In conformity with these observations he suggests an interpretation of Gen. iv. 4. which, I apprehend, is peculiar to himself: namely, that Cain brought a single offering, of the fruits of the ground; and Abel a double oblation, consisting likewise of the fruits, and of an animal sacrifice besides. His principal argument in support of this novel idea, is derived from the use of the word Mincha in this place; the meaning of which, he says, is fixed precisely in Levit. ii. 1. and confined to an unbloody oblation, viz. a meat-offering; or, as we generally appropriate the word meat to flesh, more properly a bread-offering. This term, he argues, being here applied to Abel's oblation, and being totally inapplicable to the animal sacrifice which he is expressly said to have offered, it follows, that he must likewise have made an offering of the fruit of the ground, such as Cain had brought. And this, he contends, the very turn of expression in the original strongly indicates: for that, in strictness, the passage should be rendered, "Cain brought of the fruit of the ground, a Mincha to Jehovah-and Abel brought (the same), he also (brought) of the firstlings," &c. for that in the words, & Di anam, the particle cannot be joined to the verb immediately preceding from the nature of the position, and its conNexion with a second nominative case-and that, agreeably to this, the Seventy have rendered the clause, Kat Abed nveyxe, και αυτος απο των πρωτοτόκων.

This criticism of Dr. Kennicot seems, however, unworthy of so great a name; for even admitting, that the particle is to be connected, not with the preceding verb, but with the second nominative case, the inference drawn by Dr. Kennicot will by no means follow; there being no form of expression more familiar to the Hebrew, than the emphatic repetition of the person spoken of, with this particle adjoined. To adduce instances of this were idle, as it is one of the most common idioms of the language. Whoever wishes for exam-. ples, however, may find them in sufficient plenty, in Nold. Concord. Partic. Ebr. pp. 201, 202. Now, in this application of the particle, it is manifest, that the whole of Dr. Kennicot's construction falls to the ground. Again, admitting the particle to be used in the additive sense, also, as Dr. Kennicot's view of the passage requires, yet will not this justify his translation; since, being necessarily connected with the second nominative case by this writer's own admission, it can only mean, that Abel also, as well as Cain, brought an offering; whereas, according to Dr. Kennicot, it must signify, that he brought, also of the firstlings, &c. i. e. he brought not only what Cain had brought, but besides, or in addition to that, of the firstlings of his flock; to make out which translation, the

word also must be connected, not with the second nominative case x, or autos, but with the following words, 77, or απο των πρωτοτόκων, from which it is entirely disjoined by the intervening pronoun. Thus Dr. Kennicot becomes inconsistent with himself, having first contended for the immediate conjunction of the particle with the second nominative case, and having then applied it in such a sense as to require its conjunction, not with this nominative case, but with another part of the sentence.

But he relies on the force of the word Mincha, which is applied only to Abel's offering: the Lord being said to have had respect to Abel and to his MINCHA. It is then of importance to ascertain the true meaning of this word; and the more so, because if this writer's sense of the term be admitted, and-at the same time his theory of the double oblation be rejected, the necessary inference is, that no animal was slain by Abel, but that the offering must have been of the unbloody kind, and consequently that it was, as Grotius has contended, merely an offering of the milk and wool of his flock.

Now, it is in the first place to be remarked, that he explains the word Mincha, as applied to the offerings of Cain and Abel, by the exact definition of it, as we find it specifically used under the law, where it appears to be confined to offerings of the unbloody kind. (See Two Dissert. p. 188-192.) But if Dr. Kennicot be right in explaining the Mincha in all cases by the strictness of the Levitical definition, then it necessarily follows, that Cain did not merely bring an offering of the fruits of the ground, but that he brought the very kind of meat-offering, or Mincha, appointed in the ii. ch. of Levit, where, as Kennicot emphatically observes, the description of the meat-offering concludes with these words, n nn, THIS IS A MINCHA. Cain's offering, then, must have consisted of "fine flour, with oil poured upon it, and frankincense placed thereon." The exact quantities also of the flour and oil, as prescribed in the law, must have been employed. This the force of Kennicot's argument indispensably requires. For he contends, that the very definition of the Mincha, as given in Leviticus," determines the sense of the word absolutely in the five books of Moses: for that wherever the inspired author mentions the word Mincha, as a sacrificial term, he must certainly use it in the same sense; the same, which had been settled upon it by God himself, before Genesis was composed.'

