Success is, indeed, very different in literature from what it is in life. In the former, it must depend upon ourselves; in the latter, it may depend upon things. Besides, vice is often substituted for wisdom, and sycophancy and treachery rendered more effectual than talent. An artful man regards the end more than the means; while a person of ability, judging of mankind by himself, imagines that merit is all that is neccessary to acquire consideration, and values himself upon his integrity and independence. A man of sense naturally perceives the beauty of noble and praise-worthy actions; and genius is generally accompanied by an inflexible pride of sentiment, and propensity to integrity, and honourable conduct. While, likewise, mediocrity is the parent of cunning- where there are strong ideas, there are commonly keen feelings, and ungovernable impulses. Mental vigour, therefore, often leads to actions inconsistent with the ordinary progress of things. The common business of life, indeed, is chiefly managed by habit and imitation, and a talent for it is often the emblem of a small mind. The great employment of mankind is to live. Industry will, therefore, in ordinary pursuits, always be more valued than capacity. But, perhaps, rank and riches are oftener determined by the circumstance of birth, than by any extraordinary exertion, or ability. Even virtue, which is much more valuable than either power or riches, cannot confer greatness on any one; and it is a misapplication of terms to bestow the appellation of great upon a person entitled only to that of good † Virtue is merely a habit of the mind, or a species of education which is useful to mankind. Virtue, therefore, can display no extent of thought, or intricacy of ideas. Men are prone to flatter each other for qualities which are useful or pleasing, and hence arises their profusion of commendation to those who are virtuous. But the natural force of the mind cannot be increased by virtue, nor diminished by vice-affected by praise nor dis * What are, indeed, the boasted dissimulation and art of politicians, but falsehood, and dishonesty! † Pope says-" an honest man is the noblest work of God." This has a fine sound, but nothing more. praise. Human greatness is always distinct from external circumstances, and can neither be acquired nor lost by the concurrence of things. In the same class of error, may be included reputation derived from inflated sentiment, such as the saying of Alexander that he would contend at the Olympic games, if kings were his competitors;* which is an evidence merely of pride, or of a person's own opinion of his own importance. What is called magnanimity, or the virtue of bearing evils or forgiving injuries, is also often confounded with intellect. Passions and habits ought, however, to be distinguished from judgment, Greatness of mind consists only in the superior power of discrimination-not in admiring or despising, or in performing moral duties, of which all men are equally capable. Nothing is, indeed, truly important in human nature but mental ability. By the original force of mind which men derive from nature, is their future greatness entirely determined; for what men do not accomplish by the power of their minds, must be ascribed to some foreign quality from which they can claim no merit. On the same native superiority, depends, in the first instance, the extent of that improvement which is not the least remarkable peculiarity of the human understanding, and which serves chiefly to distinguish mankind from the lower ranks of the creation. For, after the means of information which the senses furnish are exhausted, the human mind remains capable of increasing its knowledge by its own powers, as long as it continues to be exercised. The expansion of the intellect is, indeed, liable to be affected by those casualties which influence its exertion; and minds are rendered different not less by education than by nature. Yet circumstances never actually affect the original degree of ability. As all education is but information concerning the state of things, they can only assist or retard its deve By which he evidently meant to contend in rank and not in skill, and to oppose adventitious qualities to personal. lopment. Before, however, entering on the subject of educa. tion, and the various circumstances which affect mental attainment, it may be proper to say something on the nature of external objects, and those qualities which occasion intellectual exertion, or difficulty. CHAPTER II. One object or quality conceived with the same ease as another. ONE object, or a single quality, is not more difficult of conception than another. The idea of a mountain, and the idea of a grain of sand, are conceived with equal ease. The mind is affected only by the relation of qualities. Continuity and uniformity are indifferent to it. It is not magnitude, but number-the separation and division of things, which engages its attention, and furnishes the materiais of its operation. All our ideas are merely intellectual properties, called into exercise by the suggestion of external objects. They are all equally abstracted from matter, and occupy, it may for the sake of illustration be said, the same portion of the mind. All subjects are, therefore, more or less difficult of comprehenson, merely as they contain a greater or less number