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and [finally] Uncompounded Element1-these are states that are indeterminate.

[584] In this connexion what is all form' (s abbam rūpam)?

The four great phenomena and that form which is derived from the four great phenomena-this is what is called all form.'3

[584-594] Here follows the Matikā, or table of contents of the following analysis of Form, considered under quantitative categories—the usual Buddhist method. That is to say, Form is considered, first, under a number of single, uncorrelated qualities, then under dichotomized qualities, then under

1 Asankhată ca dhatu. This term, which both Buddhaghosa and the original Atthakatha (see § 1,376 in printed text of Dh. S.) identify with Nirvana, occurs often in this connexion with its opposite 'all form' (v. p. 168, n. 3) in Book III. I do not know whether this, so to speak, cosmological conception of the Ethical Ideal occurs in the older books of the Pitakas, or whether, indeed, the commentators have not laid upon the physical term more than it was intended to bear-a connotation that derives perhaps from the scholastic' ages of Buddhism. For example, in §§ 1016-1018 of the present work, to identify uncompounded element with Nirvana, just after it has been opposed to the 'topmost fruit of arahatship,' would apparently land the compilers in a grave inconsistency. I have yet to meet with a passage in the first two Pitakas which establishes the identification. In the Milinda-pañho, giving the traditional doctrine of an age half-way between Pitakas and Commentaries, we can see the theory of Nirvana as the one asankhatam developing. See pp. 268 seq. Cf. also K. V. 317-30.

2 Mahabhutani, that is, the four elements, literally, the things-that-have-become, die grossen Gewordenen, tà yɩyvóμενα—a far more scientific term than elements or στοιχεία. See further below, $$ 597, 647 et seq.

3 The various implications of the term rupam, such as objective phenomena, concrete or compound, the object of the sense of sight, material existence without sensuous appetite, etc., are discussed in my Introduction (ii.).

qualities which, taken singly, give inclusion, inclusion under the opposite, or exclusion from both; or which, taken in pairs, afford three combinations. We then get pairs of qualities taken together, affording four combinations. After that comes consideration of Form under more inductive classifications, e.g., the four elements and, fifthly, their derivatives, and so on, as given below.

[CHAPTER I.

Exposition of Form under Single Concepts (e kakaniddeso).]

[595] All form is that which is

not a cause,

not the concomitant of a cause,

disconnected with cause,1

conditioned,2

compound,3

endowed with form,"

mundane,5

co-Intoxicant,"

1 Na hetum eva. On the Commentator's analysis of the meanings of 'cause,' see under § 1053. The special connotation here is that 'form' as such is not the ground or root,' or psychical associate of any moral or immoral result. Asl. 303. The two following terms are dealt with under §§ 1074, 1076.

2 Sappaccayam. Cf. § 1083.

3 Sankhatam. This quality is involved in the preceding quality. See § 1085. See also above, p. 166, n. l. Rupiyam, or rūpam eva. The table of contents

4

(§ 584) gives the former; K. has here the latter. Either the one or the other has been omitted from the present section of the printed text. The Cy. gives the latter term -Rupam eva ti rūpino dhamma, etc. Asl. 304. 5 Lokiyam; the antithesis of lokuttaram. § 1093.

6 Sasavam. See § 1096 et seq.

Cf.

1

favourable to

the Fetters,1

the Ties,

the Floods,

the Bonds,

the Hindrances;

infected,2

favourable to grasping,3

belonging to corruption,"
indeterminate,

void of idea,5

neither feeling, nor perception, nor synthesis, disconnected with thought,

neither moral result, nor productive of moral result,7

8

uncorrupted yet belonging to corruption,
not that where conception works and thought
discursive,"

not that wherein is no working of conception,

but only of thought discursive,'

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void of the working of conception and of thought discursive,'

Saññojaniyam, etc. This and the four following terms are severally discussed in connexion with the ethical metaphors of Fetters and the rest. See § 1113 et seq. 2 Paramattham. See § 1174 et seq.

3 Upādāniyam. See § 990 and § 1213 et seq. Sankilesikam. See § 993 and § 1229 et seq.

5 Anarammanam, the idea or mental object belonging, of course, to the arupa-dhammo.

6 Acetasikam. See § 1022.

7 See § 989.

8 See § 994.

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9 Na savitakka-savicaram. This and the two following technical terms mark off form' from the mental discipline of Jhana, even though Jhana may be practised for the sake of passing from a sensuous existence to the 'universe of Form.' Cf. §§ 160, 168, 161, and 996-998.

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not accompanied by joy,'

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not accompanied by ease,'

not accompanied by disinterestedness,"
not something capable of being got rid of
either by insight or by cultivation,

not that the cause of which may be got rid of
either by insight or by cultivation,

neither tending to, nor away from, the accumulation involving re-birth,

belonging neither to studentship nor to that which is beyond studentship,

limited,2

related to the universe of sense,

not related to the universe of form,3

nor to that of the formless,

included,

not of the Unincluded,*

not something entailing inevitable retribution,5

unavailing for (ethical) guidance,

cognizable when apparent" by the six modes of cognition,

1 Cf. §§ 999-1001. These are all mental states, characterizing the other four skandhas, not the rupakkhandho. Similarly, the four following doctrinal expressions are only applicable to mental and moral categories. Cf. §§ 1007-1118.

2 Parittam. See § 1019.

3 Read na rupāvacaram. See p. 165, n. 2.

5 This and the following term belong to ethical, immaterial categories of thought. See §§ 1028-1030 and 1291; also 1288, 1289, and 277.

6 I.e., remarks the Commentator, when it is present (in consciousness). For, strictly speaking, with reference to visual and other sense-cognition, they (read na hi tāni) do not cognize the past and future; that is the function of representative cognition (manoviññānam)' (Asl. 304).

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