why we should not suppose it introduced by God, at the same time that he instituted sacrifice: for whoever considers carefully will find, that the law is in part a republication of antecedent revelations and commands, long before given to mankind." (Two Dissert. pp. 217, 218.-comp. Ainsw. on Gen. vii. 2.) Witsius considers the distinction of beasts into clean and unclean, so manifestly to relate to sacrifice in the time of Noah, and to have originated from divine institution, that he even employs it as an argument in support of the divine appointment of sacrifice before the flood. (Miscell. Sacr. lib. ii. diss. ii. § 14.) Heidegger also, though he contends for the use of animal food in the antediluvian world, yet admits the distinction of animals into clean and unclean, to have been instituted by divine authority, in reference to sacrifices before the flood. Hist. Patr Exercit. iii. § 52. tom. 1.

No. LIII.-ON THE DIVINE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE..

PAGE 40. (f)-"The first use of words appears from scripture to have been to communicate the thoughts of God. But how could this be done, but in the words of God? and how could man understand the words of God, before he was taught them?" The apostle has told us, that faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God: thus clearly pro nouncing all knowledge of divine things, and consequently all language relating to them, to have had its origin in revelation. But it is not only with respect to things divine, that revelation appears to have supplied the first intimations of language. In terms relating to mere human concerns, it seems to have been no less the instructress of man. For in what sense can we understand the naming of every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, brought before Adam for this purpose by God: but in that of his instructing Adam in the manner whereby they were in future to be distinguished? To suppose it otherwise, and to imagine that Adam at the first was able to impose names on the several tribes of animals, is either to suppose, that he must from the first have been able to distinguish them by their characteristic marks and leading properties, and to have distinct notions* of them annexed

In speaking of the necessity of a distinct notion being associated to each term indicating a class or species, it is not meant to imply, that, to render generic terms significant, appropriate abstract notions must be annexed. That notions cannot be entertained by the mind; or rather, that they involve a contradiction subversive of their existence, the very arguments and illustrations employed by Mr. Locke in their support and expla nation, are sufficient to demonstrate. See particularly Locke's Essay, B. iv. ch. vii. §9. It has been fully and conclusively established by that most acaugate of metaphysical reasoners, Berkeley, that what is called a general M M

to their several appellations; or, that he applied sounds at random, as names of the animals, without the intervention of such notions. But the latter is to suppose a jargon, not a

idea, is nothing but the idea of an individual object, annexed to a certain term, which attaches to it a more extensive signification, by recalling to the mind the ideas of other individuals, which are similar to this one in certain characters or properties. This explanation of the nature of Universals, which has been commonly ascribed to Bishop Berkeley, who has undoubtedly unfolded and enforced it in the most intelligible and convincing manner, is however of much earlier origin. The distinction of Nominalist and Realist is known to have been clearly marked in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, under the teaching of Roscelin, and his pupil Abelard. The Cynics and Stoics also of early times, maintained opinions, which entitle them to be ranked of the former class: and, contrary to the assertion of Mr. Dugald Stewart, who follows the authority of Brucker, in placing Aristotle among the Realists, there certainly are to be found in the writings of that philosopher, the elements of those just notions concerning Universals, which have been adopted by the Nominalists.

Of Roscelin, we are told by Brucker, (Hist. Phil. vol. iii. p. 907.) that he maintained the position, "Universalia, nec ante rem, nec in re existere, nec ullam habere realem existentiam, sed esse nuda nomina et voces, quibus rerum singularium genera denotentur." This opinion of Roscelin, that Universals were merely words or names, was strenuously supported, with some small alteration not very distinctly intelligible, by his follower Abelard: and was no less strenuously opposed by the Realists, who contended, that Universals have an actual existence in rerum naturâ, and that their boundaries are accurately determined by appropriate essences, according to which nature has classed the individuals of the respective species. That the authority of Aristotle was erroneously claimed by the latter; and that, on the contrary, the views of the Stagirite were favourable to the Nominal. ists, Dr. Gillies has taken laudable pains to demonstrate. In his valuable Analysis of a part of the writings of that philosopher, he has satisfactorily proved, that by general terms, Aristotle meant only to express the result of the comparison of different individuals agreeing in the same tides, or appearance, without the supposition of any correspondent general ideas existing in the mind: or, in other words, that a general term was conceived by him, to stand as a sign for a number of individuals, considered under the same aspect, and from certain resemblances assigned to the same class. See Dr. Gillies's Aristotle, vol. i. p. 66-72.