of different parts, and furnish many or few ideas; and all things possess complexity only as they possess variety. Thus, in viewing an extensive building, it is not the same to the mind as to the eye. The operation of the eye may be affected by the physical circumstances of vision, such as light or shade, by intervening objects, or by the extent of the fabric. But the difficulty of the mind must be the labour of selecting. *Thus, mathematics are, strictly, a science of relation. They have been called the science of quantity and number; but a more correct definition, would be- the science of relation of quantities. Absolute quantity is never regarded, and absolute mensuration of quantity can never be attained. One individual is merely measured by, or compared with, another. For if we ask, what is a yard-we are told, it is equal to so many feet-- a foot? equal to so many inches-an inch? equal to so many barley corns; and so on, ad infinitum. If we ask-what is four? equal to twice two-two? equal to twice one--one? an individual of any magnitude, or quantity; so that relation, and nothing but relation, is ever in view. its various parts, of removing their confusion, and arranging them according to their natural dependance upon each other. However extensive any object may be, or however far any landscape may spread, or edifice extend, it may still be easy of conception; for if all its parts be the same, they are but as one part; and without diversity, there can be no discrimi-. nation.* What is great in nature is not always difficult to the mind. Notwithstanding the suffrage of Longinus, there appears no uncommon degree of talent at least, whatever there may be of sublimity, in the passage: "Far as a shepherd from some point on high, Nor in his attempt to surpass it, when he says-" and who, considering the superlative magnificence of this thought, would not, with good reason, cry out, that, if the steeds of the Deity were to take a second leap, the world itself would want room for it!" + Physical and moral importance are very different from intellectual. Physical consists in quantity; moral, in event; and intellectual, in number. Thus, with regard to physical importance, a tree contains matter equal to many shrubs; a mountain, equal to many trees; and a kingdom, equal to many mountains. Again, with regard to moral importance, every event with which we are connected, or every change of ob The difference of magnitudes, indeed, is relation, and creates new objects, or number, and affords comparisons and ideas; but magnitude is then only a mean. Difference of quality, also, acts powerfully in multiplying number: and it is, therefore, more difficult to compare things of different qualities, than of the same quality. Thus, it is easier to compare magnitude with magnitude, than with other physical qualities; and easier to compare one set of physical qualities with another, than physical with mental. Nothing is so cheap and vulgar as descriptions of extension, or magnitude. To such contentions, as that between Longinus and Homer, there is no end. However great any object may be, it is easy to conceive a greater, by simply adding to it. sensation or an idea, and And with regard to intel jects which we perceive, creates a less or more of pleasure or pain. lectual importance, if each object or quality furnishes only one idea, it is obvious, as has been already said, that the number of ideas must depend upon the number of objects or qualities. It is farther to be remarked that things may be both physi. cally and morally important without being intellectually important, that is an object may be extensive, or an event vio lent, without being complex. Physical importance, indeed, often regulates moral importance. Thus, an earthquake, such as that of Lisbon, would produce more of human misery than the explosion of a barrel of gunpowder; and a revolution in a mighty state, would have a greater influence on the happiness of mankind than a quarrel in a petty village. But it is obvious, that, neither physical, nor moral importance, regulates intellectual. The view which the mind takes of objects is, however, sometimes arbitrary or accidental. It may either view many things as one, or one thing as many. Thus, an army may be considered in whole, or with relation to the individuals composing it; but the difficulty of conception will always be in proportion to the number, or chain of ideas. Sometimes the reduction of any set of ideas to a single idea, is accomplished by a long process of reasoning. Simplification or generalization is, in fact, the object of all science, and one of the modes in which genius is best displayed; but although it may be difficult to reach a conclusion, it is, when attained, easily understood. Acuteness, also, partakes of the nature of simplification, depending upon an extensive comparison. But as far as single objects or qualities are presented to the ind, no difference, as to the difficulty of their conception, can arise from the difference of their physical or moral dignity or meanness. There is, in fact, no quality in ideas, which dignifies one more than another. Thus, the distinction of high and low wit, arises merely from confounding material qualities with mental; for, wit is the same, on every subject, in proportion as it discovers excellence of thought. Such a distinction be |