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under Sir Thomas Graham, and after their defeat, the French were driven to retreat, encumbered with the spoil of a nation, by the bad and mountainous road to Pampeluna. It was this sole line of retreat, choked, crowded, and insufficient, which made the battle so decisive without the aid of cavalry. But look at Napoleon's battles. How was Austerlitz, Jena, or Wagram won? It was his invariable practice to mass his heavy cavalry under Murat, and after shaking the enemy with his other arms, overwhelm them with this one. Any one who has read the history of the campaign in the Netherlands in 1815, will see and acknowledge its use. The charge of the union brigade at Waterloo destroyed, as a military body, 8,000 men, and rendered forty guns useless. Frederick the Great had a magnificent cavalry, and used it most freely. Cæsar won Pharsalia with his cavalry, and Alexander won all his battles with his "companions." Ancient and modern history alike points out the use and indispensable necessity of this arm in war; but it is a fact beyond dispute that no British army has ever a proper proportion of cavalry, and that in a nation which can produce more good riders than any country in Europe. No country in the world is more suitable to the action of cavalry than the plains of Hindoostan, and nowhere is it easier for a beaten army to escape in every direction; the country is level and open, and the only way to make success decisive is to be found in that arm, which can follow with rapidity, without fatigue or disorder. It is unnecessary for us to point out the advantages of decisive success in all our wars in Asia. Anything short of it with these people is no success at all. Promptness and vigour are every thing, and that is scarcely to be accomplished here in war, without the aid of an European cavalry force. The native light horse is as necessary as the other. We propose that they should be the same in every respect as the present irregular cavalry, but we reject the name, "irregular," as unsuited to a force which is part and parcel of a regular army. There is much duty for light horse in India, which is suited to natives only. Experience has proved this description of force both cheap and efficient. We therefore propose to retain it, extending the number of regiments to twenty, and increasing the pay of a duffadar from rupees twenty-eight to thirty, and that of a sowar, from rupees twenty to twenty-five. This measure is in our opinion advisable, as all officers now attached to this force agree in declaring twenty rupees a month to be too little for a sowar. Justice cannot be done to the regiment without trenching on the means of the men till debt ensues, and then, though appearances may be kept for a time, in the end the regiment cannot be a good one.

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This force would not be used, as a rule, in charging bodies of men, but purely as light horse, in keeping open communications, clearing roads, intercepting the enemy's orderlies and despatches, feeling the way of the army, and whirling down on a mass of fugitives broken and disorganized by the European cavalry. In dours against robbers, or on the frontier, they would be invaluable. In short, it is nonsense to write what every body knows : we forget we are addressing an Indian public. One word about the command of these corps. There is no branch of the service in which the personal character of an officer is of more importance, and only those adapted to it should be there. A man may be a clever man, nay, even a good soldier, yet unsuited to the light horse. All the officers ought to be good, or at least bold riders; if they are not, they should be turned out; and a man with dash about him should be always preferred. Should an officer be himself a man of prowess, who can beat his own men at their own exercises, and who is ready to head any scheme of whatever hazard, his influence will be so much the greater for this sort of command. Men of the school of Mayne, Holmes, and Chamberlain, are the men for this force, and an effort should be made to select them. In any case those wanting should be made to leave. Can anything be more lamentable than to see a dashing horseman who cannot ride, bestriding a horse that cannot go, and hugging himself with the prospect of a command some day? For such men the sowars can but have an utter contempt, and are in consequence not very likely to be of much use when the tussle comes.

INFANTRY.-This branch of the service before the mutinies consisted of fifteen regiments H. M.'s foot, three of Company's European infantry, and seventy-four native infantry regiments. The Ghoorka corps, the Kelat-i-Ghilzie regiments, and the regiments of Loodhianah and Ferozepore, are reckoned regiments of the line, but as they are not officered by their own officers, we do not mean to include them, premising that Government might absorb them. into the new army, or keep them as they are, as may be most convenient, without in any way hurting this scheme. In place of this, we would propose to have seventeen regiments H. M.'s foot, fifteen regiments H. C.'s European infantry, and twenty-five regiments of native regular light infantry, officered as European corps. In this scheme, it is observed, first,-that an increase of two of H. M.'s regiments of foot, is required. This we think the Court of Directors could have no difficulty in arranging. Secondly, that an increase of twelve regiments of Company's European infantry is proposed. To officer these would be required the officers of twenty-four native regiments now existing.

The twenty-five regiments of native infantry, officered as Europeans, would require the officers of the fifty remaining regiments. Hence no difficulty would arise, as far as the European officers are concerned. Of the new European regiments, we have nothing to say. Their model exists in the service, and we are not aware at present of any means of materially improving it. There is one thing that we may mention, and that is the utter unsuitability of their head dress in this country. It is European and French, and quite unfit for India. In the course of this paper, we had no intention of touching upon dress; but when, as in the late operations, we see men struck down right and left by the sun, a fate from which we believe a proper head dress would have saved them, we feel bound to protest. A helmet of cork or felt, which would protect the head from the sun, down as far as the junction of the neck and shoulders, is, we think, the best thing for Europeans. For natives we think the more the dress is assimilated to their own the better. Here we might learn from France, and dress them à la Zouave, a costume that would suit them admirably, and give them for a head dress their own useful and elegant turbans. Officers and men should be dressed alike of course.

