DOCTRINE of GRACE, hath confidered this objection at large; and, in his reply, seems to have displayed that bold opposition to the general opinions of mankind, by which his

learned

✓

learned labours are diftinguished. The fubftance of his answer is here collected with all the care and caution in my power.

His Lordship observes, that the objection is founded on two propofitions, neither of them true *. One is, that

* DocTRINE OF GRACE,

P. 41.

"An Inspired Language must be a language B. 1. C. 8. “of perfect Eloquence.”

The other, that

"Eloquence is fomething congenial and effen"tial to human speech."

To the first he answers, by what he justly calls

it bold to affirm †, That "the rudeness and bar- ↑ Ibid. "baroufness of the Apoftolical Style, even tho' ×

as great as the moft exaggerated Accounts "would perfuade us to believe, is so far from proving fuch language not divinely inspired, "that it is one certain mark of this original."

To the fecond he replies, by affirming that

52.

§ Eloquence is no effential part or quality, but $ C. 9. P "merely an accidental abuse of human speech.

1

Ibid,

* C. 8. p. 51.

+ P. 56.

1 P. 56, 57.

*

"That it is a mode of communication which
changes with the changing climates of the earth.
"That it's constituent parts are arbitrary, casual,
"and capricious. That, among all the different
"kinds or fpecies of compofition which have
"been adopted by different people,
any one
"may, by being thus adopted and imitated, be-
come as real and substantial a pattern of Elo-
quence as any other whatsoever. That if the
Apoftolical writers had adhered to any one of
“these various patterns, it might still have been
"objected that they had not chofen fome one of

many others, all equal in their intrinfic value. "That none of them, however, could have been "adopted, because ‡ Eloquence, even when it "extends only to the more general principles com"mon to all languages, is nothing more than a

perfuafive turn given to the elocution to supply "that inward, that confcious perfuafion fo neceffary to gain a fair hearing: and that the end "of eloquence, is to ftifle reason, and inflame "the paffions."

There is no diftiation more frequently observed by thofe who write or speak of composition, than

that

that between real, genuine Eloquence, and the affected ornament and artifice of Rhetoricians. And, at first view, it was natural to suppose, that the cenfure of the learned Prelate was confined to these latter, and that by the term Eloquence, he understood no more than these. But as the objection to the Apostolic writings is founded on the fuppofition that there is something of real and intrinfic excellence, fomething naturally forcible, conciliating, and affecting, in certain modes of elocution; his Lordship's attack must have been directly pointed against this supposition. And as the objectors affect to require real and genuine eloquence in the inspired writers, it would be fumption to suppose that their able and judicious antagonist thought he had effectually filenced their rafh cenfures, by proving that Rhetorical artifice (a thing totally different from the former, and by no means acknowledged as an excellence) was inconfiftent with the genius of the Gofpel.

pre

Befides, his Lordship seems to have fufficiently explained his own meaning, by extending his cenfure to every thing in fpeech, which exceeds the strict bounds* of clearness and precision; every * P. 57, 58. thing which deviates from Metaphyfical or Logical

accuracy.

I pre

prefume, therefore, that I have fairly and regularly proceeded in the following examination of his Lordship's Sentiments, firft, by confidering Eloquence in it's general acceptation, as including all thofe forms of speech ufually called tropical or figurative, those modes of address which are principally intended to influence and perfuade, by exciting passion or emotion; and by enquiring whether these be not congenial to language; whether they be meerly the abuses, or neceffary and effential parts of human speech; and whether their natural power and tendency be to deceive and betray.

Secondly, by proceeding to a more artificial view of Eloquence, as a compound of several qualities, according to the divifion of the learned Prelate, and of other eminent Critics. And here we are to enquire whether these several qualities in their nature and principles, be really vague, arbitrary, fantastical, and capricious.

Hence we shall be led (in the laft place) to the confideration of that more important question, "Whether an inspired Language must be a language of perfect Eloquence.”----And when the facred writings are defended upon principles acknowledged