LECT correct without being delicate.

11.

But ftill a

predominancy of one or other quality in the mixture is often vifible. The power of Delicacy is chiefly feen in difcerning the true merit of a work; the power of Correctness, in rejecting false pretenfions to merit. Delicacy leans more to feeling; Correctnefs more to reafon and judgment. The former is more the gift of nature; the latter, more the product of culture and art. Among the antient critics, Longinus poffeffed moft Delicacy; Ariftotle, moft Correctnefs. Among the moderns, Mr. Addison is a high example of delicate Tafte; Dean Swift, had he written on the fubject of criticism, would perhaps have afforded the example of a correct one,

HAVING viewed Tafte in its most improved and perfect state, I come next to consider its deviations from that ftate, the fluctuations and changes to which it is liable; and to enquire whether, in the midst of thefe, there be any means of diftinguishing a true from a corrupted Tafte. This brings us to the most difficult part of our task. For it must be acknowledged, that no principle of the human mind is, in its operations, more fluctuating and capricious than Tafte, Its variations have been fo great and frequent, as to create a fufpicion with fome, of its being merely arbitrary; grounded on no foundation, afcertain

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II.

able by no standard, but wholly dependent on L E C T. changing fancy; the confequence of which would be, that all ftudies or regular enquiries concerning the objects of Tafte were vain. In architecture, the Grecian models were long esteemed the moft perfect. In fucceeding ages, the Gothic architecture alone prevailed, and afterwards the Grecian Tafte revived in all its vigour, and engroffed the public admiration. In eloquence and poetry, the Afiatics at no time relished any thing but what was full of ornament, and fplendid in a degree that we should denominate gawdy; whilft the Greeks admired only chafte and fimple beauties, and despised the Afiatic oftentation. In our own country, how many writings that were greatly extolled two or three centuries ago, are now fallen into entire difrepute and oblivion? Without going back to remote inftances, how very different is the taste of poetry which prevails in Great Britain now, from what prevailed there no longer ago than the reign of king Charles II. which the authors too of that time deemed an Auguftan age: when nothing was in vogue but an affected brilliancy of wit; when the simple majesty of Milton was overlooked, and Paradife Loft almost entirely unknown; when Cowley's laboured and unnatural conceits were admired as the very quinteffence of genius; Waller's gay sprightliness was mistaken for the tender spirit of Love VOL. I. poetry:

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LEC T. poetry; and fuch writers as Suckling and Etheridge were held in esteem for dramatic compofition?

THE question is, what conclufion we are to form from fuch inftances as thefe? Is there any thing that can be called a ftandard of Tafte, by appealing to which we may diftinguish between a good and a bad Tafte? Or, is there in truth no such distinction; `and are we to hold that, according to the proverb, there is no difputing of Taftes; but that whatever pleases is right, for that reason that it does please? This is the queftion, and a very nice and fubtile one it is, which we are now to difcufs.

I BEGIN by obferving, that if there be no fuch thing as any standard of Tafte, this confequence muft immediately follow, that all Taftes are equally good; a pofition, which though it may pass unnoticed in flight matters, and when we speak of the leffer differences among the Tastes of men, yet when we apply it to the extremes, prefently fhows its abfurdity. For is there any one who will feriously maintain that the Taste of a Hottentot or a Laplander is as delicate and as correct as that of a Longinus or an Addifon? or, that he can be charged with no defect or incapacity who thinks a common news-writer as excellent

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an Hiftorian as Tacitus? As it would be held LEC T. downright extravagance to talk in this manner, we are led unavoidably to this conclufion, that there is fome foundation for the prefer-1 ence of one man's Tafte to that of another; or, that there is a good and a bad, a right and a' wrong in Tafte, as in other things.

BUT to prevent mistakes on this fubject, it is neceffary to obferve next, that the diversity of Taftes which prevails among mankind, does not in every case infer corruption of Taste, or oblige us to feek for fome ftandard in order to determine who are in the right. The Taftes of men may differ very confiderably as to their object, and yet none of them be wrong. One man relishes poetry moft; another takes pleafure in nothing but Hiftory. One prefers Comedy; another, Tragedy. One admires the fimple; another, the ornamented ftyle. The young are amufed with gay and sprightly compofitions. The elderly are more entertained with those of a graver caft. Some nations delight in bold pictures of manners, and strong representations of paffion. Others incline to more correct and regular elegance both in defcription and fentiment. Though all differ, yet all pitch upon fome one beauty which peculiarly fuits their turn of mind; and therefore no one has a title to condemn the reft. It is not in matters of Taste, as in queftions

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LECT. queftions of mere reason, where there is but one conclufion that can be true, and all the rest are erroneous. Truth, which is the object of reason, is one; Beauty, which is the object of Tafte, is manifold. Tafte therefore admits of latitude and diverfity of objects, in fufficient confiftency with goodness or justness of Taste.

But then, to explain this matter thoroughly, I must observe farther, that this admiffible diverfity of Taftes can only have place where the objects of Taste are different. Where it is with respect to the fame object that men difagree, when one condemns that as ugly, which another admires as highly beautiful; then it is no longer diverfity, but direct oppofition of Taste that takes place; and therefore one must be in the right, and another in the wrong, un- . less that abfurd paradox were allowed to hold, that all Taftes are equally good and true. One man prefers Virgil to Homer. Suppose that I, on the other hand, admire Homer more than Virgil. I have as yet no reason to fay that our Taftes are contradictory. The other perfon is moft ftruck with the elegance and tenderness which are the characteristics of Virgil; I, with the fimplicity and fire of Homer. As long as neither of us deny that both Homer and Virgil have great beauties, our difference falls within the compass of

that