Now these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion-these are states that are indeterminate.

[564a, 565] This, including the description of the appropriate skandha of syntheses, is identical with §§ 496a, 497.

[Here end] the Indeterminates which are the result of Bad [Karma].

[CHAPTER II.

Action-thoughts.1

A. In connexion with the Sensuous Universe. (a) On occasion of Ideation (kā māvacara-kiriyā).]

[566] Which are the states that are indeterminate? When an element of ideation of the kind termed kiriyā

1 I have borrowed for a title the term kiriya-cittam from Asl. 293. The later form is kriya-cittam (see Abh. S., p. 2 et seq.; Bastian's Buddhistische Psychologie,' Anhang). Kiriya is discussed in my Introduction. The Cy. has the following on the term: Kiriya here means simply doing (karana-mattam). In all kiriya-thoughts those in which the stage of javanam is attained are like wind-blown blossoms, but those in which that stage is not attained are like blossoms where the tree has been felled, barren of fruit. But when this or that is kept going in the performance of function, then there is "doing" pure and simple. Hence the term kiriya is used.' Now, javanam, according to Buddhaghosa (Šum. I., 195), is the effective outcome of an act of cognition, the stage when the mind or character of the percipient subject is modified (ethically) in one way or another. But in the species of indeterminate thoughts termed kiriya there can be no practical outcome for good or bad, no karma can be set free. Hence the simile of the sterile blossoms. The Abh. S. gives also three species of non-causative kriya-thoughts as connected with the sensuous universe-reflection on senseimpressions, reflection on ideas, and the genesis of mirth (hasituppada-cittam). These correspond fairly well to the three given in the Dh. S., if the two modes of representative intellection be taken in inverted order.

has arisen,1 which is neither good nor bad nor the result of karma, which is accompanied by disinterestedness, and which has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, something tangible, or what not, then there is

Now these, or whatever other incoreal, causally induced states there are on that occasion-these are states that are indeterminate.

1 According to the Cy., the ideation which is kiriyā differs from the ideation which is result only in the mode of its arising (upattiṭṭhānam). The latter arises immediately after the act of sense-cognition. The former arises while sensation is actually proceeding, while the organism is being turned towards the object (Asl. 294). Again (ibid.), that the thought is neither good nor bad' means the absence of that cause of good or of bad which is termed the root of the one or of the other; it means the absence of those conditions of good or of bad which are termed considering things by way of their causes (yoniso-manasikara), or not so considering them. Nor the result of karma' means the absence of the generative cause (janakahetu), known as good or bad (as the case may be). Asl. 293. The marginal reading in the last sentence is obviously right.

2 With its minimum connotation, i.e., as in § 438 and elsewhere (Asl. 293).

the spheres are two,

the elements are two,

the nutriments are three,

the faculties are three,

contact,

etc.

*

[567] The skandha of syntheses (as well as the remainder of the foregoing summary) is identical with the corresponding passages in Chapter I., viz., §§ 467a, 468.

*

(b) On occasion of Representative Intellection.

1.

[568] Which are the states that are indeterminate ? When an element of representative intellection of the kind termed kiriyā has arisen, which is neither good nor bad nor the result of karma, which is accompanied by happiness,1

1 The Cy. (p. 294) pronounces this species of thought not common to men, but peculiar to the arahat. 'It is obtained in the six doors,' e.g., when an arahat sees a spot (thaṇam) favourable to one of those prescribed spiritual wrestlings termed padhanani [sic lege; cf. below, § 1366, (v.)], ' by this thought he is gladdened.' When he comes to a market-place, hears the uproar of the bargaining, and thinks, "I have done with all this thirst for gain," by this thought he is gladdened. When he has made an offering of fragrant odours or flowers at the shrine, by this thought he is gladdened. When he is tasting the food he has received as ordained, and thinks, "Verily I have carried out the doctrine incumbent upon me," by this thought he is gladdened. When he is carrying out minor rules concerning the body, and thinks, "I have fulfilled the rules concerning the door of the body," by this thought he is gladdened. Such is this kind of intellection when obtained in connexion with the "fivefold door." In connexion with the door of ideation, it arises with reference to the

and which has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, something tangible, or what not, then there is

Now these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion-these are states that are indeterminate.

[569] Question and answer on 'contact' as above passim.

[570] What on that occasion is self-collectedness?

The stability, solidity, absorbed steadfastness of thought which on that occasion is the absence of distraction, balance, imperturbed mental procedure, quiet, the faculty and the power of concentration1-this is the self-collectedness that there then is.

[571] What on that occasion is the faculty of energy. [572] of concentration ?

Answers as in § 13 and § 570 respectively.

past and the future.' As, for instance, when the Buddha smiled at the recollection of occurrences in certain of his former births, or, again, when he foresaw this and that.

6

1 It might have been expected that this 'power' as well as that of energy' would have found a place in the enumeration of the constituent states. The Cy. (p. 295) explains that concentration' and 'energy' are not present in full strength. It follows that no 'powers' are included in the summary.