But the systematization of the Vaiseṣika cannot be earlier than about 300 B.C. Kautilya (Caṇakya) in his Artha-sastra states that philosophy is only the Samkhya, the Yoga, and the Lokayata (Cārvāka) (Samkhyam Yogo Lokayatam ca ity-anvikṣiki). Oldenberg remarks, "dagegen ist dies kaum zweifelhaft, dass die Nichtnennung der beiden eng untereinander verbindenen Systeme, denen zu begegnen man hier noch erwarten könnte, des Nyāya und Vaiśeṣika, in der Tat auf deren damaliger Nichtexistenz beruht. Den Auspruch anvīkṣikī (die auf Prüfung beruhende (Wissenschaft)) zu sein erhob seiner Zeit der Nyaya ebenso entscheiden wie berechtigt." 1 Consequently the systematization of the Vaiseṣika is later than 300 B.C., probably in the first century B.C., because the information concerning the sixth schism (18 A.D.) of Jainism reveals that the Vaiseṣika had already been systematized before the beginning of the Christian era. This does not, however, directly refer to the date of the compilation of V.S. V.S. seems to have been composed earlier than the other sūtras; but it presupposes not only the Mimāmsā and the Samkhya, but also the Vedanta and others. On the other hand, the Vaiśesika doctrines in V.S. represent the earlier, perhaps the genuine, doctrines of the system—at least the doctrines prevailing before the time of the sixth schism in Jainism, and the orthodox of the system.

A distinct characteristic of the Vaiśesika is a sharp and strict analysis of an object. The six categories are only the six modes of observation and of the explanation of an object. The distinction between substance and its

1 Die indische Philosophie (Kultur der Gegenwart, allg. Gesch. d. Phil.), pp. 32-4; Jacobi, Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie, pp. 736, 738, 743.

2 Especially see 2, 1, 20 (relying on the commentaries); 3, 1, 5, 2, 19-20; 7, 2, 3-8; 7, 2, 13; 9, 2, 3.

1-2;

attributes and actions is one of the fundamental principles. It leads to the theory of the Asat-kāryavāda and self (ātman) distinguished from cognition (buddhi). But the relation between the fourth and the fifth category, universality (sāmānya) and particularity (viseṣa), is not in accordance with the above - noted characteristic, because an object is, on the one hand, classified under universality, and, on the other hand, under particularity, so that it cannot be fixed in a definite category. This is a natural consequence of the conceptual relations, as in the case of the classification of concepts in formal logic; but from the principle of the system it is not so strict as the other categories. Various opinions on this point arose even before the Christian era. Roha-gutta, the chief teacher in the sixth schism of Jainism (Trairāśika-matam, 544 s.v. = 18 a.d.) 2 imported the Vaiseṣika doctrines into Jainism. Its first three categories and the last (sixth) are just the same as enumerated in V.S.; but the fourth, universality, and the fifth, particularity, are different from those of the sutra. The original runs:—

2

"sāmanņam tiviham: 1. mahā - sāmaṇṇam, 2. sattā sāmaṇṇaṁ, 3. samaņņa-visesa-sāmaṇṇaṁ.

tatra mahāsāmānyam ṣatsv api padartheṣu padarthatvabuddhi-kāri — sattāsāmānyam bhu-padartha-sadbuddhi-vidhāyi-sāmānya-viśeṣa-sāmānyaṁ 3 dravyatvādi 3 (I). anye tu vyācakṣate: (mahāsāmānyaṁ) bhū-padārtha-sat-kāri; sattāsāmānyaṁ dravyatvādi ; samanya-viseṣaḥ pṛthivitvādiḥ (II).

viseso egaviho; evam. . . anne bhananti: samaņņai duviham param aparaṁ ca (III); viseso duviho: anta-viseso aṇanta-viseso ya."

The Sanskrt equivalent of universality has been rendered

1 Cf. SBE., vol. xlv, p. xxxiii f. and notes on ch. i, 1, 1, and ch. ii, 2, 11. 2 Indische Studien, xviii, pp. 121 f., and SBE., p. xxxvii f. (Āvaśyaka, the second of the four Mula-sūtras, vv. 77-83).

into Chinese by various terms: "generality," "universality,' "existence," "great universality," and "great existence" The first two are translations of sāmānya, the third is that of sattā or bhāva, while the fourth is evidently that of maha-samanya. The fifth might be a translation of mahā-sattā, but the term is not met with in any work. It is perhaps a translation of satta modified by the analogy of the fourth. These Chinese equivalents may show that there were also different opinions concerning the fourth category, even in later times, and that the term mahā-sāmānya was still used. That the term sāmānyaviseṣa (“universality-particularity") occurs in the Chinese translations has already been pointed out in the preceding passage; it was not classed under the fourth category, but the fifth category itself was called sāmānya-viśeṣa.2

The three subdivisions of sāmānya in the above quotation from the Jaina record are not known to V.S., Pr. Bh., the present treatise, or to any other works, and the three different opinions (I, II, III, in the above quotation) concerning the subdivisions came from different points of view.

