happiness, and misery; and the characteristic of Soul is knowledge, faith, conduct, austerities, energy, and realization (of its developments); and that of matter is sound, darkness, lustre (of jewels, etc.), light, shade,1 sunshine, colour, taste, smell, and touch. The characteristic of developments is singleness (ekatva), separateness (pṛthaktva), number, form, conjunction, and disjunction.2

Usually in Jainism the categories are divided into twosubstance (dravya) and its developments (or modifications, paryaya). The developments include attributes (guna in the Vaiseṣika), and leave no room for the latter as an independent category. The most important distinction between the Vaiseṣika on the one hand and Jainism, together with the other schools of the time, on the other is that the former strictly distinguishes substance itself from its quality and quantity, while the latter confuses them 3 with each other. In these circumstances the Vaiseṣika cannot be earlier than these schools. The Vaiseṣika, developing the principle systematically, elicited its notions of substances and attributes out of the above doctrines of Jainism and the like. And probably actions (karma), too, were derived from the same doctrines. Almost an outline of the three categories of the Vaiśeṣika is to be found here.

It may be supposed from these considerations that the Vaiseṣika has its origin in the general thought of those times, that is, the Vaiseṣika borrowed the materials from the thoughts of those days and systematized them at a somewhat later time. This supposition can be proved not only by two other evidences, but also by the descriptions of Kautilya and of the sixth schism in. Jainism.

1 Cf. V.S. 5, 2, 19-20, dravya - guņa - karma - niṣpatti - vaidharmyād abhāvas (or, bhā'bhāvas) tamaḥ and tejaso dravyāntareṇāvaraṇāś ca.

2 SBE., p. 152 f. See Eine Jaina-Dogmatik (Tattvärthādhigamasutra), ZDMG., 1906, p. 512 f.

3 Ibid., pp. xxxiii-v; Śankara on the Brahma-sūtra, 2, 2, 17.

The Vaiseṣika, together with the Nyaya, is a representative opponent of the Mimämsä in regard to the dogma of eternity of sound,1 and denies the absolute authority of the Veda. The Vaiseṣika contends that human beings have nothing innate in their minds, but every idea or concept results from experiences. Consequently the Vaiseṣika is an empirism; but such ideas produced by experiences are conveyed to others and handed down to next generations, and become, as it were, innate,3 so that the system can reconcile the conflict between empirism and the theory of innate ideas. From this standpoint the Veda is regarded as having an origin and being buddhi-pūrva. But the system observes, on the one hand, the duty of the four periods of religious life, etc., and esteems the Yoga practice; on the other hand the sutra says, "likewise the making away with those who are contrary," "making away with another has reference to an inferior," "in the case of an equal, suicide, or the destruction of the other," and "in like manner in the case of the bursting open of one burnt". Such allowances could not be consisted with the strict rules of yogins or other observances. The former observances possibly came from the Veda, the Mīmāṁsā, or other sources in the course of controversy against them; and the latter allowances may be considered and could be understood as remainders of the above-mentioned

5

1 V.S. 2, 2, 21-37; N.S. 2, 2, 13-40. See Muir, Original Sanskrt Texts, 1861. pt. iii, pp. 73-113.

2 V.S. 6, 1, 1 ff. The Nyāya defends the authority of the Veda against the Cārvāka (N.S. 2, 1, 56–67. Cf. the Carvaāka-section in the Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha).

3 See notes on ch. i, 3, 12 (cognition).

4

6, 1, 1.

5

6, 2, 2-3.

6 6, 2, 8; 5, 2, 16, etc.

Tathā viruddhānāṁ tyāgaḥ (6, 1, 13), hine pare tyāgaḥ (14), and same ātmatyāgaḥ paratyāgo vā (15). See commentaries on the sutras and on 6, 1, 12. In a word the Vaiśeşika, in some cases, permits to kill others and to take what is not given.

8 Tatha dagdhasya visphoṭane (5, 1, 12).

9 Cf. 6, 2, 1; 6, 2, 8; 10, 2, 8.

Akriya-vada or Uccheda-vada. If the Vaiseṣika had had its origin in orthodox Brahmanism, such curious features could not have appeared and could not be explained. It is therefore more probable that the origin of the Vaiseṣika was in heterodox speculations, and in the course of time the system was on one side1 adjusted to orthodoxy, just as the later Vaiseṣika adapted itself to Saivism and imported Ïśvara into the system.2

Later Mimamsakas are, in their philosophical theories, very similar to the Vaiseṣika, as in the case of Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Prabhā-kara, and M.S. contains terms identical with the technical terms of the Vaiseṣika. The similarities in the philosophical theories and in one aspect of the religious practices may suggest a conclusion the reverse of the above. But this is not the case. Though the Mimāṁsā originated earlier, as Thibaut and Jacobi3 assert, the earlier origin cannot in this case prove priority. Before the beginning of the Christian era there is, in the field of Brahmanical orthodox speculations, no trace of an atomic theory. And the essential problem of the Mīmāṁsā is ritual, while philosophical speculations are rare and quite subordinate. Under such circumstances a systematical theory of philosophy cannot be originated; on the contrary, it is more reasonable to suppose that the philosophical theories have been taken into the system from the outside and are used to make the sacrificial injunctions (dharma) or other essential factors of the system transcendent in

1 Cf. V.S. 6, 2, 1–9. The Vaiseṣika is called the Ardha-vaināsika by Sankara in his Bhāṣya on 2, 2, 18.

Cf. Bhandarkar, Vaisnavism and

2 See notes on ch. i, 3, 22 (merit). Saivism (Bühler's Grundriss, iii, 6), p. 117.

3 Thibaut, Introduction to the Artha-samgraha (Benares, 1882), p. ii ; SBE., vol. xxxiv, pp. x-xiii; Jacobi, Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie (Sitzungsberichte d. k. p. Ak. d. W., 1911), pp. 738-9.