How perfectly this corresponds with the clearest views of modern metaphysics, is manifest at a glance: and it cannot but afford peculiar satisfaction to all who feel a reverence for exalted genius, to find, that after the unworthy disparagement, which for a length of time has been so laboriously cast upon the great name of Aristotle, the honourable homage of a rational coincidence in his opinions, not merely on this, but on an almost endless variety of important subjects, has been the result of the most enlightened inquiries of later days. It has been singularly the fate of the Greek philosopher, to be at one time superstitiously venerated, and at another contemptu. ously ridiculed; without sufficient pains taken either by his adversaries or his admirers, to understand his meaning. It has been too frequently his misfortune to be judged from the opinions of his followers, rather than from his own. Even the celebrated Locke is not to be acquitted of this unfair treatment of his illustrious predecessor in the paths of Metaphysics; whilst perhaps it is not too much to say of his well known Essay, that there is scarcely to be found in it, one valuable and important truth concerning the operations of the understanding, which may not be traced in those writings against which he has directed so much misapplied raillery; whilst, at the same time, they exhibit many rich results of deep thinking, which

language: and the former implies a miraculous operation on the mind of Adam, which differs nothing in substance from the divine instruction here contended for.

have entirely escaped his perspicacity. Indeed, it may be generally pronounced of those who have within the two last centuries been occupied in the investigation of the intellectual powers of man, that had they studied Aristotle more, and (what would have followed as a necessary consequence) reviled him less, they would have been more successful in their endeavours to extend the sphere of human knowledge.

To return to the subject of this note,-it must be observed, that to the two different and opposite opinions on the nature of Universals already alluded to, namely, that of the Nominalists, and that of the Realists, there is to be added a third and intermediate one, that of the Conceptualists, so called from their distinguishing tenet, that the mind has the power of forming general conceptions by abstraction: This sect is represented by Brucker, as a modification of that of the Nominalists. "Nominales, deserta paulo Abelardi hypothesi, universalia in notionibus, atque conceptibus mentis, ex rebus singularibus abstractione formatis, consistere statuebant; unde Conceptuales dicti sunt." Hist. Phil. vol. iii. p. 908.-With this sect Mr. Locke is ranked by Dr. Reid, (Essays on the Intell. Powers, vol. ii. p. 146.) and in the justness of this allotment, Mr. Dugald Stewart acquiesces; at the same time he observes, that, from the inaccuracy and inconsistency of Mr. Locke's language, there is no small difficulty in assigning to him his true place; or rather, indeed, in determining whether he had any decided opinion on the question in dispute, (Elements of the Philosophy of the Hu man Mind, pp. 191, 192.) It certainly cannot be contended, that Locke has conveyed his meaning upon this subject with clearness or consistency; yet no doubt can possibly exist, as to the class to which he properly belongs. His placing the essences of the species altogether in the abstract ideas formed by the mind, indisputably determines him to the standard of the Conceptualist; notwithstanding that the incompatibility of the elements of his abstract idea, (Essay, B. ii. ch. xi. § 9. and B. iv. ch. vii. § 9.) and the admitted necessity of the name, to bestow upon the idea its unity, that is, in other words, its existence as an idea, (Essay, B. iii. ch. v. §.10.) mark the indistinctness of his views upon this subject; and ought, if he had examined his own notions consequentially, to have led him to adopt the party of the Nominalist.

From what has been said, it appears upon the whole, that the Nominalist and the Conceptualist, whilst they concur in rejecting the notion of the Realist," that Universals belong to things, and that general terms denote certain genera and species established in nature by appropriate essences,”at the same time differ from each other essentially in this; that whilst the one attributes universality solely to terms, and the other to certain abstract ideas expressed by those terms, the latter admits the possibility of reasoning on general subjects without the mediation of language, and the former maintains the indispensable necessity of language, as the instrument of thought in all general speculations.

If, with Bishop Berkeley, we are obliged to deny the possible existence of an abstract idea, there can be no difficulty in determining to which of these two opinions we must yield our assent. In the sign alone, and in its potential application to a class of individual objects, is universally to be found; and consequently by language only, (meaning by this, the use of signs at large,) can we conduct our reasoning one single step beyond the individual object. There is, upon this subject, an excellent remark made by an elegant and perspicuous writer, which I cannot forbear transcribing. "Whe ther it might not have been possible for the Deity to have so formed us, that we might have been capable of reasoning concerning classes of objects, without the use of signs, I shall not take upon me to determine. But this

Indeed, even abstracting from the information thus given in scripture, those who have well examined this subject have been utterly at a loss to conceive any other origin of language than divine institution. Whitby considers this so completely evident, that he thinks it forms in itself a clear demonstration, that the original of mankind was as Moses delivered it, from the impossibility of giving any other tolerable account of the origin of language. (Sermons on the Attrib. vol. ii. p. 29.) Bishop Williams, in his 2d Sermon, (Boyle Lect. vol. i. p. 167.) affirms, that though Adam had a capacity and organs admirably contrived for speech, yet in his case there was a necessity of his being immediately instructed by God, because it was impossible he should have invented speech, and words to be spoken so soon as his necessities required. Dr. Beattie endeavours to prove the human invention of language to be impossible. (Theory of Lang. 8vo. p. 101.) And Doctor Johnson is so decidedly of this opinion, that he holds inspiration to be necessary to inform man that he has the faculty of speech," which I think, says he, he could no more find out without inspiration, than cows or hogs would think of such a faculty." Mr. Wollaston contends, (Relig. of Nat. pp. 122, 123.) that language is the indispensable instrument*

we may venture to affirm with confidence, that man is not such a being, "—"It would be vain for us, in inquiries of this nature, to indulge ourselves in specnlating about possibilities. It is of more consequence toremark the advantages which we derive from our actual constitution; and which, in the present in stance, appear to me to be important and admirable: inasmuch as it fits mankind for an easy interchange of their intellectual acquisitions; by imposing on them the necessity of employing, in their solitary speculations, the same instrument of thought which forms the established medium of their communications with each other."-See p. 190, of Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, by Dugald Stewart.