Now, it is certain, that wherever the MINCHA, properly so called, is spoken of under the law, it must be understood in the sense expressly given to it by the law; and in this reference it is, that Buxtorf, Leland, Outram, and Jos. Mede, (whom Kennicot quotes in justification of his opinion) seem to

have spoken of the Mincha. But surely, when applied to oblations antecedent to the law, the term is not necessarily to be taken in that restrained sense, to which its general signification was limited, in later times, by those appropriate circumstances attached to it by the legal institution. It is undoubtedly true, as Gussetius, who is referred to by Kennicot, remarks, that a Mincha presented to God signifies an unbloody oblation. But when he says, that it always does so, and that "there is not one instance of its being used for an animal oblation throughout the Bible," (Comment. Ling. Ebr. p. 473.) he, in the first place, begs the question respecting the sacrifice of Abel, which is expressly called a Mincha: secondly, he forgets, that every other instance of its sacrificial application, is an instance of the use of the term under the law, by which its original meaning had been narrowed: and lastly, both he and Kennicot materially err in point of fact, the word Mincha being frequently employed even under the law, to denote animal sacrifices, as well as the bread or flour-offerings. Thus in 1 Kings xviii. 29, 36. 2 Kings iii. 20. and Ezra ix. 4, 5. we find the morning and evening sacrifices, which beside a bread-offering and drink-offering, included also the offering of a lamb, described by the general appellation of Mincha. In Judg. vi. 18. the same term is applied to the offering of a kid with unleavened cakes. And in 1 Sam. ii. 17. and Mal. i. 13, 14. it is used in relation to animal sacrifice, in a manner the most explicit and unqualified. So that, although, as Rosenmuller on Levit. ii. 1. affirms, this word be applied per eminentiam to the oblation of Corn, yet even under the law we find its more general signification force its way.

This proves decisively the weakness of Dr. Kennicot's argument, derived from the supposition that the words (Lev. ii. 6.) are to be understood in the sense, THIS IS A MINCHA, i. e. as marking the precise meaning of the term, wherever it occurred in a sacrificial relation. Indeed the circumstance of the various kinds of bread-offerings comprehended under the term Mincha, which Kennicot himself admits to have existed, (p. 190—192.) and of which there were not fewer than five, proves that this passage could not have been intended here as confining the term to the specific oblation to which it refers; and that it could only mean, that this oblation was one of those, which might be included under the term Mincha. Vatablus renders the words, " Munus est: i. e. tale est munus quod offerri debet Deo." See also Fagius, Vatablus, Castalio, on Exod. xxx. 9.

It is certain that the true and original signification of the word, is that of an offering presented to a superior. Thus

we find it in Gen. xxxii. 20. and xliii. 11, 15. in which places it is used for the purpose of appeasing: again, in 2 Chr. xxxii. 23. and Ps. lxxii. 10. where it is applied to offerings brought by strangers to the temple at Jerusalem: and also in 1 Kings x. 25. 2 Chr. ix. 24. 2 Kings viii. 8, 9. where it is used to denote the gifts sent to earthly princes. The word appears to be derived from an Arabic verb signifying donavit: see Rosenm. and Le Clerc on Lev. ii. 1. and Schindl. Lexic. Pentag. Parkhurst derives it from the Hebrew verb П, quievit, posuit, and Calasio from nn, duxit, without however making any change in the signification. From this it follows, that all sacrificial offerings, whether bloody or unbloody, must fall under the general denomination, Mincha. That it is taken in this large sense by all Lexicographers, Le Clerc (on Lev. ii. 1.) positively asserts. See also Castell, and especially Parkhurst, on the word.

