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have run: When a good thought . . . has arisen the object of this or that sense, etc. Again, cittam is defined as a process of connecting (sandhanam) the last (things) as they keep arising in consciousness with that which preceded them.1 Further, it is a co-ordinating, relating, or synthesizing (sandahanam); and, again, it has the property of initiative action (pure cārikam). For, when the sense-impression gets to the door' of the senses, citta m confronts it before the rest of the mental congeries. The sensations are, by cittam, wrought up into that concrete stream of consciousness which they evoke.




Here we have cittam covering both thinking and thought or idea. When we turn to its synonym or quasisynonym ma no we find, so far as I can discover, that only activity, or else spring, source or nidus of activity, is the aspect taken. The faculty of ideation (m a nindriyam), for instance, while expressly declared to be an equivalent (ve vacanam) of cittam, and, like it, to be that which attends or cognizes (vijā nāti), is also called a measuring the mental object-declared above to be cittam.5 In a later passage (ibid., 129), it is assigned the function of accepting, receiving, analogous, perhaps, to our technical expression assimilating' (sampaṭicchanam). In thus

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appraising or approving, it has all sensory objects for its field, as well as its more especial province of dhammas." These, when thus distinguished, I take to mean ideas, including images and general notions. And it is probably

1 Asl., pp. 112, 113.

2 Cf. the characteristic-sam vidahanam-of cetana in my note, p. 8.

3 The figure of the city-guardian, given in Mil. 62, quoted by the Cy.

See below, p. 18, and Asl. 123.


5 It is at the same time said to result in (establishing) fact or conformity (tathabhavo), and to succeed senseperception as such.

6 See p. 2, n. 3.

only in order to distinguish between mind in this abstract functioning and mind as cognition in its most comprehensive sense that we see the two terms held apart in the sentence: 'Cittam cognizes the dhammas which are the objects of mano, just as it cognizes the visual forms, etc., which are the objects of the senses."

When cittam is thus occupied with the abstract functioning of man o2-when, that is, we are reflecting on past experience, in memory or ratiocination-then the more specific term is, I gather, not cittam, but manoviññāņam (corresponding to cakkhuviññan a m, etc.). This, in the Commentarial psychology, certainly stands for a further stage, a higher 'power' of intellection, for representative cognition,' its specific activity being distinguished as judging or deciding (santiranam), and as fixing or determining (voṭṭhappanam).

The affix dha tu, whether appended to mano or to manoviññāņa m, probably stands for a slight distinction in aspect of the intellectual process. It may be intended to indicate either of these two stages as an irreducible element, a psychological ultimate, an activity regarded as its own spring or source or basis. Adopted from without by Buddhism, it seems to have been jealously guarded from noumenal implications by the orthodox. Buddhaghosa, indeed, seems to substitute the warning against its abuse for the reason why it had come to be used. According to him, the various lists of dhammas (e.g., in the first answer), when considered under the aspect of phenomena, of emptiness,' of non-essence, may be grouped as together forming two classes of dhatu. Moreover, each special sense can be so considered (cak khu-dhatu, etc.; see pp. 214, 215),

1 Asl., p 112.



Cf. the expression suddha-manodvaro in my note, p. 3. And on what follows, cf. pp. 129, 132, nn.

3 Viz., manoviññāṇa-dhātu and dhamma-dhātu see Asl. 153, and below, p. 26, n. 2. The term 'element' is similarly used in our own psychology.

and so may each kind of sense-object. For, with respect to sense, or the apprehension of form, they are so many phenomenal ultimates-the two terms, so to speak, in each sensory relation.

How far dhatu corresponds to vatthu-how far the one is a psychological, the other a physical conception1 of source or base-is not easily determined. But it is interesting to note that the Commentator only alludes to a basis of thought (cittassa vatthu), that is, to the heart (hada ya-vatthu), when the catechizing is in terms of m a no-dhatu. His only comment on heart,' when it is included in the description of cittam (answer [6]), is to say that, whereas it stands for cittam, it simply represents the inwardness (intimité) of thought.3 But in the subsequent comment he has a remark of great interest, namely, that the heart-basis' is the place whither all the door-objects' come, and where they are assimilated, or received into unity. In this matter the Buddhist philosophy carries on the old Upanishad lore about the heart, just as Aristotle elaborated the dictum of Empedokles, that perception and reasoning were carried on in the blood round the heart.'

