STORMING OF KUMMEROOT.

197

The new commander occupied a very strong post at Kummeroot with his force, about five miles from the Dagon pagoda, and had likewise fortified a commanding point of the river above Kemmendine, where he not only prevented the navigation of the river, but constructed fire-rafts to destroy the British vessels of war. Both positions General Campbell attacked simultaneously, leading the column against the river position in person, whilst he left the advance on Kummeroot to General M'Bean.

BURMESE GENERAL.

Campbell found his undertaking really formidable; the stockades on both sides of the river being not only admirably posted and strongly constructed, but well found with guns and men. A naval force under Captain Marryat, consisting of a brig and three cruisers, were ordered to clear the obstructions on the river. These soon silenced the Burmese artillery; and a breach having been effected,

the storming party crossed the river and carried the stockade with little loss. General M'Bean, approaching Kummeroot, found himself completely surrounded by well-constructed stockades, garrisoned by large bodies of troops, who watched his advance with great contempt. Destitute of guns, he determined on an immediate assault upon their principal stronghold, consisting of three stockades, one within the other; the last was Soomba Wongee's head-quarters. The Burmese general was taking his forenoon meal when the report of the British advance was made to him; but satisfied with his position and the valour of his troops, he merely commanded his officers to their post, with orders to "drive the audacious strangers away."

He was not allowed to finish his repast in quiet; the rapidly-approaching volleys of musketry announced the forcing of his outer line. Hastening to the scene of conflict, he found his men crowded together in the centre stockade, upon which the British fire was pouring with terrible effect. Panic-stricken and confined, all attempts of their leader to get them into order were unavailing. At length Soomba Wongee fell, and the Burmese troops fled, leaving 800 dead in the stockades; while the jungle and neighbouring villages were filled with the wounded and the dying.

Although General Campbell had captured ten stockades, covered by thirty guns, and well garrisoned, he was unable to take advantage of the panic his successes had created by marching upon the capital. He determined, therefore, to act against the maritime province of Tenasserim. The principal places offered little opposition; several excellent harbours were secured; and what was all-important, a salubrious country discovered for our troops, whom the pestilential air of Rangoon had seriously affected.

The king of Ava, surprised at the audacity of an insignificant number of men, and unable to understand their success, despatched his two brothers to superintend the war. These were accompanied by numbers of astrologers, who were to foretell the periods most favourable for success. They were likewise attended by a body of warriors termed the "invulnerables." The distinguishing features of this ludicrous and pantomimic force consisted in the short cut of their hair, and peculiar method of tatooing, the figures of elephants, lions, and tigers being elaborately and somewhat abundantly displayed all over their persons. Gold, silver, and precious stones were also inserted in their arms, introduced under the skin when young. They are considered by their countrymen to be invulnerable; and to judge from the absurd exposure of their persons to the fire of an enemy, they are either impressed with

THE BURMESE INVULNERABLES.

199 the same opinion, or find it necessary to shew a marked contempt for danger, in support of their pretensions.

The English commander had ascertained that the princes were warned by the astrologers to wait for the first lucky moon, and as this was not very near, he determined not to lie idle, and forthwith attacked several posts which had prevented provisions being brought to Rangoon. One of these, Syriam, a fort originally erected by the Portuguese, had been recently repaired and strongly stockaded. Against this place a strong party in boats was sent, and it was captured, notwithstanding the advantages in favour of the besieged; the Burmese retreated to the pagoda, leaving eight guns and a quantity of ammunition behind them. From the fort the English advanced to the pagoda, which was also carried without loss.

The astrologers, it was ascertained, had at length discovered the favoured time for attacking the British, viz. at midnight on the 30th of August. Sir A. Campbell, having made his preparations, was in readiness to receive them. The invulnerables boldly rushed up the road leading to the great pagoda, uttering threats and imprecations against the impious strangers who defiled the place with their presence. The English remained perfectly quiet until the multitude approached the gateway, when the guns were opened with discharges of grape, whilst the musketry poured in rapid volleys among them. The invulnerables, astonished at the carnage, fled to the jungle, leaving the dead and dying in every direction.

This success General Campbell determined to improve by driving the enemy from all their posts near Rangoon. Major Evans was accordingly dispatched with three hundred men to ascend the Lyne river, and Colonel Smith with the light division on the road to Pegu. Colonel Smith having cleared several stockades, learnt that a large body of the enemy, with cavalry, elephants, and guns, were in a fortified pagoda at Kytloo. As his men were all sepoys, he sent to General Campbell for a European reinforcement. His request was refused, with what appeared to Colonel Smith an imputation on his motives. Conceiving that his courage was doubted, he resolved to hazard an attack, which proved unsuccessful; and, after severe loss in killed and wounded, he was compelled to order a retreat, the gallantry of the officers being unsupported by their men, who were alarmed at the superior physical strength of the Burmese.