In the preceding note, the necessity of language, as the instrument of thought and reasoning, was particularly adverted to. In the judgment of many profound thinkers that necessity is recognized. Lavoisier, in the preface to his Elements of Chemistry, expresses his coincidence in the maxim of Condillac, that "we think only through the medium of words:" and that "the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged." (Kerr's Translation, p. xiv.) Plato describes thinking as conducted by mental speech, το διανοείσθαι λόγον, ον αυτή προς εαυτήν η ψυχή διεξέρχεται : and in the philosophy of the Greeks, reason and words are denominated by one and the same term aayos.-Now, if this be just; if language be, in truth, the indispensable instrument of reasoning; is it too much to affirm, that language could not have been discovered by reasoning; or in other words, that the operations of reasoning could not have effected that, by which alone its operations are conducted?

According to the Conceptualist indeed, who holds that the mind can contemplate its own ideas independently of words, the invention of language by the exertion of thought, is by no means inconceivable; since, on this hypothesis, reasoning may precede language, and therefore may minister to its discovery. And yet, when considered somewhat closely, it may not perhaps *ppear a very easy matter to imagine the practicability of such a process.

of thought: and even Herder, who has laboured to prove language not to have been of divine appointment, admits that without it reason cannot be used by man.

Reasoning, it is manifest, can be conducted only by propositions or affirm. ations, either verbal or mental. A proposition affirming of any individual thing that it is itself, or that it is not another, is (could we even suppose the mind in its first stage of thinking capable of forming such a proposition,) not to be ranked amongst the class of affirmations which belong to reasoning. The power of distinguishing individual objects pertains to the faculty of perception, and is necessary to reasoning, but can form no part of it. Nothing individual then being an attribute, every affirmation which can make a part of reasoning demands the existence of a general sign. The formation of general signs must therefore precede all affirmation, and consequently every exercise of the reasoning faculty. The conceptualist who asserts, that general signs are supplied by the general ideas with which abstraction furnishes the mind, must of course contend, that the exercise of the power of abstraction must be antecedent to every act of reasoning. Now, in the first place, it cannot but be deemed extraordinary, that the very faculty, which is pronounced to be the distinguishing characteristic of the rational species, should be called into action previous to the exercise of reason. If such a faculty can be exerted before the use of reason, why not exerted without it? And in that case, why should not the tribes of irrational animals, whose perceptions of individual objects may be as distinct as those in the minds of men, pass from those individual perceptions to universal ideas, if such transition can be made without the exercise of reason?-But again, not to dwell upon this consideration, (since it may be pretended that it is abstraction itself which in its consequence produces rationality,) if we inquire what it is that can put an unreasoning mind upon this process of abstraction; a process allowed by all to be difficult, and represented by some in such a light as makes it appear to embrace contradictions; it will not be very easy to give an answer. In contemplating things by classes, it is true, we both expedite the acquisition of knowledge, and facilitate its communication. But can these ends act upon a mind, which has not yet begun to reason? Can the anticipations of knowledge become a motive, where it has not yet been learned, what knowledge is: or can the desire of communication constitute an incitement, where the very notion of the subject matter to be communicated has never yet been conceived? For it must be remembered that as we are now speaking of language as subsequent to reasoning, and of reasoning as subsequent to abstraction, we must conceive abstraction to be exerted, without any notion actually acquired either of reasoning or language, or any direction or forecast suggested by a reference to either. Abstraction, in short, in this view of the case, is a random and unintelligible movement, which is excited by no design, proposes no object, and admits no regulation. So irrational a foundation for a rational superstructure cannot be deliberately maintained.

Dr. Price, whose system imposed on him the necessity of upholding the existence of abstract ideas, as "essential to all the operations of the understanding, and as being implied in every act of our judgment," felt himself at the same time obliged, from the foregoing considerations, to deny that such ideas can be acquired by any mental process, such as that of abstraction. Were abstract ideas (he observes) formed by the mind in any such manner, "it seems unavoidable to conceive, that it has them at the very time that it is supposed to be employed in forming them. Thus, from any particular idea of a triangle, it is said we can form the general one: but does not the very reflection said to be necessary to this, on a greater or lesser triangle, imply that the general idea is already in the mind?” (Review of the principal difficulties in morals, p. 37.) The learned Cudworth, in like manner, speaking of the understanding as an artificer that is to fabricate abstract notions out