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1 Cf. below, pp. 214, 215, with 209-211.

2 Asl. 264; below, p. 129, fn.


3 Asl. 140 Heart-thought (Hadayan ti cittam). In the passage-" I will either tear out your mind or break your heart "the heart in the breast is spoken of. In the passage (M. i. 32)-" Methinks he planes with a heart that knows heart" (like an expert)!-the mind is meant. In the passage-"The vakkam is the heart"-the basis of heart is meant. But here cittam is spoken of as heart in the sense of inwardness (abbhantaram).' It is interesting to note that, in enumerating the rupaskandha in the Visuddhi Magga, Buddhaghosa's sole departure from conformity with the Dhamma-Sangani is the inclusion of hadaya-vatthu after vitality.'


The other term, that which is clear' (pandaram), is an ethical metaphor. The mind is said to be naturally pure, but defiled by incoming corruptions. (Cf. A. i., p. 10.)

It is possible that this ancient and widely-received tradition of the heart (rather than the brain, for instance) as the seat of the soul or the mind is latent in the question put by Mahakotthito, a member of the Order, to Sariputta, the leading apostle: 'Inasmuch as these five indriyas (senses) are, in province and in gratification, mutually independent, what process of reference is there, and who is it that is gratified by them in common?' So apparently thinks Dr. Neumann, who renders Sariputta's answer'The mind (mano)'-by Herz. This association must, however, not be pressed. For in another version of this dialogue more recently edited, Gotama himself being the person consulted, his interlocutor goes on to ask: What is the patisaranam of ma no-of recollection (sati)— of emancipation-of Nirvana ?3 So that the meaning of the first question may simply be that as emancipation looks to, or makes for Nirvana, and recollection or mindfulness for emancipation, and ideation or thinking refers or looks

1 M. i. 295.

2 Kim patisaranam. The word is a crux, and may bear more than one meaning. Cf. Vinaya Texts (S. B. E. xvii.), ii., p. 364, n.; Dialogues of the Buddha,' i., p. 122, n. Dr. Neumann renders it by Hort, following Childers.

It is worthy of note that, in connexion with the heresy of identifying the self with the physical organism generally (below, p. 259), the Cy. makes no allusion to heart, or other part of the rupam, in connexion with views (2) or (4). These apparently resembled Augustine's belief: the soul is wholly present both in the entire body and in each part of it. With regard to view (3), is it possible that Plotinus heard it at Alexandria, or on his Eastern trip? For he, too, held that the body was 'in the soul,' permeated by it as air is by fire (Enn. iv.). Buddhaghosa's illustrative metaphor is as a flower being "in" its own perfume.' I regret that space fails me to reproduce his analysis of these twenty soul-hypotheses.

3 S. v., p. 218. In the replies mano is referred to sati, sati to vimutti, and this to Nirvana.

to memory,1 so sensation depends on thinking, on mental construction (to become effective as knowledge).



It is, indeed, far more likely that Buddhist teaching made little of and passed lightly over this question of a physical basis of thought or mind. It was too closely involved with the animistic point of view-how closely we may see, for instance, in the Bṛihadaranyaka Upanishad. When King Milinda puts a similar question respecting the subject of sensations, he does so from so obviously animistic a standpoint that the sage, instead of discussing mano, or heart, with him, argues against any one central subjective factor whatever, and resolves the process of cognition into a number of connate' activities. The method itself of ranking mental activity as though it were a sixth kind of sense seems to point in the same direction, and reminds us of Hume's contention, that when he tried to catch himself' he always 'tumbled on some particular perception.' Indeed it was, in words attributed to Gotama himself, the lesser blunder in the average man to call 'this four-elementish body' his soul than to identify the self with what is called cittam, that is, mano, that is, viññāņam.' For whereas the body was a collocation that might hold together for many years, mind, by day and by night is ever arising as one thing, ceasing as another!' 3

Impermanence of conscious phenomena was one of the two grounds of the Buddhist attack. So far it was on all fours with Hume. The other ground was the presence of law, or necessary sequence in mental procedure. The Soul was conceived as an entity, not only above change, an absolute constant, but also as an entirely free agent. Both

1 Cf. the interesting inquiry into the various modes of association in remembering, given in Mil., pp. 78, 79, and 77, 78.

2 Mil. 54. He calls it vedagu (knower), and, when cross-examined, abbhantare jivo (the living principle within).

3 S. ii., pp. 94-96.

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