Bolan Pass, seventy miles in length, was effected after much suffering; and when the troops reached Quettah on the 4th of April, so reduced were they in all their supplies, that the camp-followers were under the necessity of feeding on roots, skins of beasts, &c.

Thence to Candahar the sufferings of the soldiers and followers were very great; and when they reached that city on the 4th of May, the latter dwindled down to 20,000. The expectation that supplies would be there obtained was doomed to disappointment. The army found itself as badly fed as ever; and, in order not to exhaust completely the miserable means of the commissariat, a move onward towards Ghuznee was at once decided upon, although the distance was fully 230 miles, and the army wanted most of the requisites for a long journey.

On the 21st of July the British troops encamped under the walls of Ghuznee, which were found to be far stronger than had been anticipated. Hesitation would have been ruinous; and the choice lay between making a dash at this stronghold, and a timely retreat to the starting point. Fortunately for the besiegers, it was discovered that one of the gates of the town had not been built up with masonry, and accordingly this was blown in with gunpowder during the night, the breach thus effected being at once taken advantage of by a storming party, seconded by all the troops available for an assault of the kind. The town was quickly captured; and, in spite of some desperate resistance from the Afghan garrison, the citadel fell within a few hours. The loss of the British in killed and wounded was but trifling; that of the besieged amounted to 1000 slain, and 3000 wounded and captured.

The fall of this stronghold of the Afghans was fortunate in many respects; for it not only afforded the troops much that was needed, but struck terror into the hearts of the enemy, and at once opened the road to Cabool. The army was not allowed a long halt; Colonel Wade, who was moving onwards from Peshawur, fought his way through the Kyber Pass and seized Jellalabad, driving before him Akbar Khan, the second son of the Dost, and capturing a large supply of arms, ammunition, and horses. On the 30th of July the main body of the army, with Sir John Keane, Shah Soojah, and Mr. MacNaghten, marched towards the capital; from which, as they approached, Dost Mohammed fled with a chosen body of horsemen, making his way to the west, beyond the reach of regular troops.

Deserted by their ruler and every chieftain of any consequence, the inhabitants of Cabool had little choice left them but to open their gates to the advancing columns of the British, who entered the Afghan capital, with Shah Soojah at their head, in all the pomp and circumstance of vic

tory. There were none to oppose the placing the English nominee on the throne; and this was accordingly done; though it does not appear to have occurred to any of the actors how they were to manage to keep him there without the presence of an overwhelming military force.

Thus far the game had proceeded smoothly enough; despite the privations of the troops, every thing had succumbed to them; and if the miserable arrangements of a most defective commissariat had not involved the army in utter confusion, it was owing rather to good fortune than to any other contingency.

The commander-in-chief hastened from the scene of his hollow exploits; and scarcely resting at the seat of government, took his way home, to shew himself to the British public as the conqueror of Afghanistan, receiving, as the fruit of his splendid achievement, a title and a pension; the greatest exploit of the entire campaign having been the blowing open of a wooden door with a few bags of gunpowder.

The bulk of the troops followed their retreating commander; a small force being left behind in various positions, scarcely any of which were tenable against an enemy. Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir William MacNaghten were left at Cabool in a political capacity, with a garrison under the command of Major-general Elphinstone and General Sale, badly housed, and still worse provided with a commissariat. So miserably, indeed, was this department conducted, that it was frequently only by dint of hard bribing, that any provisions could be procured from the neighbouring country.

Matters remained tranquil through the first winter; which, in that country, proved a most severe season for our troops, both European and native. The spring ushered in a foretaste of what was in store for the British. Dost Mohammed was known to be at no great distance from Cabool, raising the people, and inciting them to vengeance on the unbelieving invaders of their country. Akbar Khan, his “fighting” son, was every where leading large bodies of Afghan troops against our outposts; cutting off supplies, and harassing the troops in every possible manner.

In the summer of this year (1840) some sharp encounters with the enemy took place, much to his discomfiture; the rude courage and brute energy of his wild troops being quite unable to cope with the disciplined bravery of English regiments. After many desperate engagements, Dost Mohammed surrendered himself a prisoner to the British envoy, Sir W. MacNaghten; and was, before the end of the year, sent beyond the frontier. A pension of 30,000l. a year was allowed him, and a residence for himself and his numerous family allotted at Mus

soorie, on the north-western frontier, where he quietly remained awaiting the course of events.

They were not very long in casting their shadows on the foreground. Akbar Khan had been no party to his father's submission; and so far from contemplating a similar course, omitted no opportunity of falling upon any British force which came in his way. Month after month witnessed the same system of desultory warfare; always to our damage, and seldom to that of the enemy, who were completely masters of this art of campaigning.

Beyond this system of petty and vexatious warfare, and the evidently-growing dislike of the people to our influence and presence in the country, there was little to disturb the course of events at Cabool. At the same time there were not wanting those who could see below the surface of things, and who prophesied the approaching storm. Hints, warnings, and advice were alike thrown away upon the British envoy, who appeared to discredit all that did not coincide with his own previously-formed opinions.4

This strange infatuation clung to him up to the last moment; and when the 2d of November, 1841, ushered in a general rising of the people of Cabool, he was still unpersuaded of any real danger, and expressed a belief that "it would all blow over." It did blow over; but it swept with it the existence of the whole English force. From that fatal morning the record of events in Afghanistan is a sad and terrible recital, uncheered by but one single bright and stirring deed-the gallant and apparently hopeless defence of Jellalabad by its small and ill-provided garrison.

The massacre of Burnes, and every officer, woman, and child found with him in the city, was followed by the seizure of the commissariat, and the gathering of numerous bodies of Afghans within and about the walls. The energy and faculties of both officers and men seemed to have been completely paralysed by the suddenness, rather than the greatness of the danger; and in this manner many valuable days were suffered to pass, adding to the confidence and numbers of the enemy; and in proportion dispiriting our own troops. Resistance did not form a part of the tactics adopted by this most unfortunate body of men, who preferred trusting to negotiations with men who were proverbial for their utter faithlessness, rather than to their own energy.

Towards the end of November Akbar Khan arrived in Cabool with a chosen body of horse; and from that day matters drew rapidly to a crisis. Conferences were held between the chief and the British envoy, 4 The Military Operations at Cabool, &c., by Lieutenant Vincent Eyre.