Path, and who is cultivating a way wherein investigation is the dominant factor.1

[1035] Which are the states that have arisen' ?2

Those states that have been born, have become, have been gotten, created, re-created, made manifest, that have arisen, have come to pass, have happened, have supervened, have been caused to arise, are classed together among the things that have arisen, to wit, form, feeling, perception, syntheses, intellect.

[1036] Which are the states that have 'not arisen'?

Those states that are unborn, have not become, have not been gotten, nor created, nor re-created, nor made manifest; that have not arisen nor come to pass; nor happened, nor supervened; that have not been caused to arise, that are classed together among the things that have not arisen, to wit, forms, feelings, perceptions, syntheses, intellect. [1037] Which are the states that are bound to arise ?4

1 The construction in this sentence is obscure. Vimamsādhipateyyam is apparently in the nominative case. The Cy., however (p. 359), substitutes, in quoting, the instrumental-which only makes the reading obscurer. Anyway, it proceeds to explain that the term shows a joint 'supremacy' between the Path and an adhipateyyam to be only possible (cf. § 269) when the latter is either investigation' or 'energy.' When the latter is 'desire' or a 'thought,' then the Path yields its sway over the mind to the adhipateyyam. But when the student makes either of the former his governing influence, both it and the Path are his joint governors.

2 Uppanna, i.e., which from the moment they came into being, and for as long as they had distinguishable being, have come to pass and been sustained. Asl. 45.

3 Read nibbatta, abhinibbatta.

6

Uppadino, i.e., will certainly arise, from the fact that their efficient cause is in part completed' (Asl. 45). Later (pp. 360, 361) the potential happening of these resultant states is declared to be due to the enduring validity of their conditions (dhuvapaccayatthena), which cannot fail to produce their effects, even though

The results of those good and bad states related to the worlds of sense, form and the formless, or to the life that is Unincluded, the consequences of which are not yet matured, to wit, the four skandhas and that form due to karma having been wrought which will arise.

[1038] Which are the states that are past?

Those states that are past are extinct, dissolved, changed, terminated, exterminated; are past and classed among the things that are past; in other words, the five skandhas.

[1039] Which are the states that are future?

The states that are unborn, that have not become, not been gotten, nor created, nor re-created, nor made manifest; that have not arisen, nor come to pass, nor happened, nor supervened; that have not arrived, and are classed among the things that have not arrived.

[1040] Which are the things that are present?

3

Those states that have been born, have become, have been gotten, created, re-created, made manifest; that have arisen, have come to pass, have supervened, have been caused to arise; that have arisen over against and are classed among the things that have so arisen.

4

[1041-1043] Which are the states that have the past future... present as their object of thought?

100,000 æons intervene. The gospel (lit., Path) of the future Buddha, Metteyya, is anuppanno, but his (or anyone's) fruition belongs to the uppadino dhamma.

1

Avipakkavipäkānam. Inserted in K., but, as is stated in that edition, not inserted in the Burmese or the European text.

2 The printed text reads niruddhangata; the Cy., niruddha vigata; K., niruddha parinată (not vipariņa tā).

3 Abhinibbatta is omitted in the printed text. Cf. § 1035; also K.

Paccuppanna, the word rendered by 'present' in the question. Cf. our 'ob-vious,' ob-jective,' ob-ject,' in its most general psychological sense, as something present to the subject of the mental states.'

Those emotional, perceptual and synthetic states, as well as those of intellect applied to sense-impressions, which arise in connexion with states that are past . . future

present.1

[1044] Which are the states that are personal ?2

Those states which, for this or that being, are of the self, self-referable, one's own,3 individual, the issue of grasping; in other words, the five skandhas.

[1045] Which are the states that are external ?

4

Those states which, for this or that other being, for other individuals, are of the self, self-referable, their own, individual, the issue of grasping;5 in other words, the five skandhas.

[1046] Which are the states that are personal-external? States which are both [personal and external]."

[1047-1049] Which are the states that have an object of thought concerning the self . . . concerning that which is

1 Cf. § 1022.

2 On ajjhatta and bahiddha cf. §§ 742, 743. The Cy. distinguishes four varieties in the connotation of ajjhattam, namely, gocarajjhattam, niyakajjhattam, ajjhattajjhattam and visayajjhattam, two of which are identical with two of the three meanings cited by Childers. The specific meaning used here is said to be the second.

3 For niyata read niyakā.

That is, all beings except one's self.' Asl. 361.

5 Upādiņņā is omitted in the printed text.

Tad ubhayam is the curt answer. It is to be regretted that Buddhaghosa's fertility in illustration was not applied to this species of dhamma. Incidentally one gathers that they alternate between self-reference and reference to other selves. For whereas the dhammā in the first and third questions are said to be either 'limited' or enlarged' (see §§ 1019-1021), and those in the second are said to be 'infinite,' states that are 'infinite' are said 'not to take as their object that which now relates to the external, now to the self.' (Asl. 361, 362.)

Those emotional, perceptual, synthetic states, as well as those of intellect applied to sense-impressions,1 which arise in connexion with states of the self . . . states that are external . . . states that are personal-external.

[1050] Which are the states that are both visible and impingeing ?2

The sphere of visible form.

[1051] Which are the states that are invisible, but impingeing?

The spheres of the five senses and the spheres of sound, odour, taste and the tangible.

[1052] Which are the states that are both invisible and non-impingeing?

The four skandhas; that form, moreover, which, being invisible and non-impingeing, is yet included in the sphere of [mental] states; also uncompounded element.

[CHAPTER II.

The Group on Cause (hetu-gocchakam).]1

I.

[1053] Which are the states that are causes? (A) The three causes of good (karma).

1 In connexion with the statement (§ 595) that form is that which is not a cause,' the Cy. distinguishes, as did Aristotle, four varieties of cause. The coincidence, however, scarcely extends beyond the number. Hetu is either (a) cause as cause (hetu-hetu); (b) cause as condition, or necessary antecedent wherewithal' (paccayahetu); (c) cause as ultimate or supreme (uttama-hetu); and (d) cause as an attribute held in common (sādhāranahetu). Asl. 303. These distinctions are shown to be applied as follows: (a) the trinity of threefold cause given in § 1053. Here the word is always paraphrased by 'root,' root, conversely, standing for productive agent in general (see the list in note to § 981), and, of course, for moral agency especially. (b) I have declared, bhikkhu, that ‘I the four great phenomena are the causes, are the conditions of the form-skandha.' When the paccayo is material, it may be said to coincide with Aristotle's second formal principle ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Possibly paccayo was this conception so generalized as to include the immaterial wherewithal requisite for the effect. Colebrooke, however ('Life and Essays,' ii. 419), said that the Bauddhas distinguish between hetu as proximate cause and pratyaya (paccayo) as as concurrent occasion.

(c) When good (karma) takes effect, it is the object ultimately or supremely desired '-and the opposite, of course, in the case of bad karma. This may possibly approximate