Answer, ‘It has been answered before that the opinion is not acceptable. Earth possesses not merely smell, but also other attributes, so that earth is not the material cause (of the olfactory organ). And, as earth originates in an aggregation of many elements (i.e. atoms, according to the other's theory), there is no pure earth apart from water, etc. If the cognition of smell is produced (in the ̧ olfactory organ) by reason of possessing smell, the cognitions of colour, etc., must be produced at the same time, because earth possesses the four attributes (i.e. colour, taste, smell, and touch).' Question, 'Smell is possessed by earth alone, and the olfactory organ is terrene, so that the olfactory organ only can perceive smell.' Answer, The attributes of earth are nothing but earth; the olfactory organ must perceive all the attributes of earth. Also water alone possesses cold touch, and fire alone possesses hot touch; and cold and heat must be perceived by the tongue and the eyes. But this is not the case. Besides, there are in reality no substances. Consequently the sense-organs cannot be established. And the function of them, i.e. the production of cognitions, comes from contact with substances; but, if there are no substances, there is no contact, nor function of the sense-organs. It is, therefore, impossible that the sense-organs should have definite material causes.'

1

"1

p. 26a. p. 25b: "Some teachers maintain that (1) in the eyes fireelements are predominant, because the eyes come from karma's, which possesses a quality similar to the eyes, that is, the eyes are obtained by presenting light to others (in the previous life). (2) The eyes perceive objects by the help of light, and cannot perceive anything without light. Therefore the eyes must have predominance of the fire-element. (3) Fire in general illuminates objects in a distant place; in like manner the eyes perceive coloured objects at a distance, because there is fire in the eyes. (4) After a man has died, the eyes return to the sun, consequently the eyes are known to have the sun as their essence. (5) The eyes perceive colour only; and, as colour is possessed by fire, the eyes perceive, after all, their essence. In this way ether, earth, water, and wind are known to be predominant in the other organs. When a man has died, the organ of hearing returns to ether, because the organ perceives sound, which is

The quotation tells us that the Vaiseṣika is of opinion that earth possesses the four attributes, water three, fire two, and wind one; but such earth, etc., are not atoms, because the passage treats them as aggregates. This agrees with V.S.1 But the special attribute of earth is smell, that of water is cold, and that of fire is hot. This also agrees with V.S.,2 except that cold and heat are touch. Not only is the relation between the sense-organs and the objects explained as in V.S., but also the opinion that cognition comes from contact is quite correct. In another passage Hari-varman quotes: “Cognition is produced by the contact of self with mind. Self is eternal, like sound.”3 The passage, together with the above long quotation, asserts that self is something different from cognition, and that mind is an indispensable factor in the psychic process. The theory that sound is eternal, like self, is a well-known dogma of the Mimāmsā. The statement is sometimes confused even with the Mimāṁsā.

As for the perceptibility of the categories, Hari-varman says: "a certain teacher maintains that number, extension, single individuality, conjunction, disjunction, agreeableness, disagreeableness, actions, universality, particularity,

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possessed by ether. The other organs are similarly explained. The conclusion is that each element is predominant in the corresponding organ." See N.S. 3, 1, 63; 1, 1, 13; 3, 1, 70-3, and notes on ch. ii, 1, 6. 1 2, 1, 1-4.

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2 2, 2, 2-5.

3 p. 42a, pp. 63b, 67b.

66

Single individuality is literally one (or sameness) and difference (or separateness)". This is certainly a translation of eka-prthaktva.

5 Agreeableness and disagreeableness are perhaps corruptions of paratva and aparatva, and may be replaced by priority and posteriority. Ci-tsan, evidently depending upon this passage, states that unity, difference, conjunction, disjunction, number, extension, agreeableness, disagreeableness-these eight attributes reside in the nine substances. But the first two (unity and difference) cannot be independent of number and extension, or priority and posteriority, so that eight must be seven. He further says that pain, pleasure, aversion, desire, foolishness, cognition, effort, and negligence-these eight reside in self and mind. But foolishness and cognition (lit.

3

and (some) substances, although not coloured things, are visible (V.S. 4, 1, 11; 8, 1, 5)."1 "Number, extension, single individuality, conjunction, disjunction, agreeableness, and disagreeableness these things each have reality. The sutra of the other system mentions that a pot is something different from pot-ness (ghaṭatva, cf. V.S. 1, 2, 11-16), and that the cognition of a pot presupposes potness (8, 1, 6)." "Colour residing in substances which are large and more than one is visible (4, 1, 6). Wind is invisible (2, 1, 10)." 5

When the above passage is compared with the statements that "the four elements are sometimes imperceptible", and "when things are destroyed, they pass into atoms", it is seen that all atoms are imperceptible, while substances as aggregates are perceptible upon condition of being large (mahat) and more than one (aneka-dravya); but wind is an exception. These and other points are in agreement with V.S.

