thought which is accompanied by pleasure, associated with knowledge, and having, as its object, a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then there is contact, feeling, etc.1 [here follows the list of 'states' dealt with in §§ 1-145 and constituting the First Thoughtthese, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion-these are states that are good.

[Here ends] the Second Thought.2

III.

[147] Which are the states that are good?

When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe has arisen accompanied by pleasure, disconnected with knowledge, and having as its object, a sight, a sound, a

was not, I take it, so bad a Buddhist as to mean that an asankharikam cittam was a thought in and for itself spontaneous, i.e., uncaused. He would mean only that the subject of the thought experienced it without being conscious of its mental antecedent as such, without paccaya-gahanam. In a cittam sasankhärena, on the other hand, the thought presents itself in consciousness together with its mental conditions. In the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha the terms used in a similar connexion are asankhārikam and sasankhārikam. J. P. T. S., 1884, p. 1 et seq. Cf. Warren, Buddhism in Translations,' 490. 1 In the text (§ 146), at the omitted repetitions indicated by '.. ре reference is made to § 147. More correctly reference should be made to § 1. The second typethought is in all respects (including Summary and 'Emptiness Section) identical with the first (Asl. 156), with the sole exception of the additional implication by the prompting of a conscious motive.' With the same exception the fourth, sixth, and eighth type-thoughts are identical with the third, fifth, and seventh respectively. Hence the reference in § 159 of the text should have been to § 157. 2 K. reads Dutiyam Cittam, and so on for the eight.

smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then

1 Sammãditthi should have been here omitted in the text, just as it is rightly omitted at the place of its second mention between avyapado and hiri. Its absence from the third type of thought is involved in the qualifying phrase disconnected with knowledge,' just as wisdom, 'insight,' etc., are. Cf. K. In 147a the Path is said to be fourfold only.

These, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion-these are states that are good.

[Summary, cf. § 58 et seq.]

[147a] Now, on that occasion.

[148] What on that occasion is the skandha of syntheses? The content of the sanskāra-skandha is the same as in the First Type of Thought, § 62,4 with the following omissions : The faculty of wisdom,'

1 That of wisdom' being omitted.

2 See preceding note.

3 'Absence of dulness' being omitted.

In the text the reader is referred to § 62 without reservation, and is thereby landed in inconsistencies. K. enumerates the content of the skandha in full, omitting all those factors which are incompatible with a thought divorced from knowledge. I have thought it sufficient to name only these excluded factors.

These are omitted as incompatible with the quality 'disconnected with knowledge.'

[149] Which are the states that are good?

*

When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe has arisen by the prompting of a conscious motive, a thought which is accompanied by happiness, disconnected with knowledge, and having as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then there is contact, etc. [continue as in § 147]-these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion-these are states that are good. . . .2

1 Placed erroneously in the text after § 147.

So K. The text, by omitting not only the repetitions, but also the essentially distinctive factor sasankhärena, renders the insertion of the Fourth Thought' quite unintelligible.

Buddhaghosa gives a different illustration of this type of thought in harmony with its resemblance to and difference from the former cittam sasankhärena, viz.: in its involving a pleasurable state of mind, but not any great understanding or discernment. Such is the thought of little boys, who, when their parents duck their heads to make them worship at a cetiya, willingly comply, though doing so without intelligent conviction. Asl. 156.

V.

[150] Which are the states that are good?

When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe has arisen, accompanied by disinterestedness,1 associated with knowledge, and having as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state, or what not, then there is contact, etc. [continue as in § 1, but for 'joy' and happiness' substitute' equanimity' (upekkhā), and for the faculty of happiness' substitute 'the faculty of disinterestedness'].2

[151] What on that occasion is contact? Answer as in § 2.

[152] What on that occasion is feeling?

The mental [condition] neither pleasant nor unpleasant, which, on that occasion, is born of contact with the appropriate element of representative intellection; the sensation, born of contact with thought, which is neither easeful nor painful; the feeling, born of contact with thought, which is neither easeful nor painful-this is the feeling that there then is.

[153] What on that occasion is disinterestedness 23 Answer, as in preceding reply, omitting the phrase 'born

1 Upekkha. This is impartiality (lit., middleness) in connexion with the object of thought, and implies a discriminative knowledge' (Asl. 157). Cf. its significance in the cultivation of Jhana, § 165. In the Jhana that may arise in connexion with the first type of thought, which is concomitant with 'joy' and 'ease, it is replaced by 'selfcollectedness.' See § 83.

2 Here, again, the excision, in the text, of practically the whole answer, and the reference to § 156, where the sixth thought is differentiated from this, the fifth thought, by the quality sa sankhärena, quite obscures the classification adopted in the original.

3 Substituted for 'joy' and 'ease,' §§ 9, 10.