In the subsequent examination of this affair by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, they assigned the following as reasons why the attack should have been successful:

I. The evident surprise of the enemy at the time of the explosion of the mine, and for some time after.

2. The comparatively small force in the enemy's works.

3. The ineffective fire of the enemy's artillery and musketry, there being scarcely any for about thirty minutes after the explosion, and our artillery being just the reverse as to time and power.

4. The fact that some of our troops were able to get two hundred yards beyond the crater, toward the crest, but could not remain there or proceed further for want of supports, or because they were not properly formed or led.

The Committee gave the following as the causes of the failure:

1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement being mainly by flank instead of extended front. General Meade's order indicated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery Hill, and that proper passages should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of the court that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops should have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack, parallel to the line of the enemy's works. The evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed over at and to the left of the crater, without any previous preparation of the ground.

2. The halting of the troops in the crater instead of going forward to the crest, when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy.

3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working par. ties, and of material and tools for their use, in the Ninth Corps.

4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not properly led.

5. The want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand.

Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest been

gained, the success might have been jeopardied by the failure to have prepared in season proper and adequate debouches through the Ninth Corps' lines for troops, and especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major-General Meade.

While the repulse was a great disappointment to the army, yet it did not occasion the least shade of despondency in the army or throughout the North. During the following summer and autumn months the siege was pressed forward. Not a day of idleness was allowed in the trenches. The restless activity and indomitable perseverance of Grant kept them constantly employed in attempts to cut the enemy's line of communication and diversions upon the north side of the James to threaten Richmond.

On the 12th of August a strong expedition was sent out from Deep Bottom, and with reckless courage stormed the Confederate entrenchments and obtained a strong position within six miles of Richmond. This attack was intended as a feint, to cover a movement of the Union forces in another attempt to obtain possession of the Weldon Railroad.

On the morning of the 18th General Gregg, with his cavalry division, succeeded in striking the railroad six miles south of Petersburg, and succeeded in tearing up the road, pushing his advance within three miles of the city, where he entrenched his forces. The cavalry were strongly reinforced by Warren and his corps, and though Lee made desperate and furious attacks day after day to regain the road, he was repulsed with great slaughter, and the Union forces refused to relinquish their hold.

The loss of the road would prove a terrible calamity to Lee, not only cutting off his most important line of supplies and recruits, but it foreboded the destruction of his entire army. Concentrating an immense force, gathered from all

points of his encampment, Lee massed them in heavy columns, concealed by the forest, and on the morning of the 20th rushed upon the Union lines, leaping over breast works, engaging in a hand to hand fight with the desperation of a "lost cause." The carnage was fearful, the Federals fighting as desperately against overpowering numbers. Though their losses were nearly five thousand they held their position, which was now made perfectly secure, and they had permanently cut off from the Confederates their line of supplies.

Subsequent operations were pushed to the left from time to time, not without constant and desperate struggle, yet always resulting in the gradual advancement of the Union lines, and on the 5th of February they had reached Hatcher's Run, which was brought into our lines only after a severe struggle. At this point the Boydton plank road crosses; after the capture of the Weldon Road this had become very valuable and necessary to the enemy in the transportation of supplies from the Weldon Road at a point several miles below the Union lines. The Confederate defences at Hatcher's Run also covered the Southside Railroad two miles further west. Thus days and weeks of constant and uninterrupted warfare passed in the several departments of the army without any very decisive results, though in each movement Lee was losing and Grant was gaining.

On the 4th of September the joyful tidings that Sherman had captured Atlanta was announced to the army before Petersburg. A salute of a hundred shotted guns was discharged upon the doomed city, which was defiantly answered by fire from every Rebel gun. On the 25th of December Sherman had achieved his triumphant march to

the sea, which is more particularly noticed in the following chapter.

Grant and his army around the Rebel capital was now in winter quarters. His operations were principally of a defensive character. His lines were strengthened, his army recruited, men were furloughed, and the festivities of the camp revived. Sitting in his little wooden hut at City Point, the Union commander was perfecting plans and making preparations for the spring campaign, which was destined to be the death blow to the Confederacy. Already the gloom of despondency had settled upon the South, and the early overthrow of the "Slaveholders' Rebellion" was foreseen. The hero of Vicksburg and Chattanooga had now a firm hand upon the throat of the Rebellion, and notwithstanding its death throes and writhings, he would not relinquish his hold until the monster was strangled.

CHAPTER XV.

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA.

General Grant's plan of operations at the time of his assuming command of the armies of the United States embraced the co-operation, as has been previously stated, of ali of the Union forces. The principal co-operating force, and the second army in point of numbers, was the force gathered at Chattanooga, under Major-General W. T. Sherman. This force numbered nearly one hundred thousand men, with two hundred and fifty-four guns. Opposed to him was a large army, fully sixty thousand men, under General Joseph E. Johnston, encamped in and about Dalton, Georgia.

General Sherman commenced his advance movement on May 6th, and by the

10th of July, after a

most brilliant series of

WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN.

maneuvers and fierce fighting at Buzzard's Roost, Snake Gap, Resaca, Cassville, Dallas, Kenesaw, Pine Hill, and

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