Naiyāyika in any works of his; but the above quotations cannot be found in the V.S.; they exactly agree with the N.S. It is curious enough to notice that Deva himself used the Nyaya theories instead of the Vaiseṣika in regard to so important a doctrine as the existence of self, while Vasu, commenting on the same work, used the Vaiseṣika theories, which were also handled by Nāgārjuna. It is therefore clear that Deva considered the Nyaya theories as being also Vaiseṣika. In other passages also Deva confused the Nyaya theories with the Vaiseṣika, e.g. the theory that the eyes have a kind of light which goes out to objects, when we perceive them, and makes them perceptible,1 and the theory of the relation between a whole and its parts. Consequently, the Nyaya system was not regarded as distinct from the Vaiseșika, if indeed. the former had been systematized or N.S. had been composed.3

1 N.S. 3, 1, 32–4.

2

Śata-śāstra, p. 44a; Śata-śāstra-vaipulya, p. 50b. 4, 2, 4-17; Sata-śāstra, p. 42a.

2 N.S. 2, 1, 31-4; 3 Nos. 1254, 1259, and 1260 (all were translated in 508-35 A.D.), are ascribed to Deva, but it is doubtful whether they are really Deva's works. No. 1259 refutes the four systems, which maintain that self and cognition are one and the same thing (the Sāṁkhya), that they are something different from each other (the Vaiśeṣika), that they are either the same or different (the Nirgrantha), and that they are neither the same nor different (the Jñatiputra). This classification of the four systems is followed by Sara-mati's Mahā-yāna-praveśa-śāstra (No. 1243, p. 65a), by Dharma-pāla's Vaipulya-sata-śāstra-vyākhyā (a commentary on No. 1189, p. 116a, a little different), and Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi-śāstra, p. 3b. The first and the second of the four systems are also set forth in the Śata-śāstra, chs. 3, 4. No. 1254 has the first two of the four systems in a part of the commentary by an unknown writer. Deva's text consists of one hundred syllables (the work is called the Śatākṣara-śāstra), and contains a description of the first two of the four systems. No. 1260 states the twenty different opinions concerning Nirvana. The seventh is the opinion of the Vaiseṣika. It runs, "The Vaiseṣika maintains that atoms and so on (here the text is corrupted) are eternal and produce all things in the world, intelligent and unintelligent, by combination. The first process of combination is the combination of two atoms and so Without atoms and so on there is no combination of them. If there is no combination, they exist dispersed. The dispersed existence of atoms and so on is Nirvana. Consequently the Vaiseṣika says that (the knowledge of) atoms and their qualities leads to Nirvāṇa."

on.

Deva also refutes the Asat-kārya-vāda,1 attributes, universality, and particularity, but the refutation is not of great importance. Universality and particularity in Deva's work will be referred to later on.

6. Hari-varman, in his Satya-siddhi-sastra, says: "An opponent urges, 'Some teachers maintain that everything exists, while others contend that everything does not exist. What are really existing and what are not existing? The author answers, Those things which really exist are contained in the twelve ayatanas named by the Buddha. The substances, such as earth, etc.; the attributes, such as number, etc.; the actions, such as throwing upwards and throwing downwards, etc.; universality, particularity, and inherence—these objects and prakṛti are, like the horn of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the feet of a snake, the smell of salt, and the colour of wind, called non-existent. In a certain sutra the Buddha said, "There is no trace left (by birds) in sky, no Śramana among Tirthakas, and people like to discuss in vain whether the Tathāgata exists or not (after death)." (These are examples of things non-existent.) But, according as people adhere to different systems, they differently acknowledge things as existent or real. The six categories, such as substance, etc., are real in Ulūka('s system); the twenty-five principles are real in the Samkhya; and the sixteen topics (artha) are real in the Nyāya.

1 Śata-śāstra, p. 45b f. ; 2 pp. 41b-43a; p. 51a.

Śata-śāstra-vaipulya, p. 51b.

* Ch. xxiii, p. 17a. Nyaya is originally na-ya-hsiu-mo in Chinese. Na-ya is the transliteration of Nã-ya (= Nyāya). Hsiu-mo is the same as Swei-mo in Zho-thi-swei-mo. Prajñā-ruci in his translation of the Madhyāntānugama-śāstra (No. 1246, translated in 543 A.D.) uses the transliteration Zho-ya-su-mo. Zho-ya is the transliteration of Ña-ya (= Nyāya). Su-mo is the same as Hsiu-mo and Swei-mo. Both Naya and Ñāya are the same as Nyāya (Jacobi, Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Māhārāṣṭrī, p. 119; Andersen, Pāli Reader, p. 105); but Nāya is also identified with Jñāta in Jñātaputra (Jñātiputra, Weber, Ind. Stud., xvi,

1

We have here, for the first time, a mention of the six categories. Though Nagarjuna and Deva knew the six categories, they did not name them side by side. Importance attaches to the reference to the sixteen topics of the Nyaya. The sixteen topics are not explained in the work, nor does the name Nyaya occur again throughout the work. But it is evident that the Nyaya had been systematized before Hari - varman. Hari-varman also confused the Nyaya theories with the Vaiseșika, and did not regard the Nyaya as a system independent of the Vaiseṣika.