See Brahma-sūtra, 2, 2, 17. Sankara on the sutra and on 1, 4, 28; Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 22 (15). Some Mimāmsakas did not acknowledge an atomic theory (Śloka-vārttika on 1, 1, 5, sec. 5, śl. 183).

relation to them. For instance, the Mimämsä acknowledges the nine sorts of the means of knowledge (pramāna);1 but the means of knowledge have no such philosophical import in the system as in other systems; they only serve to prove that the sacrificial injunctions are far superior to them, and accordingly they are adopted in as large a number as possible. The philosophical speculations also serve the same purpose, never serve for the foundation of the system. Consequently the philosophical theories are so loose that eminent followers could explain them in their own ways, and this led to different opinions. Those theories in the system which are common to the Vaiseṣika are due to the receptiveness of the system when continually attacked by the latter. Thus this system cannot be considered as the source of the Vaiseṣika.

As for the Amarā-Vikkhepa, the Vaiśeșika did not accept it as it was. As a realistic system, the Vaiśeşika is contrary to the idealistic tendency; nevertheless it was influenced by the Amarā - Vikkhepa. A Jaina tradition says, "indem alle diese 36 Unterabteilungen (9 substances, 17 attributes, 5 actions, 3 universalities, particularity and inherence) der sechs Grundprincipien sich unter vier Gesichtpunkte stellen, nämlich 1. den der Position (Beisp. puḍhavī prthivi); 2. den der Negation der Position (Beisp. apudhavi); 3. den der Prohibition (Beisp. nopuḍhavī); 4. den der Negation der Prohibition (Beisp. no apuḍhavi), so ergeben sich

=

1 In Sabara-svāmin's Bhāṣya on M.S. the six sorts are enumerated (pp. 6, 10). The Gauḍa-pada-bhāṣya on S. K. v. 4 asserts that sambhava, pratibha, and aitihya are acknowledged by Jaimini. Cf. S. T.-Kaumudi on v. 5; N.S. 2, 2, 1-12; Pr. Bh., pp. 213-30.

2 See the sutras 1, 1, 4-5.

3 That the system is comprehensive will be seen in Kumārila-bhatta's Śloka-vārttika. Not only the Vaiseṣika theories, but also the essential parts of Dig-naga's logic are accepted and taken in by Kumārila as well as by Prabhā-kara. Almost all the varieties of logical theory from Dig-naga down to Kumārila are contained in the Sloka-värttika on M.S. 1, 1, 5, autpattika-sūtra, sections 3 and 5.

die 144 (Punkte)." 1 This is perhaps a prior stage of enumeration (uddeśa), definition (lakṣaṇa), and explanation (parīkṣā)2; but the relation to the Amarā-Vikkhepa cannot be denied,3 because the above four points of view are almost the same as the four modes of expression (atthi, n'atthi, atthi ca n'atthi ca, and n'ev'atthi na n'atthi). Further, this strict method of investigation seems to have helped the development of the Vaiseṣika principle, distinguishing substance itself from attributes and actions, and of the theories concerning the relation between concepts and their objects, and of logic✦ in the system.

XI. DATE OF SYSTEMATIZATION: THE CATEGORIES

Generally a philosophical system may be described from the three points of view, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. In ancient times metaphysics is usually predominant, and epistemology appears at a later time and in advanced philosophical speculations. Consequently, though epistemology is really the foundation of metaphysics, the former is much neglected as compared with the latter in the ancient history of philosophy. The epistemological factor of the general thought of the time of Maha-vira and Buddha is not much developed in the Vaiśeṣika; but the essential parts of the three points of view are well combined in the system. The facts are therefore in favour of the conclusion that the origin of the Vaiśesika was in the time of Maha-vira and Buddha (the sixth-fifth century B.C.).5

1 Leumann, Indische Studien, Bd. xviii, p. 121 f.

2 Nyāya-kandali, pp. 26–7; Nyāya-bhāṣya, p. 9; Nyāya-vārttika, p. 29. 3 See Brahma-jāla-sutta, pp. 37-40.

4 See notes on ch. i, 3, 12 (cognition).

5 Another evidence that the origin of the Vaiseṣika is as old as Jainism is found in the fact that the terms hetu and pramāņa have the same meaning in both systems. See Vidyābhūṣaṇa, History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic, pp. 4-5; V.S. 9, 2, 4 (hetur apadeso, lingam pramāṇaṁ karaṇam ity-anarthāntaram).

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