1

explains it. Then there is no logical reason for the seṣavat in the first explanation; hence, the seṣavat has to be explained after Pingala's manner and Vatsyāyana's second explanation 1; they are complementary to each other. It appears that Vātsyāyana intended in his Bhāṣya to comprise and unite different explanations.

5. It has been stated that Deva and Hari-varman did not distinguish the Nyāya school from the Vaiseṣika, or rather they did not regard the Nyaya as a system distinct from the Vaiseṣika. Pingala and Vasu may have been of the same opinion, because, commenting on the works of Nagarjuna and Deva, they did not make a distinction between the two systems and confused the Nyaya theories with the Vaiseṣika.

Such a tendency is also found even among followers of the Nyaya; since the author of the sutra uses the Vaiseṣika theories, Vātsyāyana and Uddyota-kara use the Vaiseṣika theories many times, and Uddyota-kara calls Kaṇāda Paramarsi, and the Vaiseṣika-sutra the śāstra or the sutra. Followers of the two systems, at least the Naiyāyikas, did not disapprove of this attitude. Handt holds the opinion that the name Vaiśeșika in early times must have included followers of Kaṇāda and Gotama. Brāhmaṇas and Buddhists usually reckon them as followers of one system. Even Sankara, naming the Vaiśeşika system the school of Kana-bhuj, criticizes the Nyaya theories in the course of his refutation of the former. In Madhava's Sarva-darśana-samgraha the term Nyaya is only applied to the theory of logic.2

1 Seṣavan nāma pariseṣaḥ sa ca prasakta-pratiṣedhe 'nyatara-aprasangāc chiṣyamāne saṁpratyayaḥ. Cf. S.-tattva-kaumudi on S.K., v. 5, and A. Bürk, Die Theorie der Schlussfolgerung (anumāna) nach der S.-t.-kaumudi des Vācaspati-miśra, VOJ., vol. xv, pp. 251-64, 1901. The division between vita and avita in anumāna is, as the writer asserts, dependent upon the Nyaya-kośa, p. 728 (n.), not for the first time established by Vacaspati-miśra. It has been used by Uddyota-kara in his Nyāya-vārttika, p. 126.

2 Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiseṣika-Philosophie, p. 26.

6

According to Hall's Bibliography 1 Vacaspati - miśra wrote works or commentaries on the five systems other than the Vaiseṣika. In his case the Vaiseṣika is probably considered as included in the Nyaya; he wrote the Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā.2 Udayana3 wrote on the one hand a commentary on Pr. Bh., named Kiraṇāvalī, and a pure Vaiseṣika work called the Lakṣaṇāvalī1; and on the other the Nyaya-värttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi and the Kusumāñjali.5 The Kusumāñjali is a Nyāya work, because Udayana enumerates the four sorts of pramāna. He himself is an eminent Naiyāyika. In this work Udayana proves the existence of Paramātman, i.e. Īśvara, and states the fourteen different opinions relating thereto.7 The Naiyayika is one of them, but the Vaiseṣika is not enumerated. In the Kiraṇāvalī he also states the different opinions of the Samkhya, the Yoga, the Vedanta, and the Tautatita concerning emancipation (apavarga). If Udayana had considered the Nyāya a distinct system from the Vaiseṣika, he would have referred to the Nyaya in the Kiraṇāvalī (a Vaiśeṣika work). If his not having done so is due to being a Naiyāyika,

1

8

p. 87. Cf. Woods, Yoga-system of Patañjali, p. xxi.

2 Published in Vizianagram Skt. S., vol. xiii. Vācaspati-miśra also wrote the Nyaya-tatṭvāloka (Cat. of Skt. MSS. of the India Office, No. 1868). 3 As for the dates of Vacaspati-miśra and Udayana, see Cowell's Introduction to his Kusumāñjali; Bodas' Introd. to the Tarka-saṁgraha, Introd. to the Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā; Candra-kanta's Introd. to the Kusumāñjali; Professor Garbe, Berichte d. k. s. G. d. W. Philol.-hist. Kl., 1888; and Keith, JRAS., 1898, pp. 522 f. Vacaspati-miśra lived in the ninth century and Udayana in the tenth.

4 Published as an appendix of the Kiraṇāvalī (Benares S.S.), and in the Pandit, xxi, 625 ff., with the Nyāya-muktāvalī.

5 Published and translated by Cowell with a commentary, Calcutta, 1864; and also published by Candra-kānta with Udayana's Prakaraṇa, a commentary and a gloss, Calcutta, 1891 (Bibl. Ind.).

6 Ch. 5.

7 Ch. 1.

8

pp. 6-8. "Tautātita" is the followers of Kumarila Bhatta, who are usually called the Bhāṭṭa. See Upaskāra on 7, 2, 20, Vivṛti, p. 461. Here the Tautatita is the representative of the Mimāmsakas.

he would have cited the Vaiśesika instead of the Nyaya in the Kusumāñjali (a Nyāya work). We face a dilemma in this point. If we suppose that he considered the two systems as one school, the dilemma can easily be solved. Vacaspati-miśra also, being his predecessor and following Vatsyayana and Uddyota-kara, will not have made a distinction between the two schools. It may therefore be concluded that there were some teachers, even in the Nyaya, who did not regard the Nyaya as a distinct school. The facts that the term Nyāya as the name of a school is hardly found in the Chinese translation of the Tripitaka, except in the Satya-siddhi-sastra and the Madhyāntānugamaśāstra, and that Buddhist writers often confuse the Nyaya with the Vaiseṣika, are probably due to this tendency. Udayana's enumeration of the four systems, which includes the Vaiseṣika and the Nyaya, as the representative schools, shows that in those days there was a growing tendency to reckon the so-called six systems as one group, since in earlier times the six systems (sad-darśana) seem not to have been regarded as a group.

DASAPADARTHI

A TREATISE ON THE TEN CATEGORIES OF THE VAISESIKA

CHAPTER I

INDIVIDUAL PROPERTIES OF THE TEN CATEGORIES

Section 1.-Ten categories

There are ten categories: 1, substance; 2, attribute; 3, action; 4, universality; 5, particularity; 6, inherence; 7, potentiality; 8, non-potentiality; 9, commonness; and non-existence.

10,

Section 2.-Substance

What is the category substance? Nine substances are called the category substance.

What are the nine substances? 1, earth; 2, water; 3, fire; 4, wind; 5, ether; 6, time; 7, space; 8, self; and 9, mind-these are the nine substances.

What is earth? That which has colour, taste, smell, and touch (as its attributes) is called earth.

What is water? That which has colour, taste, touch, fluidity, and viscidity (as its attributes) is water.

What is fire? That which has colour and touch (as its attributes) is fire.

What is wind? That which has touch only (as its attribute) is wind.

What is ether? That which has sound only (as its attribute) is ether.

What is time? That which is the cause of the notions of simultaneity, non-simultaneity, slowness, and quickness with respect to that and this (thing) is time.