Hari - varman further says, "Some teachers (the Samkhya) maintain that colour, etc., are nothing but elements (maha - bhuta), while other teachers (the Vaiseṣika) contend that elements are something different from colour, etc."2 The statement corresponds to the characteristic of the Vaiseṣika that substances distinguished from attributes and actions. to the Vaiśesika the four elements are

are

"According sometimes

p. 308). The substitution of Nyāya for Na-ya-hsiu-mo depends upon the fact that the sixteen topics seem to be those of the Nyaya, and the Madhyāntānugama-śāstra mentions the name in the passage where logical theories are discussed, and ascribes the name to followers of a system of logic. Ci-tsan in his commentary on the Sata-sastra says that the Maheśvara(-deva) school has the sixteen topics of logical theory. His enumeration of the sixteen topics exactly agrees with N.S. But he identities Naya-hsiumo with the Nirgranthas. He also enumerates the sixteen principles of the Nirgranthas, which do not at all agree with N.S. (Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō, 73, bk. 5, p. 3856). The Madhyantānugamaśāstra also asserts that the Maheśvara-school is connected with logic. N.S. acknowledges Īśvara (4, 1, 19-21) and followers of the Nyāya have a relation to Saivism, so that the Nyāya and Saivism were sometimes confused with each other. See Bhandarkar, Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, p. 117; Nyaya-vārttika, p. 466 (cf. Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, 1, 9; Brahmasutra, 2, 1, 33).

1 The mention of the six categories occurs once more on p. 68a.

2 Ch. xxxviii, p. 21b. The Asat-kārya-vāda is discussed in ch. cli, pp. 78b-79a.

3 This characteristic is refuted by the author in ch. cxliv, pp. 76-77a. The author's standpoint is not a realistic, but a kind of idealistic one.

imperceptible," and "when things are destroyed, they pass into atoms ".2 From these passages it is plain

that the term element means atom, and that the author did not distinguish the one from the other; this arises from the fact that the author did not, in his system, acknowledge an atomic theory. In his quotations the atoms are of four sorts.

6).

"The followers of Ulūka maintain that the touch of earth is neither cold nor hot, and the soft (touch) of wind is explained as in the case of earth; but the touch of water is cold and that of fire is hot (V.S. 2, 2, 4-5). . Earth alone has the quality of being changed by baking, and this is not the case with water, etc. (7, 1, V.S. does not mention that the touch of earth is neither cold nor hot; but it is stated in Pr. Bh.5 The opinion that cold and hot are included in touch is not known to V.S. The reference to the theory of pākaja is noticeable. As for earth, it is said: "Question, The followers of Ulūka contend that smell is an attribute belonging to earth alone (V.S. 2, 2, 2). Is the opinion acceptable or not?' Answer, 'There is, in reality, no substance like earth; this has been explained above. The opinion is, therefore, not correct. Besides, the Vaiseṣika maintains that white copper, lead, tin, gold, silver, and copper, etc., are included in fire and possess smell in themselves. Consequently, smell is not confined to earth alone. . . This is an interesting reference. V.S. says that the fluidity, through conjunction with fire, of tin, lead, iron,

1 Ch. xxxix, p. 22a.

2 p. 67b.

66

3 Literally "Ripening-change". "Ripening" has, at the same time, the same meaning as "baking", like pāka in Sanskṛt. Ripeningchange" is pāka-ja.

2

silver, and gold, is common to them with water.1 Fluidity is a natural attribute of water and the cause of flowing; consequently fluidity in tin, etc., is accidental. In V.S. tin, etc., are not classified as fire. Pr. Bh. divided fluidity, for the first time, into two sorts, intrinsic (samsiddhika) and occasional (naimittika). The former is the fluidity of water and the latter is that of earth and water. But gold, etc., are not included under fire. According to later

followers of the Vaiseṣika gold is so classified.

The origin

of their opinion belongs to a time earlier than Hari-varman. "This has been explained above" refers to ch. xxxviii, where it is argued that elements (mahā-bhūta) are not real, but are only names, that is, there are no elements independent of colour, etc.; elements are nothing but colour, etc.; and it also relates to the following:

"Question, Some teachers hold that one sense-organ has one nature (i.e. prakrti, material cause). (e.g. the olfactory organ consists of earth, because) the cognition of smell is produced by reason of the predominance of the attribute (smell in the organ) and of possession of smell. (Similarly water, fire, and wind are the material causes of the organs of taste, sight, and touch respectively, because) the cognitions of taste, colour, and touch are produced (in the organs, in which) water, fire, and wind. are predominant.8 Is the opinion correct or not?'

66

1 The original runs, ‘trapu-sīsa-loha-rajata-suvarṇānām agni-saṁyogad dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam (2, 1, 7).”

2 2, 1, 2 and 5, 2, 4.

5 Nyāya-kośa, pp. 946-7; Siddhānta-muktāvalī (Benares, 1882), p. 25; Upaskāra on 2, 1, 7.

6 p. 216 f.

7 The view of the author is the same as that of the Samkhya. The author is said to have been a follower of the Samkhya before he became a Buddhist, as stated above.

8 The passage in the Chinese translation cannot be understood literally. But it must be understood by reference to V.S. 8, 2, 5–6, “bhūyastvād gandhavattvac ca prthivi gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ; tathā-āpas tejo vāyuś ca rasa-rupa-sparśa-aviseṣāt.”