present, some of its features, we may embody in the following proposition so much of it as it is necessary for us to consider at this stage of our discussion, viz., The ultimate, only and alone test of the canonicity of a writing as a whole, or any part thereof, is that testimony which the Holy Spirit may inwardly deliver to its inspiration. That this is the only correct interpretation of this paragraph is manifest, first, from the connection in which it occurs. The object of the statement as a whole is professedly to lay down principles for the determination of the canon of Scripture. This being true, we have but three alternatives among which to choose: either (a,) the writer forgot the very thing he started out to do, and has laid down no test, which may be dismissed; or (b,) the test laid down is complex and not simple, which, as we will see, is excluded by other statements; or (c,) the test is simple, and consists in the single principle just announced. That the last is the true and only interpretation is manifest, in the second place, from what is said on this point in other connections. Let the following, from among other statements that might be quoted, serve as an illustration.

Dr. Archibald Alexander, with his usual sobriety and discrimination, says: "It is certain that the influence of the Holy Spirit is necessary to produce a true faith in the word of God; but to make this the only criterion by which to judge of the canonical authority of a book is certainly liable to strong objections." Upon 1 this the following comment is made by the writer whose test of canonicity we are examining: "In this passage Dr. Alexander throws himself against the Gallican Confession, as he acknowledges; but he probably did not realize that he was going against the unanimous testimony of the Reformed Confessions, the Westminster standards, and the entire body of Continental Protestants and British Puritans; and certainly he did not apprehend the peril of his departure from the fundamental principle of the Reformation." Now, admitting the justice of the concessions so generously made here to Dr. Alexander's ignorance, and trying to preserve due composure under the alarming tone of bravado which Canon of the Old and New Testaments, pp. 114-116, cited in Whither, p. 78.

2 Whither, p. 78.

pervades this passage, you will observe that this language is equivalent to a strong affirmation that "the only criterion by which to judge of the canonical authority of a book" is the testimony of the Holy Spirit to its inspiration.

We have now passed under a careful review the several parts of this theory. If our examination has been prolonged, it has been due to the character of the witness with whom we have had to deal. He has shown himself to be an apparently reluctant witness. A close cross-examination has been necessary, therefore, to compel him to lay aside his reluctance and to testify to the real nature of his theory. If the attempt has been successful, two considerations will go far to compensate us for the time it has taken: First, We may feel sure that our view of the theory is correct, inasmuch as it has been derived from the statements of one of its advocates; and, second, We need not tarry long upon its refutation, for this is one of those cases where a clear statement of a theory is almost equivalent to a refutation of it.

Our examination, then, has shown that the leading features of this theory may be reduced to three. Of these two are negative in character, and one positive. The negative features may be thus stated:

1. No kind or amount of human testimony can establish the canonicity of a writing.

2. The inspiration of a writing would not be established even if it should be proven to be the official production of an inspired

man.

The positive thus: The ultimate, only and alone test of the canonicity of a writing, or of any part of it, is the testimony of the Holy Spirit to its inspiration; which testimony is delivered in the heart of the believer.

The first stricture which I have to offer upon this theory is, that, let its advocates deny and attempt to disguise the fact as they may, it is nevertheless true that this doctrine of canonicity is liable to all the objections of mysticism, and, like mysticism, must sooner or later lead to fanaticism. It is simply another illustration of the saying that extremes meet. Here we have rationalisin run to seed in irrationalism. Let us see. What is the evidence

of canonicity upon which we are invited to repose our faith? Is it not, after all that can be said, simply and solely a subjective impression produced upon the mind of the inquirer? This subjective impression, it is true, purports to be from the Holy Spirit. But what is there to certify the inquirer that he is not the dupe of a heated or disordered fancy, or, worse still, of a wicked spirit? It may be said that the Holy Spirit is just as able to assure indi viduals now that he is speaking to them as he was to do the same in the case of apostles and prophets. This is granted. But how did he assure apostles and prophets that he spoke to and by them? Was not the internal voice invariably confirmed and corroborated by some external sign? Moses first sees the bush burning without being consumed, hears an audible voice, witnesses a number of miracles, and then, and not until then, he goes to Israel and to Pharaoh, and says, "Thus saith the Lord." Paul speaks of the signs of an apostle. These were doubtless signs to the apostle himself as much as to others. It seems perfectly safe to say that in every case where the Holy Spirit spoke, in this special way, to one or by one, his voice was either preceded, accompanied or followed by miraculous evidence addressed to the senses. It seems safe to say, that wherever communication is opened de novo between God and a man there is a necessity for miracles. As soon as we come into possession of God's written word this necessity in a manner ceases; for in the word itself we have the safeguard we need. By it we can try the spirits whether they be of God. It may be granted, then, that the Spirit who gave the word is able to bear such testimony to it as his word as will leave no shadow of doubt upon the mind. The question is not what the Spirit can do, but what he does. It would be preposterous to assert that, in addition to witnessing to the word in the heart, he works miracles in order to assure men of the canonicity of this, that or the other book of Scripture. But without these miracles, how can men be assured that they are not following an ignis fatuus? Let us suppose that some one has deposited five thousand dollars in bank to the credit of Mr. A. B., an individual not personally known to any of the officials of the bank. Shortly after it has been deposited, in steps a man, who draws a check in these terms: 'Pay to self or