3

In the first opinion (I), i.e. the opinion of Rohagutta, the mahā-sāmānya corresponds to abhidheyatva ("capability of being designated ") and jñeyatva ("knowableness"), as common properties (sādharmya) of the six categories in Pr. Bh., and to "knowable" in our treatise. This view was probably suggested by V.S. 1, 1, 8. As it is applied only to the categories, the 1 The first is used in the translations of the Śata-śāstra and the Satyasiddhi-sastra (both by Kumāra-jīva), and of the Upaya-kausalya-hṛdayasastra (by Kekaya), the second and the fourth in the translation of our treatise (by Yuan Chwang), and the second to the fifth in Kwhei-ci's commentaries on Nos. 1197 and 1216.

4

2 See notes on ch. i, 10 (commonness).

3 Pr. Bh., p. 16, and notes on ch. ii, 11.

41, 1, 8 runs, sad anityatvaṁ dravyavat kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānyaviseṣavad iti dravya-guna-karmaṇām aviseṣaḥ. The other three categories relate to the same object, in which the first three categories reside.

mahā-sāmānya does not relate to the contents of the categories; but the samanya, lower than the mahasāmānya, includes the contents of the categories and relates to the visesa, so that the lower samanya is called sāmānya-viseṣa. The sattā-sāmānya corresponds exactly to satta or bhāva in V.S.1 The division of mahāsāmānya and sāmānya-viśeṣa springs from the same point of view (padarthatva, "category-ness," and dravyatva, "substance-ness," etc., as the objective entities corresponding to the subjective concepts of category and substance, etc.), while the sattā-sämānya comes from the notion with regard to the bhu-padartha1 that that is existent. Both sattā-sāmānya and sāmānya-viseṣa have the same scope, and sāmānya-viseṣa naturally implies existence. Even mahā-sāmānya must imply existence. Pr. Bh. ascribes existence (astitva) to the six categories as a common quality (sadharmya). Accordingly, padarthatva in padarthatva-buddhi-kari implies existence (sad, in bhu-padartha-sad-buddhi-kāri). Sattā-sāmānya, therefore, turns out to be superfluous, and the three subdivisions are reduced to two. If bhu-padartha should mean the six categories, the mahā-sāmānya and the sattā-sāmānya would, after all, become one. The third opinion (III, param aparaṁ ca) probably accepted such a consequence. This third opinion was adopted by Pr. Bh., which maintains that the para-sāmānya (“the highest universality") is satta, while the apara-sāmānya ("the lower universality") includes sāmānya-viśeṣa-sāmānya in the first opinion, and aṇanta-viseso (anantya-viseṣa), the second sort of viseso (viseṣa). Consequently, the viseṣa (“particularity") contains anta-viseso (antya-viśeșa, “the final species or the ultimate particulars") alone. The second opinion (II) is too artificial.

The fifth category, viseșa, is not usually subdivided. Bhu-padartha includes the first three categories. See Pr. Bh., pp. 17, 19.

Even Pr. Bh. does not know the two sorts of viseṣa, but a similar subdivision is met with in Kwhĕi-ci's commentary.1

These different opinions show that the intention was to classify things either under universality or under. particularity, and to fix them in the definite classes. At the same time they prove that the systematization of the Vaiseṣika theories contained in V.S. took place in a time distant from 18 A.D. Besides, that the Jainas themselves maintain that the Vaiseṣika system was established by Roha-gutta is a good reason for holding that the systematization was not very near to the sixth schism, because, had the systematization been very recent, they could not have claimed to be the founders. On the other hand, it may be supposed that the systematization did not take place at a time very remote from the schism: otherwise the Jainas could not have connected Roha-gutta with its origination, because the founder would have been conceived as a legendary personage. The probabilities are in favour of even the middle of the first century B.C. as the date of the systematization.

2

XII. THE SUTRA; EVIDENCE FOR DATING: 1. THE

VIBHASA, ETC.

We have now established the date of the supposed origin and systematization of the Vaiseșika, and learned a little in outline of the doctrinal development. We shall next proceed to obtain some materials concerning the date of V.S. and the development of the doctrines from Chinese translations.

1. To begin with, we shall first refer to the Abhidharmamahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra,3 which was composed by Vasu-mitra