IL

that diversity of Taftes, which I have fhewed L E C T. to be natural and allowable. But if the other man fhall affert that Homer has no beauties whatever; that he holds him to be a dull and fpiritlefs writer, and that he would as foon perufe any old legend of Knight-errantry as the Iliad; then I exclaim, that my antagonist either is void of all Taste, or that his Tafte is corrupted in a miferable degree; and I appeal to whatever I think the standard of Taste, to fhew him that he is in the wrong.

WHAT that ftandard is, to which, in fuch oppofition of Taftes, we are obliged to have recourse, remains to be traced. A ftandard properly fignifies, that which is of such undoubted authority as to be the teft of other things of the fame kind. Thus a ftandard weight or measure, is that which is appointed by law to regulate all other measures and weights. Thus the court is faid to be the ftandard of good breeding; and the fcripture, of theological truth,

WHEN we fay that nature is the standard of Tafte, we lay down a principle very true and juft, as far as it can be applied. There is no doubt, that in all cafes where an imitation is intended of fome object that exists in nature, as in representing human characters or actions, conformity to nature affords a full and diftinct criterion

D 3

II.

LECT. criterion of what is truly beautiful. Reason hath in fuch cafes full fcope for exerting its authority, for approving or condemning; by comparing the copy with the original. But there are innumerable cafes in which this rule cannot be at all applied; and conformity to nature, is an expreffion frequently used, without any distinct or determinate meaning. We must therefore fearch for fomewhat that can be rendered more clear and precife, to be the standard of Tafte.

TASTE, as I before explained it, is ultimately founded on an internal fenfe of beauty, which is natural to men, and which, in its application to particular objects, is capable of being guided and enlightened by reason. Now, were there any one perfon who poffeffed in full perfection all the powers of human nature, whofe internal fenfes were in every inftance exquifite and juft, and whofe reafon was unerring and fure, the determinations of fuch a perfon concerning beauty, would, beyond doubt, be a perfect ftandard for the Tafte of all others. Wherever their Tafte differed from his, it could be imputed only to fome imperfection in their natural powers. But as there is no fuch living ftandard, no one perfon to whom all mankind will allow fuch fubmiffion to be due, what is there of fufficient authority to be the standard of the

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various

various and oppofite Taftes of men? Moft LECT. certainly there is nothing but the Tafte, as far as it can be gathered, of human nature. That which men concur the moft in admiring, must be held to be beautiful. His Tafte must be esteemed just and true, which coincides with the general fentiments of men. In this ftandard we must reft. To the fense of mankind the ultimate appeal muft ever lie, in all works of Tafte. If any one fhould maintain that fugar was bitter and tobacco was sweet, no reafonings could avail to prove it. The Taste of fuch a perfon would infallibly be held to be diseased, merely because it differed fo widely from the Taste of the species to which he belongs. In like manner, with regard to the objects of fentiment or internal Taste, the common feelings of men carry the fame authority, and have a title to regulate the Tafte of every individual.

BUT have we then, it will be faid, no other criterion of what is beautiful, than the approbation of the majority? Muft we collect the voices of others, before we form any judgment for ourselves, of what deferves applaufe in Eloquence or Poetry? By no

means;

there are principles of reafon and found judgment which can be applied to matters of Tafte, as well as to the subjects of science and philofophy. He who admires or cenfures any D 4 work

LECT. work of genius, is always ready, if his Taste be in any degree improved, to affign fome reafons of his decifion. He appeals to principles, and points out the grounds on which he proceeds. Tafte is a fort of compound power, in which the light of the understanding always mingles, more or lefs, with the feelings of fentiment.

BUT, though reafon can carry us a certain length in judging concerning works of Tafte, it is not to be forgotten that the ultimate conclufions to which our reasonings lead, refer at laft to fenfe and perception. We may speculate and argue concerning propriety of conduct in a Tragedy, or an Epic Poem. Juft reasonings on the fubject will correct the caprice of unenlightened Tafte, and establish principles for judging of what deserves praise. But, at the fame time, thefe reafonings appeal always, in the last resort, to feeling. The foundation upon which they reft, is what has been found from experience to please mankind univerfally. Upon this ground we prefer a fimple and natural, to an artificial and affected ftyle; a regular and well-connected story, to loofe and fcattered narratives; a catastrophe which is tender and pathetic, to one which leaves us unmoved. It is from confulting our own imagination and heart, and from attending to the feelings of others, that

any

any principles are formed which acquire autho- L E C T. rity in matters of Taste *.

WHEN We refer to the concurring fentimentsof men as the ultimate teft of what is to be accounted beautiful in the arts, this is to be always understood of men placed in fuch fituations as are favourable to the proper exertions of Tafte. Every one muft perceive, that

*The difference between the authors who found the ftandard of Tafte upon the common feelings of human nature ascertained by general approbation, and those who found it upon established principles which can be ascertained by Reason, is more an apparent than a real difference. Like many other literary controverfies, it turns chiefly on modes of expreffion. For they who lay the greatest ftrefs on fentiment and feeling, make no fcruple of applying argument and reafon to matters of Tafte. They appeal, like other writers, to established principles, in judging of the excellencies of Eloquence or Poetry; and plainly fhew, that the general approbation to which they ultimately recur, is an approbation refulting from difcuffion as well as from fentiment. They, on the other hand, who, in order to vindicate Tafte from any fufpicion of being arbitrary, maintain that it is afcertainable by the standard of Reason, admit nevertheless, that what pleases universally, muft on that account be held to be truly beautiful; and that no rules or conclufions concerning objects of Taste, can have any juft authority, if they be found to contradict the general fentiments of men. These two fyftems, therefore, differ in reality very little from one another. Sentiment and Reason enter into both; and by allowing to each of these powers its due place, both fyftems may be rendered confiftent. Accordingly, it is in this light that I have endeavoured to place the subject.

among

II.