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order," and signs it "A. B." He steps up to the desk and passes his paper over to the cashier. The cashier, of course, will wish the signature identified. Suppose, now, the man who has just drawn the check says, "I will identify it." Would not the cashier very promptly respond, "But, my dear sir, who will identify you?" We are told by the advocates of this theory that the Spirit of God will identify his own writings. But, we make bold to ask, who will identify the one claiming to be the Spirit of God? Reason demands that when we have so much at stake we should only act under the protection of every possible safeguard. The Scriptures recognize and ratify this demand; but the theory we are considering utterly ignores it. To all intents and purposes it makes the whole Bible, and each part of it, a new revelation to each individual. The authority of this stupendous revelation rests solely upon a subjective impression, for the Holy Spirit no longer accompanies the word with "signs and wonders following." The fruit of such pernicious doctrine it is easy to see.

It may be proper to add at this point, that the writer is not alone in seeing the virus of mysticism in this theory. Long ago the venerable Dr. Archibald Alexander uttered his warning against even that modified form of the theory which appears in the Gallican Confession, and based that warning upon the inherent tendency of the theory to the errors of mysticism. Later, this is the view of the theory which has arrested the attention of the clear and vigorous mind of Francis L. Patton, president of Princeton College, who says of it: "It does not tend in the slightest degree to reconcile us to these opinions to say that the Reformers entertained them. It would not be strange if, in their opposition to the claims of the church of Rome, they went to the opposite extreme and were in danger of falling into the errors of the mystics."

It has been alleged, however, that the theory is clearly distinguished from mysticism and guarded against error from that quarter by the fact that the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit is delivered "by and with the particular writing or part of writing" which happens to be under investigation.

(a.) My first comment upon this position is, that its plausibility

lies wholly in the fact that the language used is similar in sound to language used in the Confession of Faith, in a materially different connection and with a totally different sense. The advocates of this theory will find that the mere form of sound words will fail to hide its nakedness and ugliness from thoughtful minds.

(b.) My next comment is, that the terms used, when viewed in the connection in which they are used, are confused and confusing. They convey no very distinct idea of any kind. Let it be remembered that the question to be decided is: Is this particular writing inspired? And we are told that the Spirit establishes its inspiration by testifying "by and with" the writing itself. But if the writing is the channel through which the testimony of the Spirit is delivered, then surely it would seem to be necessary in some way to connect the channel through which the testimony comes with the source from which the testimony is said to proceed. If A. B., being unable to attend court, sends a written deposition, before it can be received in evidence the court must be certified that it proceeds from A. B. If it be said that A. B. is surely competent to certify that a certain document proceeded from him as its author, this is granted. But observe, this implies that A. B. himself is present and has been duly identified. If so, then the question might arise, why testify by and with the writing when he is on hand to speak for himself to all points mentioned in the document? Moreover, let it be carefully observed that in this case we would not have two independent converging mutually corroborative lines of testimony resulting in cumulative evidence, but a mere repetition of testimony.

(c.) But we are told, by way of explaining the terms, that "It is one thing to say that the Spirit teacheth us by the Scripture, and another thing to pretend the Spirit's teaching besides, beyond, or contrary to the Scripture; the one is a divine truth, the other is vile montanism."

Upon this I remark first, that it is difficult to see how the Spirit can teach us by the Scripture before we are in possession of the Scripture. The very core of our inquiry is, Is this writing Scripture? Until this is settled the Holy Spirit has no Scripture with which to teach us anything. In a word, the naked testimony