Perceptibility of sound is discussed in chapter 1, On the Perception of Sound. The qualities of sound affirmed by the other system can be summarized as follows: "Sound is an attribute (guna) of ether (V.S. 2, 1, 27). It reaches to the organ of hearing and causes the cognition (cf. 2, 2, 21). Though sound is an attribute, its transiency is common to action (karma), (2, 2, 25); but sound has, like other attributes, no action, because it is an attribute (7, 1, 15; 7, 2, 12; 7, 2, 25). Sound is produced by conjunction, disjunction, or cleverness in Chinese), being complementary to each other, are a translation of buddhi, and effort (lit. diligence) and negligence are also a translation of prayatna, so that eight must be six. The number of attributes in Ci-tsan's commentary is seventeen (Dainihonzoku-zōkyō, 73, bk. 5, pp. 384b, 385a).

another sound (2, 2, 31). Sound is momentary (kṣaṇika), as actions are, and continuous (santāna)." 1 These qualities almost agree with V.S. But the qualities of being momentary, like actions, and continuous, are not mentioned in V.S. This is a natural consequence of the qualities of sound stated in V.S.; and these two qualities were accepted for the first time by Pr. Bh.2 Continuity is also accepted by N.S. (2, 2, 17); but momentariness is rejected (3, 2, 11 f.). If we compare the passage with "Others say, 'You contend that the cognition of colour is produced without contact of the eyes with coloured objects. This is impossible, because the eyes have light, and the light goes out to contact with the colour (of the objects), and then the cognition is produced,' ,"3 the passages are seen to contain Nyaya theories. The latter is evidently the Nyaya theory. Other theories similar to the Nyaya are found also in chapter cxxix, On Doubt, which may be compared with N.S. 1, 1, 23; its Bhasya, and 2, 1, 37.

The most important reference is the following: "In substances which have no (distinct) attributes the attribute is produced by conjunction with fire, that is, the original black colour is destroyed and the red colour is produced." 5

This refers to the theory of pākaja. The Vaiśeṣika theory of pakaja is different from the Nyāya theory. The former is called the Pīlu-pāka-vāda, while the latter is named the Pithara - pāka - vāda. As stated above, Hari varman knew the Vaiśeṣika theory of pākaja; but this reference is more similar to the Nyāya

1 p. 28a f., and chs. xlix, lvi.

2 pp. 287-8.

3 p. 28b.

+ N.S. 3, 1, 30-50.

5 p. 286.

6 Pr. Bh., pp. 106-7. See notes on ch. ii, 2, 2; Upaskāra on 7, 1, Vivṛti (Šāstrārtha-samgraha, App. in Bibl. Ind.), p. 466; Nyāya-kośa, p. 455 f.; Cowell, Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha, pp. 154–5.

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than to the Vaiśesika. explained in V.S. But N.S. says, "Or as the blackness of an atom is not eternal." 1 Thus the Nyaya is always confused with the Vaiseṣika, or the former is regarded as a complement to the latter.

At least such a process is not

Hari-varman also states that the Brāhmaṇņa has six sorts of duty, the Kṣattriya four sorts, the Vaisya three sorts, and the Sudra one, according to a Dharma-sutra,2 and that it is not sin, but a cause of good rewards, for the Kṣattriya to kill others in order to protect another from danger. The author denies not merely the last permission, but also the injunction of the Veda, which permits to kill animals for sacrifice. "Question, 'There is no guilt on the part of a man who commits robbery for the support of his parents, as a Dharma-sutra allows; a man may steal food from a Śūdra when he has been without food for seven days; stealing in such cases is, for him, not guilty. When his life is in danger, stealing food from a Brāhmaṇa tends not to sin, even though he is not really righteous, because he is in a crisis. Like ether, which cannot be defiled by anything, he is not stained (cf. Upaskāra on 6, 1, 12).' Answer, 'A certain sūtra of the Brāhmaṇas says, "when a Brāhmaṇa is about to commit robbery, if the possessor of things comes to prevent it, he must deliberate on both himself and the possessor. If the possessor be inferior to himself, he may put the possessor to death (V.S. 6, 1, 14), because

1 N.S. 4, 1, 67, "anu-śyāmatā'nityatvavad vā"; 3, 2, 77, "anuśyāmatā-nityatvavad etat syāt" (this, an opponent will say, may be just like the eternity of the blackness of an atom), is rejected by the author of N.S.

2 Vasistha-dharma-sūtra (SBE.), 2, 13 f.; Manu, x, 75 f. Cf. Āpastamba, 2, 5, 10, 4 f.; Gautama, 10, 1, f.; Baudhāyana, 1, 10, 18, 2 f.; Pr. Bh., pp. 272-3.

3 p. 47a. Also the passage says that one who dies on the battle-field goes to heaven, as a verse asserts that one who dies in a campaign (goes to heaven) and is selected by angels as their companion. This may be compared with the Bhagavad-gītā or other works.