NOTE.

Note (G) p. 159.

"We ought to remember, that the descriptions which we frame to ourselves of God, or of the divine attributes, are not taken from any direct or immediate perceptions that we have of Him or them; but from some observations we have made of his works, and from the consideration of those qualifications, that we conceive would enable us to perform the like. Thus, observing great order, conveniency, and harmony in all the several parts of the world, and perceiving that everything is adapted, and tends to the preservation and advantage of the whole; we are apt to consider that we could not contrive and settle things in so excellent and proper a manner without great wisdom; and thence conclude that God, who has thus concerted and settled matters, must have wisdom: and having then ascribed to Him wisdom, because we see the effects and result of it in his works, we proceed, and conclude that He has likewise foresight and understanding, because we cannot conceive wisdom without these, and because if we were to do what we see He has done, we could not expect to perform it without the exercise of these faculties.

"And it doth truly follow from hence, that God must either have these, or other faculties and powers equivalent to them, and adequate to these mighty effects which proceed from them. And because we do not know what his faculties are in themselves, we give them the names of those powers, that we find would be necessary to us, in order to produce such effects, and call them wisdom, understanding, and foreknowledge: but at the same time we cannot but be sensible that they are of a nature altogether different from ours, and that we have no direct or proper notion or conception of them. Only we are sure that they have effects like unto those that do proceed from wisdom, understanding, and foreknowledge in us: and when our works fail to resemble them in any particular, as to perfection, it is by reason of some want or defect in these qualifications.

"Thus our reason teaches us to ascribe these attributes to God, by way of resemblance and analogy to such qualities or powers as we find most valuable and perfect

in ourselves.

"If we look into the holy Scriptures, and consider the representations given us there of God or his attributes, we shall find them generally of the same nature, and plainly borrowed from some resemblance to things with which we are acquainted by our senses. Thus when the holy Scriptures speak of God, they ascribe hands, and eyes, and feet to Him: not that it is designed that we should believe that He has any of these members according to the literal signification: but the meaning is, that He has a power to execute all those acts, to the effecting

of which these parts in us are instrumental: that is, He can converse with men as well as if He had a tongue and mouth; He can discern all that we do or say as perfectly as if He had eyes and ears; He can reach us as well as if He had hands and feet; He has as true and substantial a being as if he had a body; and He is as truly present every where as if that body were infinitely extended. And in truth, if all these things, which are thus ascribed to Him, did really and literally belong to Him, He could not do what He does near so effectually, as we conceive and are sure He doth them by the faculties and properties which He really possesses, though what they are in themselves be unknown to us." King's Sermon, § iv. p. 6-10.

That I do not admit Dr. King's application of his principles to the explanation of the difficulty of reconciling the divine Prescience with human Freedom, is necessary to be mentioned, for the sake of such of my readers only as have not seen the notes accompanying my edition of his Sermon, and may be led to suppose the contrary, from a statement in a note to one of Mr. Davison's Lectures on Prophecy, in which he attributes to me the adoption of the Archbishop's views on that point. That statement originated entirely in a mistake; as the author (whom I believed to be incapable of wilful misrepresentation) candidly acknowledged to me. The fact is, he had omitted to read my publication, and had attributed those opinions to me merely from conjecture, because they were those of Dr. King. That for several years, Mr. Davison's work should have continued on sale with the error uncorrected,

is more than I profess to explain. It was in fact rectified only in a subsequent edition.

My reasons for differing from Archbishop King on the point above-mentioned, are fully stated in the notes to his Sermon. But of the soundness and the importance of his general principles, I am the more convinced, because their not having been refuted, certainly does not proceed from their not being thought worth notice. They have been assailed both formerly, and of late, by numerous and zealous opponents; all of whom have mistaken entirely either the question itself, or Dr. King's view of it. For instance, advantage has been taken of his expressions, that "the divine attributes are quite unlike ours," and "altogether different;" which have been taken to mean (either through very culpable carelessness, or something worse) that they have no resemblance at all,-nothing in common; and "that, on his principles, the infliction of gratuitous misery may be perfectly consistent with the Divine Mercy:" and it might have been added, with equal fairness, that, on his principles, a contrivance so framed as to defeat its proposed object, would be equally consistent with the Divine Wisdom: all which, as may be seen even from the above quotation, is the very reverse of what Dr. K. does say. He all along dwells on the agreement in the effects resulting, from the divine attributes, and from human ones bearing the same names, as the very ground on which those names are so applied: but the causes of those effects, he maintains, we have no right to consider as necessarily otherwise similar; inasmuch as the Beings

who are the subjects of those attributes are so immensely different.

This is a mistake (to use the mildest interpretation) of Dr. King's meaning: the question itself has been, if possible, still more mistaken. It has been contended, for instance, that all exhortations to imitate the Deity must be nugatory, if we know not precisely what his attributes are, or regard them as of a different character from the human: as if Solomon's exhortation, "Go to the ant, thou sluggard, consider her ways, and be wise," could not be put in practice unless we were convinced that the proceedings of the insect are directed, not by any incomprehensible instinct, but by mental habits, in all respects agreeing with human prudence, and industry.

And as for the words "same" and "similar," so often employed in discussions of this point, so great is the confusion of thought resulting from their ambiguity, and from the general laxity with which they are applied, that it may be allowable to extract from the "Elements of Logic" a passage in which I have attempted to dispel this confusion. Chap. v. § 1. p. 274-276. Dr. King, I have there said, "remarked (without expressing himself perhaps with so much guarded precision as the vehemence of his opponents rendered needful) that "the attributes of the Deity (viz. Wisdom, Justice, &c.) are not to be regarded as the same with those human qualities which bear the same names, but are called so by resemblance and analogy only." For this he was decried by Bishop Berkeley and a host of other objectors, down