Drusius (on Heb. xi. 4.) affirms, that it is of greater extent than is commonly admitted. Ainsworth observes (on Lev. ii. 1.) that it was generally any solemn gift or present to God, or man in special, a present or sacrifice unto God: more specially, an offering of the fruits of the earth." Sykes also, (Essay, &c. p. 17.) uses the word in the same general sense, whilst he admits, that "later use has pretty much confined it to oblations of flour or meal."

How little reason then Dr. Kennicot had for introducing so novel and dangerous a criticism, is, I trust, upon the whole, sufficiently evident. How inconsistent also it is with the ideas of sacrifice, which he holds, in common with the doctrine maintained in these discourses, will appear, when it is considered, that if in the case of Abel's oblation, the word Mincha be supposed to relate, not to the sacrifice of the animal, but solely to an offering of the fruits with which it was accompanied, it must follow, since God is said to have had respect for his Mincha, that it was not the animal sacrifice, but the offering of the fruits, which conciliated the divine regard. And thus the theory, which pronounces the animal sacrifice to have been originally enjoined, as a type of the great sacrifice of Christ; and which ascribes to this, as the instituted expression of the true faith, the superiority of Abel's offering over that of Cain, is at once overturned. And yet to this very theory it is, that Dr. Kennicot, in his Dissertation on the Oblations of Cain and Abel, has given his warmest support.

Perhaps it may not be amiss here, to endeavour to fix the true meaning and value of the sacrificial terms, p,, and na, Corban, Mincha and Zebach; and the more particularly, as their relative force seems not to have been stated with

Y Y

exactness by any late writer. The first of these terms being derived from p, signifies whatever was brought to God before the altar; whether dismissed, as the scape-goat; dedieated to the service of the Sanctuary, as the sacred vessels, and the conductors of the sacred rites, the Levites; or offered up, as the sacrifices properly so called, which were consumed at the altar. Again, the Mincha was an oblation, which was of the nature of a sacrifice, being consumed at the altar, whether it consisted of things animate or inanimate, although, as we have seen, the Mosaic institution in a good degree narrowed its application; confining it, for the most part, to what is called the meat-offering, or as it should in strictness be denominated the bread or flour-offering. And lastly, the Zebach was the oblation of an animal slain in sacrifice. Thus, Corban is the most general term, including all sorts of offerings, or dedications, to God in his temple. Mincha is the next in order, applying to those offerings which were consumed at the altar. And Zebach is the species infima in the scale, relating only to the animal sacrifice.

But to return to Dr. Kennicot, and the immediate subject of this note. His remark on the word way, that it necessarily involves the idea of number, becomes now totally inapplicable. The idea of a double oblation in the case of Abel, which it was intended to support, has been shown to be entirely groundless: and indeed his observations on the force of the word λ itself, seem not less so. That "the notion of number is included in every application of the word throughout the New Testament," is so far from being true, that numerous passages may be cited, in which no such idea can possibly attach to the word. Thus, in Mat. vi. 25. Is not the soul more (v) than meat?-and again, xii. 41. Behold, a greater (#λs) than Jonas is here. Many other such instances may be seen in Stephanus's Greek Concordance, to which Dr. Kennicot has referred in support of his opinion. But the true force of the word, both in the positive and the comparative, may be best seen in Schleusner's Lexicon. It will thence appear, that the just value of the expression in the passage in Hebrews has been given in the text: a more ample, or fuller sacrifice, expressing in emphatical terms, that which partook more largely and essentially of the true nature and virtue of sacrifice. Vatablus renders the word uberiorem.

No. LXIII.-ON THE NATURE AND GROUNDS OF THE FAITH EVIDENCED BY THE SACRIFICE OF ABEL.

PAGE 43. (r)-FAITH (we are informed by the apostle, Romans x. 17.) cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word