The Burmese had in the Arracan for invading Bengal. a powerful force, marched on

meantime commenced preparations in Maha Bandoola, their commander, with Ramoo, and attacked a small body of

British stationed there. These, after a gallant resistance, were overwhelmed and nearly all destroyed or captured. The intelligence of this catastrophe reaching the commanding officer, who was marching to their relief, he made for Chittagong, considering that would be the next place upon which the enemy's power would be directed. The Burmese, however, never attempted to turn their advantage to account; and before Bandoola entered upon fresh aggressions, he was recalled to defend his country. This affair produced most painful impressions throughout Bengal. The peasantry fled from the invisible Burmese, as they were called; and the native merchants of Calcutta were dissuaded with difficulty from removing their families and property from that city. These alarms were fostered by the Peishwa and other Mahratta princes at Benares, as was subsequently ascertained.

By the end of the rainy season the British in Rangoon had formed far more favourable opinions of their position. Great improvements were visible in the health of the troops, and hopes of an early advance were entertained. Five hundred Mugh boatmen from Chittagong were brought in and employed in preparing boats for the river service; a reinforcement also had arrived, consisting of two British regiments, some native infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery. Added to these, transports with draught-cattle began to arrive; all of which tended to impart fresh spirit to the men, who were busily preparing for their advance when the approach of Maha Bandoola and his force was announced. He was the best general in the Burmese service, and commanded the largest army they had ever sent into the field.

The enemy's approach was learnt by means of an intercepted letter from Bandoola to the ex-governor of Martaban, stating that he had left Prome at the head of an army well disciplined and supplied, either to capture or drive the English from Rangoon.

On the 30th of November the Burmese assembled in the forest in front of the Shoe-dagon Pagoda. Their lines, extending from above Kemmendine in a semicircular direction to the village of Puzendown, were easily traced by the smoke from their watch-fires. As night set in, the hum of voices from this multitude ceased, and in its place was heard the sound of heavy columns marching to the very edge of the jungle which formed our barrier. The greatest alertness was displayed by the British, a furious assault on the pagoda being momentarily expected; but day broke without their expectations being realised. Scarcely had the day dawned when hostilities commenced with a heavy fire of musketry at Kemmendine, the reduction of that place being

ATTACK ON KEMMENDINE.

201

preliminary to any general attack. The firing was long and animated; and from the commanding situation at the great pagoda, though nearly two miles from the scene of action, the troops posted there could distinctly hear the yells and shouts of the infuriated assailants, occasionally returned by the hearty cheer of the British seamen, as they poured in their heavy broadsides upon the resolute and persevering masses.

In the afternoon several Burmese divisions were discerned marching towards the Dallas river; and later in the day dense bodies issued from the forest, about a mile from the east front of the pagoda, taking position on the river at Puzen down, already strongly occupied by cavalry and infantry. These formed the left wing of the Burmese army. The centre was posted in the forest, and defied all conjecture as to its strength or position. In a few hours the British were completely surrounded, with the narrow channel of the Rangoon river alone unoccupied in their rear. The line of circumvallation taken up by the enemy extended a considerable distance, and being divided by the river, weakened Maha Bandoola's means of assailing us on any particular point; but the celerity, order, and regularity with which the different corps took up their stations reflected much credit on the Burmese general.

In the afternoon a sortie was made to ascertain the disposition of the Burmese; and as they were entirely unprepared for this movement, they were forced from their earth-mounds, or coverings, which they had rapidly thrown up, with severe loss, leaving a great quantity of arms and tools in the trenches. But in the evening the Burmese returned to these works, and began fresh excavations. Soon after sunset the enemy's activity was again evinced by a fierce attack on Kemmendine, the country being simultaneously illumined by the flames of their tremendous fire-rafts, set adrift in the river to destroy our shipping at Rangoon. These rafts the sailors secured and towed ashore, where they were consumed, whilst the attack on Kemmendine by land was also repelled.

For three or four days Sir A. Campbell allowed the enemy to advance their outposts until within fifty yards of his lines, when ascertaining that they had brought all their ammunition and stores from the jungle into their entrenchments, he resolved on a decisive attack. Two bodies under Majors Sale and Walker were ordered to advance, while a number of armed boats under Captain Chads proceeded to Puzendown Creek, and opened a fire upon the enemy's intrenchments. Walker's column was stoutly opposed; but advancing, it drove the Burmese from their trenches at the bayonet's point, though with the loss of its leader. Sale's column met with less resistance, forcing the centre