any fresh argument, yet by an implied assent to such as have convinced themselves: those again who think differently, feel that the Author has merely declared his sentiments, and (provided his language be not insolent and overbearing) has left them in undisturbed possession of their own. Not so, one who supports his opinions by cogent reasons: he seems by so doing to call on them either to refute the arguments, or to alter their own views. And however mildly he may express himself, they are sometimes displeased at the molestation thus inflicted, by one who is not content merely to think as he pleases, leaving others to do the same, but seems aiming to compel others (the very word

cogent," as applied to reasons, seems to denote this character) to think with him, whether they like it or not. And this displeasure one may often hear vented in the application of the title "dogmatical;" which denotes, when so applied, the exact reverse of dogmatism; viz. that the Author

b

is not satisfied with simply declaring his own opinions; (which is really dogmatism;) but, by the reasoning he employs, calls on others to adopt them.

I am aware, however, that truth may be advocated, and by sound arguments, in a needlessly offensive form. And it has always been my aim to avoid, as far as may be without a sinful compromise of truth, every thing tending to excite hostile feelings, either within or without the pale of my own Church.

In reference to the works cited or alluded to, with censure, or with approbation in various parts of these volumes, and the names of which, in the former case, I have for the most part purposely omitted, I think it right to state in this place my reason for that procedure. No one, either personally, or as an individual writer, is the object of any designed attack. The censure I have at any time

thought it necessary to pass, has been always intended for the opinions maintained, or the arguments adduced. If there are several persons by whom these are admitted, then, the censure is directed against each of these persons, as much as against the Author I may have cited. If on the contrary the opinions alluded to in any case, are obsolete, or have attracted little or no notice, that is my mistake; I wish the error and the refutation of it to be forgotten together. To call attention to obscure and at the same time erroneous, works, is far from my design.

When, indeed, I meet with any thing that I deem an important error in the works of some Author on whom I may have thought it right to bestow high praise for some other parts of his writings. on the same subject, there seems to be then a sufficient reason for distinctly alluding to him in the censure of such

error, lest his merits in other points should give it currency. And this is the single exception I have thought it right to make to the rule just mentioned.

On the other hand I have thought it proper to refer (whenever my memory would serve me) to any Author to whom I may have been indebted for a valuable remark. And I have been of course even the more careful to do this when it has happened that such an Author is one not generally known; because in that case I should be desirous, if possible, to call attention to his works.

Some of the works to which I have referred are those of living Authors whom I have the pleasure of knowing personally : and I am not sure that I may not, on that ground, incur censure for citing them with approbation; as if I must unavoidably be biassed by partial feelings. I would rather, however, incur the suspicion of such par

tiality, than of not daring to do that justice to a friend which would be due to a stranger. And it should in fairness be remembered, that though it is very possible to overrate a friend, yet, as it is also possible that a writer of real merit may possess personal friends, so, it would be hard that this should necessarily operate to his disadvantage, by precluding them from bearing just testimony in his favour.

It may be necessary however to add, that whatever writers I may refer to, whether of small or of great reputation, I do not mean to appeal to any as of decisive authority, or to adopt them as guides. Some of them may be such as to create more or less of a presumption in favour of their opinions till satisfactorily refuted. Others may supply valuable testimony as to the prevailing opinions in their time ; or may suggest arguments which are to be judged of according to their intrinsic weight. But I have learned to "call no