We now come to consider the proposed new native regiments, and as it is here we introduce as it were a new element into the service, we must enter into the subject a little at large. We propose that each regiment of native light infantry shall consist of two colonels, two lieut.-colonels, two majors, fourteen captains, twenty-two lieutenants, and ten ensigns, one surgeon or assistant-surgeon, two native doctors, one sergeant major, one quarter-master sergeant, twenty European sergeants, twenty drummers or buglers, fifty havildars, fifty naiks, and 800 sepoys; that these regiments should be drilled and disciplined precisely as an European corps; that the barrack system be introduced, and the daily orderly room. A small bungalow should be erected at the quarter guard for the European officer of the day, where he would remain during his tour. As the regiments would be light infantry, of course, greater attention would be paid to their particular drill. It will be observed there are no native officers. Our remarks on the subject of their claims upon Government are found under the head of artillery. Their claims are nothing. They have thrown aside pensions, pay, rank, consideration, and honesty-for treachery, robbery, and murder. They must abide by their bargain. It is not expedient to reinstate them, and therefore they should not be reinstated. Except on this principle, there is no reason resting on the slightest foundation why they should be taken back into the service, and as this SEPT., 1857.

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reason or principle is wanting, let us have none of them at all. The substitution of the twenty sergeants for these native officers would be of excellent effect. One end of the sepoy's barracks, or a small house in rear, could be built for them, and they would be charged with the constant superintendence of the men in quarters. When the regiment was out, they would be most valuable assistants to the officers in the supernumerary ranks. The twenty-five new regiments, we would propose, should be drawn complete and entire from different provinces. Sikhs, Goorkhas, Poorbeahs, Bundelahs, Jats, and men from Behar, should all be taken. If ten battalions of the first named were among them, it would be well. They should all be generalservice corps across sea. Of the disarmed regiments men might be taken on their agreement to take the new oath-otherwise give them their congè. The Sikhs of these regiments, it would be well to collect and form new Sikh regiments of, and the Poorbeas might come into our terms, or leave it alone. The regiments however ought not to be mixed. A corps of Sikhs should consist of Sikhs only. Of Ghoorkas the same. Perhaps a treaty might be made with Nepaul, permitting us to recruit a certain number of men annually in her territory. The money they would bring in, would be certainly beneficial to that state.

The great drawback to the efficiency of the late native army was the small influence possessed by the officers. This was in most cases absolutely nothing. Complaining as they have done of the way they were treated in this respect, the European officers had but a faint idea how very little influence they had. The massacres however opened their eyes and those of every body else. The fact is proclaimed in blood that the Government of this country cannot govern the army by means of regulations, and head quarters only. The power of the officers brought into actual contact with the men, must be greatly enlarged. The native soldier must feel that the European officer is the master of his fate, and that he has no appeal against him. The farce of a native court martial is now, we trust, buried for ever. Let the commanding officer have the power of summarily dismissing a man from the service. It will not do to say, this may be abused. If the brigadier and general do their duty, and really look into the affairs of the regiments under their command, no officer commanding a regiment can be capricious or unjust with impunity. If he is, let him lose his command; and with selected officers, and a report of all such transactions made, not for revision of the sentence, but for judgment on the competency of the commanding officer, there is little fear but that the soldier will meet with justice in

the long run. What applies to the commander of a regiment applies to the commander of a company. It is the proud boast, but the true one, of au Englishman, that the more you trust him, the better does his character show. That is true of the large majority, and it is only for the majority that humanity can devise a rule. It is the mistrust the Government has shown of its officers, which has first rendered them careless of their duties, and subsequently, by relieving them in their youth of all responsibility, rendered many of them afterwards unfit for such an emergency as has just occurred. Why have the Punjab men shown so well? Simply because as young men the burden of responsibility was thrown upon them, they were brought up in official life to rely upon themselves, they were estimated by what they were worth, and the day of trial was to them but what they were accustomed to, certainly intensified; but to others it was as novel as a journey to the moon.

We have before stated that we trust never to hear more of a native court martial, except under peculiar circumstances in a regiment of light horse or irregular cavalry, whichever may be the designation. The native court martial was trial by the superintending officer in the majority of cases; and when the native officers did interfere, it was generally to award. some very inadequate punishment to an offence. With the disappearance of the native officer his functions go also, and the European officer should in all cases try a man. In the lines of every native regiment, there should be a congee-house with solitary cells. This mode of punishment, we speak from experience, has the very best effect. Although we would abolish the native court martial, we are strongly of opinion that a native tribunal should exist for the settlement of claims for debt against sepoys. We know that many officers in this matter differ from us, and recommend the total abolition of all means of recovering debt, as the best way of preventing it. We have however very closely observed this matter, have had large experience in dealing with it, and we are convinced such a tribunal is desirable, and further, that it should be a native one. have seen the native court of requests, composed of European officers out of the Company's territories, and of native officers. in them, and we have no hesitation, after considerable experience of both, to pronounce the native court the better tribunal of the two, for the purpose for which it is intended.

We

In connection with this we would discuss the question of bazars, and think we can give cogent reasons for the course we propose. The first thing we would urge is the abolition of sudder bazars. The sudder bazar goes nowhere. It is stationary, and in conse

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